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INTRODUCTION
Corporate charitable giving is big business. Fundraisers estimate
that in 1992, U.S. corporations "contributed" $6 billion1 to qualified
charitable organizations.' Hardpressed for funds, qualified charities
actively seek and compete for corporate contributions.3 Fundraising
literature identifies corporate giving as the last great frontier of phi-
lanthropy." Marketing literature touts corporate giving as the latest
advertising and public relations technique. 5 Both camps proclaim
that corporate giving is good for business and extol the business ad-
vantages which flow from transfers to charity.6 In short, corporate
giving means "doing best by doing good."'
Legal scholarship ignores the way corporate giving is described,
justified, and expressed by those making the transfers (corporate
managers) and those receiving the transfers (fundraisers).' Instead,
1. 1993 GIVING USA: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1992 10
(Anne E. Kaplan, ed. 1993) [hereinafter GIVING]. For a discussion of charitable giving statistics,
see infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
2. This Article deals with corporate transfers to charitable organizations exempt from federal
income tax under section 501(c)(3) and qualified to receive tax-deductible contributions under
section 170 of t n er oet 1 T, as amend Unless otherwise noted, all section
references refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the regulations thereun-
der. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (describing in more detail the requirements for
qualification and the general types of organizations which so qualify).
3. Fundraising literature is replete with helpful suggestions of how to secure corporate contribu-
tions. See infra notes 300-08 and accompanying text (discussing the fundraising literature).
4. As used throughout this Article, the term "marketing and fundraising literature" refers to a
broad range of texts discussing the practice of corporate giving. Generally, the fundraising litera-
ture is directed to charities and offers advice concerning how to attract corporate funding. The
most influential trade journal is The Chronicle of Philanthropy, a biweekly newspaper reporting
on issues of interest to charitable organizations. Corporate giving is a popular topic. Marketing
literature is directed toward corporate managers. Tips on corporate giving can be found in trade
journals for various industries as well as in advertising journals. Both perspectives (how to attract
corporate transfers versus how to make corporate transfers) discuss the business benefits associ-
ated with corporate giving.
5. See infra notes 273-332 and accompanying text (discussing the publicity benefits of corpo-
rate giving).
6. See infra notes 300-318 and accompanying text (discussing the perceived business benefits
associated with corporate transfers to charity).
7. This phrase is the title of a particularly outspoken text written by two fundraising consul-
tants who specialize in arranging corporate sponsorship programs. RICHARD STECKEL & ROBIN
SIMONS. DOING BEST BY DOING GOOD (1992).
8. This Article refers to two general classes of individuals: corporate managers and fundraisers.
The term corporate managers refers to corporate employees (they may or may not be shareholders
in the corporation). Corporate managers vary considerably in rank and authority. They include
corporate officers as well as public relations and corporate giving executives. Fundraisers are em-
ployed by the charitable organization to attract corporate (and individual or foundation) financial
support. A third group of players consists of independent agents. Those retained by corporations
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it presents the widespread practice of "corporate giving" as an ap-
parent paradox: why would corporations give away $6 billion in as-
sets each year? It then typically analyzes this practice in terms of
the theory of corporate purpose and federal tax policy.9 Both ap-
proaches fail because they misapprehend the behavior they purport
to explain. Both assume that the distinguishing feature of corporate
giving is the absence of a quid pro quo; the absence of an expected
commensurate benefit. Yet, this assumption is at odds with the con-
temporary understanding of corporate giving. Marketing and fun-
draising literature describes corporate giving in terms of "enlight-
ened self-interest,"10 making it clear that a corporate transfer to
charity is "not altruistic; it is intensely self-interested."' 1 Such
transfers are made with the expectation of receiving a commensu-
rate benefit in return.' 2 The anticipated benefit ranges from immedi-
ate advertising and marketing services to long-term public relations
and goodwill advantages."3
Legal scholarship, however, posits disinterested corporate giving
are advertising and marketing specialists who specialize in developing advertising or marketing
programs centered on transfers to charitable organizations. Individuals retained by charitable or-
ganizations are typically referred to as fundraising consultants, some of whom may charge a fee
based on a percentage of the funds they raise on behalf of the organization. See, e.g., id. at 260-61
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of using consultants).
9. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992) (discussing the corporate theory approach); see also, E.C. Lash-
brooke, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section 170 and the Great Corporate Giveaway, 22 PAC. L. J.
221 (1991) (discussing a more tax-centered approach).
10. See infra note 149 (explaining that "enlightened self-interest" was coined by a witness in
the landmark charitable giving case of A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)).
The case established the propriety of corporate transfers to charity, thereby resolving any linger-
ing concern that such transfers were ultra vires. Id. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text
(discussing A.P. Smith).
11. Peter D. Hall, Business Giving & Social Investment in the U.S. in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING:
STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 221, 241 (Richard Magat ed., 1989) [hereinafter Hall, Busi-
ness Giving].
12. Part 11 examines the practice of corporate giving as explained by corporate managers and
fundraisers. Both groups detail the very tangible benefits that purportedly inure to a corporate
donor. See infra notes 273-487 and accompanying text (discussing the many explanations for
corporate giving). For example, DOING BEST BY DOING GOOD advised, "When corporations rub
shoulders with nonprofits, something nice happens: the image of the nonprofit rubs off on the
corporation. Corporations can take advantage of this by sidling up to nonprofits that have charac-
teristics that they want for their own." STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 15.
13. As discussed in Part II, this Article divides the perceived benefits into three general catego-
ries: advertising and marketing services, public relations efforts designed to enhance corporate
goodwill, and long-term investments in future markets and future employees. The distinguishing
feature among the three categories is how directly the corporation realizes the benefit. See infra
notes 333-444 and accompanying text (discussing the three catagories of perceived benefits associ-
ated with corporate giving).
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- giving that is separate and distinct from all other, necessarily,
self-interested corporate transfers.14 This either/or construction of
corporate giving is the unstated starting point for both the corporate
theory or the tax policy approach analysis of corporate giving.
Under the corporate theory approach, corporate giving is mea-
sured against a particular theory of corporate purpose, such as profit
maximization or corporate social responsibility.15 If the purpose of
the corporation is to maximize shareholder profit and gain,16 then
corporate giving represents a misuse of corporate funds. The profit
maximization view of corporate purpose explains disinterested cor-
porate giving as either the result of a misguided belief in corporate
social responsibility, 7 or an attempt by corporate managers to fur-
ther their class interests.' 8 On the other hand, if the purpose of the
corporation includes the advancement of broader societal interests,' 9
then corporate giving is not only desirable, it is necessary. This view
of the corporation points to judicial and legislative approval of cor-
porate giving as acceptance of the social responsibility model of cor-
porate purpose.2
The tax policy approach focuses on the incentive for corporate
transfers 21 to certain qualified charitable organizations 22 provided in
14. See infra notes 198-213 and accompanying text (discussing disinterested corporate giving).
15. Legal scholarship evaluates corporate giving in terms of profit maximization or social re-
sponsibility. Accordingly, this Article focuses on profit maximization and social responsibility the-
ories of corporate purpose. When the favorable federal tax treatment of corporate giving is ana-
lyzed historically it is clear that the tension between these divergent views of corporate purpose
was at the forefront of contemporary legal thought.
16. See infra notes 120-52 and accompanying text (comparing the profit maximization model
of corporate purpose to the social responsibility model).
17. See infra notes 120-52 and accompanying text (comparing the profit maximization model
of corporate purpose to the social responsibility model).
18. See infra notes 455-68 and accompanying text (discussing the use of corporate transfers to
charity as a form of "social currency" by corporate managers).
19. See infra notes 120-52 and accompanying text (comparing the social responsibility model of
corporate purpose to the profit maximization model).
20. See infra notes 153-76 and accompanying text (discussing the desirability of socially re-
sponsible corporations). Under such a model, the danger of abuse by corporate managers may
continue, but the underlying behavior is consistent with corporate purpose.
21. Beyond this simple encouragement, federal social policy constructed during the Reagan-
Bush administrations both advocated and affirmatively relied on corporate funding of charitable
activities. For example, President Bush's education reform initiative, the creation of the New
American Schools Development Corporation ("NASDC"), was dependent upon corporate fund-
ing. See infra notes 415-19 and accompanying text (discussing the NASDC). The Clinton admin-
istration has continued this reliance on corporate funding of charitable activities (i.e., voluntary
nontax revenue) in connection with its support the NASDC and its national service program. The
National and Community Service Trust Act requires the establishment of an independent Federal
corporation that will actively solicit corporate contributions. See National and Community Service
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the form of an income tax deduction under section 170 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code23 for "charitable contributions." 24 Only corporate
transfers to qualified charitable organizations made without the ex-
pectation of receiving a commensurate benefit qualify as a deducti-
ble "contribution or gift" under section 170.25 Other transfers to
charity may be deductible as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses under section 162.26 Thus, federal tax policy assumes that
there are two distinct types of corporate transfers to charity: one
advances the corporate goal of social responsibility (section 170 con-
tribution or gift), and the other furthers the goal of profit maximiza-
tion (section 162 ordinary and necessary business expenses).
The proponents of corporate giving eschew such polarized views
of corporate behavior. The articulated rationale for corporate giving
effectively merges the two classic expressions of corporate purpose:
profit maximization and social responsibility. Under the rubric of
"enlightened self-interest," when a corporation makes a transfer to
charity it advocates a model of corporate social responsibility, but it
articulates the goal of profit maximization. By expressing corporate
Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 103-82, 107 Stat. 785 (1993).
22. This article uses the terms "qualified organization," "charitable organization" and "char-
ity" interchangeably to mean organizations described under section 170(c) qualified to receive
tax-deductible contributions and exempt under section 501(c)(3) from income tax imposed on
income related to their exempt purpose. I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(3) (1988). Current IRS statis-
tics indicate that there are over 1,000,000 exempt organizations, 800,000 of which are qualified to
receive tax-deductible contributions. Although section 170(c) lists various types of qualified orga-
nizations, this Article focuses on "charitable" organizations specifically defined under section
170(c)(2). See infra note 184 (quoting § 170(c)(2)).
23. 1.R.C. § 170 (1988). The deduction reduces the after-tax cost of transfers to charity. The
following example illustrates this reduction. Assume that a corporation's top marginal tax rate is
35%, as provided in section 11 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Id.
§ il(b)(1)(D) (raising the top marginal rate of tax on corporate income from 34% to 35%).
Assume a corporation transfers $100x to a qualified charity. If the amount of the transfer is fully
deductible in the year of the transfer, the corporation 'saves' the $35x of tax that it otherwise
would have paid with respect to the $100x. The $100x transfer to charity only 'costs' the corpora-
tion $65x. Traditional tax policy analysis identifies this 'lost' $35x as a tax expenditure in the form
of foregone federal revenue. For an in depth discussion of the after-tax cost of corporate transfers
to charity, see infra notes 177-272 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the tax expenditure
theory, see infra notes 488-522 and accompanying text.
24. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1)(1988). See also infra note 182 (citing the relevant portions text of sec-
tion 170(a)(1)).
25. I.R. C. § 170(c)(1988). See also infra note 184 (citing the relevant portions of the text of
section 170(c)).
26. I.R.C. § 162 (1988). Section 162 provides a deduction for ordinary and necessary trade
and business expenses. See infra notes 225-37 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between the section 170 charitable contribution deduction and the section 162 business expense
deduction).
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giving in terms of the corporate bottom line, the paradox is seem-
ingly resolved, and a profit maximization critique of corporate giv-
ing is deflected. Corporations do not give away assets."' To the con-
trary, corporate giving consciously tries to capitalize on the goodwill
associated with social responsibility28 and to use such charitable
goodwill for corporate advantage. This commodification of charita-
ble goodwill is known in the advertising and marketing industry as
the "halo effect."29
The halo effect attaches to corporations that appear to give assets
away to charity. The belief that a corporation can (and should)
make disinterested transfers to charity has its origin in the social
responsibility model of corporate purpose.30 Although "social re-
sponsibility" is conspicuously absent from the marketing and fun-
draising literature, it is the stated rationale for the corporate chari-
table contribution deduction provisions under section 170,31 as
illustrated in the legislative history surrounding the enactment of
the corporate charitable deduction in 193532 and its 1981
amendments."
The historical context of the enactment of the corporate provi-
sions of section 170 may explain the disjunction between the stated
policy reasons for the deduction (i.e., encourage socially responsible
behavior by corporations) and the present conception and practice of
corporate giving (i.e., enlightened self-interest calculated to enhance
27. Corporations expect to receive a commensurate benefit in exchange for any transfer. See
infra notes 300-332 and accompanying text (discussing the expectations of corporate managers).
The commensurate benefit that corporations expect to receive is the result of the generally
favorable public perception of transfers to charity (and charitable organizations), known as the
"halo effect." See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text (discussing the "halo effect").
28. Consumer surveys indicate that perceived acts of social responsibility carry wide public
appeal and approval. See infra notes 300-08 and accompanying text (discussing marketing and
fundraising literature which shows that corporate giving enhances image and increases profits).
Despite this broad public appeal, the model of the socially responsible corporation has not with-
stood the criticisms of those who advance profit maximization as the only rational corporate goal.
See infra notes 120-23, 133-39 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly and judicial criticism
of the social responsibility model of corporate purpose).
29. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text (discussing the "halo effect").
30. See infra notes 124-26, 141-52 and accompanying text (discussing the social responsibility
model of corporate purpose).
31. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (discussing the 1935 enactment of the corpo-
rate charitable deduction).
32. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014 (adding subsection (r) to section
23 of the Revenue Act of 1934, thereby permitting a corporation to deduct charitable contribu-
tions to the extent of five percent of its income).
33. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(e)(4) (1988); see also infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the 1935 enactment of the corporate charitable deduction).
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profit maximization).
Congress enacted the corporate charitable deduction in 1935 dur-
ing a period of economic instability when the Federal government
significantly increased its involvement in the provision of social ser-
vices.34 On a practical level, it was in the best interest of the federal
government to encourage private philanthropy, and the government
actively solicited assistance from the private sector."8 The enactment
of the deduction provided an incentive for corporate transfers to
charity.36 The fact that the deduction applied to a corporate "contri-
bution or gift" added a charitable gloss to such transfers.
In legal scholarship, the debate between Professors Berle and
Dodd over the nature of corporate powers37 had transformed the
prevailing notion of corporate purpose and yielded a new concept of
the socially responsible corporation." This new concept of social re-
sponsibility added rhetorical force to the federal government's re-
quest for corporate support. Both the theory and the deduction
served to legitimize corporate transfers to charity that were declared
ultra vires under the laws of many states.3 9
The initial appearance of social responsibility in the federal tax
code40 may have been driven by the federal government's pragmatic
34. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (discussing the 1935 enactment of the corpo-
rate charitable deduction).
35. See, e.g., infra note 158 (discussing Congressional support for corporate generosity).
36. For a brief history of the enactment of the corporate charitable contribution deduction, see
infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
37. The result of the Berle-Dodd debate was the application of trust principles to corporate
powers, specifically that the powers of corporate managers or officers were fiduciary powers. The
disagreement between Professor Berle and Professor Dodd centered on the class of individuals (or
interests) to whom the corporate managers owed a fiduciary duty. Professor Berle proposed the
application of trust principles to corporate powers in order to address the divergence of corporate
control from ownership documented in his earlier study co-authored with Professor Means.
ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932). See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Berle's
profit maximization theory of corporate purpose). Professor Berle theorized that corporate manag-
ers held corporate powers in trust for the shareholders. Professor Dodd simply expanded this view
with the notion that corporate powers were held in trust not only for shareholders, but also for
broader societal interests. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing Professor
Dodd's social responsibility theory of corporate purpose).
38. See infra notes 153-76 and accompanying text (discussing the "socially responsible corpo-
rate citizen").
39. As discussed in Part I Section B, in 1935 corporate transfers to charity were considered
ultra vires and, therefore, void under the laws of many states. Legislation and judicial decisions
eventually authorized corporate transfers to charity. See infra notes 73-103 and accompanying
text (discussing legislative attitudes toward a deduction for corporate charitable contributions).
40. This historical context does not explain the continued prevalence of social responsibility
language in connection with the 1981 amendments. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text
[Vol. 44:1
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goal to attract corporate funding for social programs. This pragma-
tism not only explains the continued existence of a corporate chari-
table contribution deduction that is rooted in outdated theories of
corporate purpose,41 but perpetuates the belief that corporations
make disinterested transfers to charity.
The "socially responsible" behavior that the corporate section 170
deduction purports to encourage bears little resemblence to the "en-
lightened self-interest" that the deduction subsidizes. The effect of
this mischaracterization is twofold: (i) the deduction adds a charita-
ble gloss to transfers that corporate managers and the fundraisers
understand as a corporate "purchase of goodwill,"' 2 and (ii) the
stated policy reasons for the deduction misdirect any tax expendi-
ture analysis of corporate giving.'3
Corporate giving, as the natural expression of "enlightened self-
interest," is the antithesis of the type of transfer deemed deductible
as a charitable contribution under section 170. To qualify for the
deduction, a transfer must constitute a "contribution or gift,""" and
it must be "to or for the use of"' 5 an organization described in sec-
tion 170(c)."' Neither a common sense reading of the phrase "con-
tribution or gift" nor its present judicial interpretation encompasses
anything as calculated as "enlightened self-interest."' 7 Because cor-
porate giving is inherently self-interested, a corporate transfer to
charity cannot qualify as a "contribution or gift" under section 170.
This notwithstanding, each year corporations deduct billions of dol-
(discussing the corporate charitable contribution deduction provision).
41. Although the theory of social responsibility has not fared well over.the .years, the federal
government does remain very interested in encouraging corporate support of sial.programs, as
evidenced by the language of section 170. I.R.C. § 170 (1988). See infra notes 177-87 and ac-
companying text (discussing section 170).,
42. Even the Treasury Department agrees with the characterization of corporate transfers to
charity as the "purchase of goodwill." In connection with proposed regulations regarding the allo-
cation of corporate charitable contribution deductions against foreign source income under section
861, the Treasury Department unequivocally stated that corporate transfers to charity represented
a "purchase of goodwill" in the country in which they were used. See infra note 392.
43. For a discussion of the tax expenditure theory, see infra notes 488-522 and accompanying
text.
44. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988). For a detailed discussion of the statutory provisions of section 170,
see infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
45. 1.R.C. §170(c) (1988); see infra notes 182-224 accompanying text (discussing which trans-
fers qualify as charitable contributions for purposes of tax deduction).
46. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (discussiig the types of organizations which
qualify under section 170(c)).
47. Generally, the deductibility of a transfer as a charitable contribution under section 170 is
determined by the nature of the transfer and the status of the donee. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988).
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lars under section 170.48
The fact that the federal tax code purports to distinguish true
corporate giving from other business expenses49 reinforces the "halo
effect." One way to help untangle the misconceptions surrounding
corporate giving would be to repeal the corporate deduction provi-
sions of section 170. Such repeal would tarnish, if not remove, the
charitable halo under which corporations now actively trade.50
In the absence of the corporate charitable contribution deduction
most transfers to charity would be deductible under section 162 as
ordinary and necessary business expenses. 51 This ability to substitute
a section 162 deduction 52 (albeit imperfectly) 53 for a section 170 de-
duction satisfies unstated policy reasons for the continuation of the
deduction, such as the need to raise corporate nontax revenue to
fund certain charitable and/or governmental activities. If Congress
perceives a need to provide greater incentives for such transfers, it
should clearly articulate the need and address it without the charita-
ble gloss provided by locating the deduction within section 170.
The second effect of the mischaracterization of corporate trans-
48. For a discussion of IRS statistics on corporate giving, see infra notes 59-72.
49. To a large extent our contemporary understanding of charity is defined by reference to
organizations qualified to receive tax-deductible contributions under the applicable provisions of
the federal tax code. The influence of the federal tax code is so pervasive in the charitable arena
that legal scholars and economists consistently explain and analyze corporate giving in terms of its
favorable tax treatment. The "halo effect" is reinforced, and perhaps to some extent constructed,
by the very provision under which corporate transfers to charity are improperly characterized. See
infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (discussing the section 170 corporate charitable deduc-
tion provision).
50. As discussed in Part II, Section C, the "halo effect" may provide more than a simple mar-
keting advantage: it may represent an avenue through which corporations use "enlightened self-
interest" to obtain and exercise corporate (managerial) political, social, and economic power. See
infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text (discussing the "halo effect"); see also infra notes 141-
52 and accompanying text (discussing "enlightened self-interest").
51. Current federal tax law recognizes that certain transfers qualify under both sections 162
and 170. Section 162(b) provides that in such circumstances section 170 takes priority. This is to
prevent a taxpayer from avoiding the ceiling limitations imposed on charitable contributions.
I.R.C. § 162(b) (1988). Section 162 deductions are not subject to comparable limitations. See
infra notes 225-37 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between the section 170
corporate contribution deduction and the section 162 business expense deduction).
52. The substitution effect illustrates that the continued deductibility of corporate transfers to
charity does not represent a significant loss in federal revenue nor would its repeal significantly
increase federal revenue. See contra Lashbrooke, supra note 9, at 248 (advocating the repeal of
the corporate charitable deduction).
53. In certain instances, corporate transfers to charity are afforded more favorable tax treat-
ment than section 162 deductions. For example, transfers which qualify under section 170 are
immediately deductible and need not be capitalized. In addition, certain transfers of property are
subject to more favorable tax treatment if they are characterized as a section 170 contribution
rather than a section 162 business expense. See infra notes 225-37 accompanying text.
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fers to charity is a distortion of the tax expenditure analysis of the
federal budget. 4 In practice, corporate managers and fundraisers
agree that corporate transfers to charity represent a calculated
purchase of advertising services or goodwill. Thus, the budgeted tax
expenditure for corporate giving (i.e., the corporate charitable con-
tribution income tax deduction under section 170) subsidizes a cor-
porate "purchase of goodwill" - something very different from the
type of corporate transfer envisioned by the "contribution or gift"
requirement of section 170.11 Once a corporate transfer to charity is
recast as a corporate purchase of goodwill, a deduction for such
transfers becomes a normative adjustment and not a tax expendi-
ture.5" Although this conclusion may seem anticlimatic, it focuses
attention on the second federal tax subsidy that such transfers re-
ceive: the donee charity is exempt from federal income tax upon the
receipt of the transfer."' If a corporate transfer to charity is a
purchase of goodwill, then the transfer should represent unrelated
business income taxable to the donee charity. This raises many
questions for additional research and study. 8
This article examines and documents why corporations make
transfers to charity. Part I provides a historical background of cor-
porate giving, particularly the evolution of the theory of corporate
purpose and the gradual doctrinal acceptance of corporate giving. It
also describes the structure of the current federal income tax treat-
ment of corporate transfers to charitable organizations, including
the ability to "substitute" section 162 deductions for section 170 de-
ductions. Part II reviews the various explanations for corporate giv-
ing. At the outset, it rejects the prevailing tax-centered explanations
advanced by legal scholarship and econometric research. It then ex-
amines the current understanding of corporate giving, as expressed
54. For a discussion (and critique) of the traditional tax expenditure theory, see infra notes
488-522 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 188-224 and accompanying text (discussing the "contribution or gift"
requirement).
56. Obviously, this assumes that one accepts the basic premise of the tax expenditure theory
that certain deductions represent normative adjustments to the tax base. All other deduction,
credits and exclusions are tax expenditures representing an indirect federal subsidy.
57. This means that corporate transfers to charity characterized as "contributions" are not only
deductible to the corporation, but also are exempt from tax action when received by the donee
charity. Generally, a qualified charity is subject to federal income tax on business income that is
not substantially related to its charitable purpose (i.e., unrelated business income as defined under
section 511). See infra notes 508-11 and accompanying text.
58. For a discussion of the potential areas for future study, see infra notes 523-43 and accom-
panying text.
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in marketing and fundraising literature, and reveals a pervasive be-
lief that corporate giving is good for business. Central to this belief
is the commodification of charitable goodwill - the "halo effect."
This Part contrasts the federal income tax characterization of corpo-
rate transfers to charity with an in-depth discussion of three differ-
ent categories of corporate giving: (i) advertising and marketing ser-
vices, (ii) public relations, and (iii) investment in future markets
and future employees. Part II concludes with the caveat that conclu-
sions based on marketing and fundraising literature are incomplete
because they represent the articulated reasons of the proponents of
the behavior. As such, there may be alternative (and unspoken) ex-
planations for corporate transfers to charity, such as the ability of
corporations to exercise social and political power. Part III discusses
the tax expenditure theory of deductions and recasts the analysis of
the corporate charitable contribution deduction as an indirect fed-
eral subsidy for the corporate purchase of advertising or public rela-
tions services. Thus, Part III takes the corporate charitable deduc-
tion outside the realm of the tax expenditure budget, and sets the
stage for future research into the tax treatment of corporate funding
in the hands of the donee charity.
I. CORPORATE GIVING: ITS SCOPE, HISTORY, AND TAX
TREATMENT
A. Statistical Overview of Corporate Charitable Giving
Fundraisers estimate that corporations transferred $6 billion to
qualified charities in 1992."1 This figure does not include grants paid
by corporate charitable foundations, but it does include contribu-
tions from corporations to their foundations.6 0 In 1992, corporate
59. GIVING, supra note 1, at 10. The Annual Report is prepared annually by American Associ-
ation of Fund-Raising Counsel, Inc. and is based on reports from corporations themselves. The
most recent Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") statistics on charitable giving relate to 1989. Inter-
nal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income - 1989 Corporation Income Tax Returns. IRS figures
include only amounts reported as charitable contribution deductions on corporate federal income
tax returns. Given that corporations may make transfers to charity that they do not claim as a
charitable deduction, IRS statistics undercount the actual level of corporate transfers to charitable
organizations. See Hayden W. Smith, Corporations Are More Generous Than You Think, THE
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 22, 1991, at 37 (discussing the flaws in the IRS statistics).
60. In any discussion of corporate giving, it is important to understand the distinction between
direct corporate funding of charitable activities and distributions from corporate charitable foun-
dations. The latter are separate nonprofit corporate entities organized and operated for charitable
purposes. Corporate charitable foundations are exempt from federal income tax and eligible to
receive tax-deductible contributions. This distinction is often overlooked. For example, Professor
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charitable foundations made grants totaling $3.2 billion to support
various charitable projects."
Much to the disappointment of charities,6" the 1992 level of cor-
porate giving was less than the 1991 level. For the first time in
years, 3 the level of corporate giving did not keep pace with the rate
Green cited examples of grants made by corporate foundations rather than direct corporate giving
to illustrate the type of charitable endeavors funded by corporate transfers. Shelby D. Green,
Corporate Philanthropy and the Business Benefit: The Need for Clarity, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 239, 259-60 (1990) (urging uniformity in the rules governing corporate transfers to charity).
Although one could argue persuasively that corporate charitable foundations are indeed corporate
agents, such an argument requires a much more detailed analysis than is possible within the con-
text of this Article. This Article discusses only direct corporate transfers to charity, but as such
includes corporate transfers to charitable foundations.
61. GIVING, supra note 1, at 74. Corporate charitable foundations are subject to the private
foundations rules and are required to disburse a certain percentage of their assets annually for
charitable purposes in order to qualify for exemption and avoid excise taxes. IRC § 4701 (1988).
Generally, a 'private foundation' is a sub-category of exempt organizations. An organization is
classified as a private foundation if it is not "publicly supported (does not receive contributions
from a number of donors), it does not receive a substantial amount of its revenue from the per-
formance of its exempt function (e.g., hospital and nursing homes), and it is not closely-related to
a 'publicly-supported' organization." Classification as a private foundation is considered less-
favorable because private foundations are subject to a host of excise taxes, are subject to more
restrictive rules than other charities, and are subject to additional oversight of their activities. See
BRUCE R. HOPKINs, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION 429-611 (1987).
62. Smith, supra note 59, at 38 (discussing charities' responses to the apparent reduction in
corporate giving).
63. IRS statistics on corporate transfers to charity are not available for years after 1988. IRS
figures undercount the total corporate transfers to charity. See supra note 59. For this reason, as
well as the lack of recent IRS data, this article uses the estimates of corporate giving prepared by
fundraising associations. The American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel, Inc. estimates of
corporate charitable giving (in billions of 1992 dollars) as follows:
1980 ............... 4.31 1985 ............... 6.78
1981 ............... 4.81 1986 ............... 6.83
1982 ............... 5.31 1987 ............... 7.01
1983 ............... 5.73 1988 ............... 6.83
1984 ............... 6.41 1989 ............... 6.67
1990 ............... 6.42
1991 ............... 6.24
1992 .............. 6.000
GIVING.. supra note 1, at 16-17.
For purposes of comparison, the following IRS statistics note the amount of reported corporate
charitable contribution deductions (in billions of dollars):
1980 .............. 2.355 1985 .............. 4.472
1981 .............. 2.514 1986 .............. 5.179
1982 .............. 2.906 1987 .............. 4.980
1983 .............. 3.627 1988 .............. 4.893
1984 .............. 4.057 1989 .............. TBA
Hayden W. Smith, Corporate Giving Still Stalled. Inflation Outpaced Company Gifts for Third
Year, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 22, 1991, at 1, 10.
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of inflation.64 While corporate giving may be currently stalled at $6
billion, in prior years the amount of corporate transfers to charity
increased steadily.65 Until 1992, corporate transfers to charity in-
creased annually despite inconsistent trends in corporate pre-tax in-
come.66 Such increases occurred despite predictions by economists
that corporate giving would decline in response to the lowering of
corporate federal income tax rates by the 1986 Tax Reform Act.67
Fundraising literature identifies corporate giving as the last great
frontier of philanthropy."8 Seminars, pamphlets, and books offer
fundraisers helpful hints on how to lure corporate transfers.6 9 The
emphasis on corporate giving appears disproportionate when mea-
sured against the $101.83 billion that fundraisers estimate individu-
als gave to charitable organizations in 1992.70 However, it is corpo-
64. See Smith, supra note 59, at 38 (comparing the rate of corporate giving with the rate of
inflation).
65. An interesting anomaly is the increase in 1986, followed by a measurable decrease in 1987.
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the top marginal corporate tax rate decreased from 46% to
34%. In order to maximize the tax benefit of transfers to charity, fundraisers and tax planners
urged corporations to "prepay" future transfers by increasing 1986 transfers. In addition, a special
rule permits corporations to treat as paid in the prior tax year contributions paid in the current
tax year. See infra note 183.
66. Corporate pre-tax income (in billions of $):
1980 .............. 240.9 1987 .............. 287.9
1981 .............. 228.9 1988 .............. 347.5
1982 .............. 176.3 1989 .............. 342.9
1983 .............. 210.7 1990 .............. 355.4
1984 .............. 240.5 1991 .............. 334.7
1985 .............. 225.0 1992 .............. 371.6
1986 .............. 217.8
GIVING.. supra note 1, at 106.
67. As discussed in Section A of Part 11, Clotfelter concluded that "based on available
econometric evidence," the reduction in the top marginal corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34
percent and "the resulting increase in the net cost of making gifts will result in a modest decline
in corporate giving, on the order of 5 %." Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charita-
ble Giving, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS supra note 11, at 105,
115.
68. See infra notes 300-08 and accompanying text (discussing marketing and fundraising
literature)
69. See infra notes 290-93 and accompanying text (discussing Clotfelter's projections).
70. Individual charitable giving (in billions of dollars):
1980 .............. 40.71 1987 .............. 72.32
1981 .............. 45.99 1988 .............. 80.07
1982 .............. 47.63 1989 .............. 87.75
1983 .... ......... 52.06 1990 .............. 91.00
1984 .............. 54.46 1991 .............. 95.32
1985 .............. 58.66 1992 ............. 101.83
1986 .............. 67.63
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rate giving, accounting for only 4.8 % of total charitable giving71
which has captured the imagination of fundraisers.7
B. A Brief History of Corporate Giving and the Law
1. Corporate Giving and the Deduction
During the years before the enactment of the deduction, corpora-
tions made transfers to charity without any tax incentive, and in
many states, without legal authority. 3 When Congress enacted the
corporate charitable contribution deduction provisions, it was en-
couraging behavior that was ultra vires under state law. 4 Therefore,
individuals lobbying in favor of the deduction sought not only
favorable tax treatment but also a subtle legitimization of corporate
giving. The new legitimacy provided by the deduction was not lost
on legislators and judicial decisionmakers. 75 Eventually, all states
GIVING, supra note 1, at 20-21 (does not include the dollar value of volunteer labor).
71. Fundraisers estimate that total charitable giving in 1992 was $124.31 billion. The sources
were:
$(billions) % of total
Individuals 101.83 81.92
Bequests 8.15 6.56
Foundations 8.33 6.70
Corporations 6.00 4.83
TOTAL 124.31 100.0
Id. at 20-21.
Unlike individuals, corporations make almost no contributions to religious organizations. CHARLES
T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 173 (1985) (citing 1980 statis-
tics estimating that corporate giving to nonreligious organizations was "about a sixth the size of
individual giving [to nonreligious organizations]"). Consequently, corporate giving represents ap-
proximately 20% of secular charitable giving.
72. The federal government has also expressed interest in encouraging corporate funding of
charitable endeavors. See infra notes 415-19 and accompanying text (discussing the new reliance
of federal programs on corporate funding).
73. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text (discussing corporate giving prior to the en-
actment of the charitable deduction).
74. After World War I, many states passed legislation authorizing corporations to make gifts to
charity. Texas and New York were the first states to enact such legislation. Barry D. Karl, The
Evolution of Corporate Grantmaking In America, in THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS HAND-
BOOK 20, 28 (James P. Shannon, ed., 1991) ("Wartime legislation in the states of Texas and New
York permitted gifts by corporations. ... ). Writing in 1956, Richard Eells reported, "[t]hree-
fourths of the states and the Territory of Hawaii have adopted, in one form or another, such
permissive legislation." RICHARD EELLS, CORPORATION GIVING IN A FREE SOCIETY 17 (1956).
Eells also reported that the American Bar Association proposed an amendment to the Model
Corporation Act in 1950 authorizing corporations to make donations to charity. Id.
75. Later cases approved corporate contributions citing, inter alia, the strong public policy to
uphold (and encourage) such transfers as evidenced by the federal tax deduction. Green, supra
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and the District of Columbia passed legislation permitting corporate
contributions.76
(a) Corporate giving prior to the Revenue Act of 1935
Congressional testimony in support of a corporate deduction
pointed to World War I as the beginning of a widespread practice of
corporate giving.77 This view of the history of corporate giving ena-
bled the proponents of the corporate contribution deduction to ex-
plain its absence in the 1917 Revenue Act (i.e., there was no reason
to provide a deduction for behavior which did not exist).78 However,
this explanation ignored the then-existing pattern of corporate giv-
ing. For example, during the late nineteenth century, railroads made
transfers to Young Men's Christian Associations along the ex-
panding rail routes to provide needed housing for the railroad work-
ers. 79 In 1917, the year Congress enacted the individual deduction,8"
note 60, at 249-54.
76. In addition, the 1992 Proposed Final Draft of the Corporate Governance Project of the
American Law Institute provides that the primary purpose of the corporation is to 'enhance' cor-
porate profit and shareholder gain. Id. at 242. Section 2.01(c) of the Proposed Final Draft recog-
nizes that a corporation has the power to make 'reasonable' gifts. Id.
77. Congressional testimony presented a standardized version of the history of corporate giving.
For example, one witness explained:
Before the World War corporation contributions were an exceptional occurrence in
this country. They were so exceptional that the omission of their right of deduction in
the original income war taxes is not surprising. The war developed these contributions
immensely and community chests . . .have continued to secure these contributions
until they amounted to 22 percent of all contributions to community chests in 1929.
Revenue Act of 1934: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess, 136-37
(1933-34) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Allen T. Burns, executive director of the National
Association of Community Chests).
The following year, Frederic B. Kellogg submitted a similar statement to the House Ways and
Means Committee noting that "the practice of generous and wide-spread corporation contribu-
tions began in the war and continued ever since." Proposed Taxation of Individual and Corporate
Incomes, Inheritances, and Gifts: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1935) [hereinafter Proposed] (statement of Frederic R. Kellogg, President
of Community Chests and Councils, Inc.). See also Report on the Revenue Revision Act of 1927-
28: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th-70th Congs., 102 (1927) [here-
inafter Report] (statement of Congressman Carl R. Chindblom) ("As a matter of history you will
find that very little of this charity work was done by corporations before the war.").
78. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing the ultra vires nature of corporate
giving and the consequential lack of such activity).
79. F. EMERSON ANDREWS, CORPORATION GIVING 24 (1952). The early history of corporate
giving involved public projects which were directly related to the well-being of the corporation's
employees. See id. (discussing railroad transfers to the YMCA to benefit their employees); see
also Karl, supra note 74, at 25 (discussing Young Men's Christian Associations).
80. Congress enacted the individual charitable contribution deduction in 1917. War Revenue
Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300 (1917). The Tariff Act of 1913, did not include a
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corporate transfers to the American Red Cross alone totaled
$17,948,696."1 Despite this sizeable amount of corporate giving, the
War Revenue Act of 191782 limited the charitable deduction to indi-
viduals. The stated rationale was to reduce the cost of charitable
giving8" in the face of higher wartime tax rates.84 Legislative history
also suggests that lawmakers believed that the charitable sector
could provide social services more efficiently than the federal
government.8 5
Congress debated and rejected a corporate deduction in 1919,
1928, and again in 1934. In each case, Congress expressed reluc-
tance to encourage behavior prohibited by state law." The ultra
vires nature of corporate transfers to charity also presented a chal-
deduction for individual charitable contributions although an amendment to provide a deduction
was introduced. The Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913). Congressman
Rogers introduced an amendment providing a "deduction for gifts made by individuals to charita-
ble, benevolent and religious societies," but it was not approved. 50 CONG. REC. 1259 (1913)
(statement of Cong. Rogers).
81. ANDREWS, supra note 79, at 28 (citation omitted) (noting that in 1917, a significant num-
ber of corporations made direct contributions to charity). See generally Hearings, supra note 77,
at 135-37 (discussing corporate charitable contributions from 1917 to the late 1920's).
82. War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300 (1917). The Revenue Act of
1917 increased the rate of tax in order to raise revenue to fund the war effort. Id.
83. For a discussion of the effect of tax rates on the cost of charitable giving, see infra notes
177-81 and accompanying text.
84. Senator Hollis explained the need for the deduction in the following terms: "usually people
contribute to charities . . . out of their surplus. . .when war comes and [Congress] impose[s]
these very heavy taxes on incomes, that will be the first place where the wealthy men will be
tempted to economize . . . in donations to charity." Senator Hollis ended his quote with, "[t]hey
will say, 'Charity begins at home.' " 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis). After
concluding his remarks, Senator Hollis introduced into the Congressional Record a series of letters
and editorials in favor of the deduction. Id.
85. Senator Hollis, without any thought that a charitable organization could have administra-
tive expenses, optimistically stated, "for every dollar that a man contributes for these public chari-
ties . . . the public gets 100 percent; it is all devoted to that purpose." Id. (statement of Sen.
Hollis). Obviously, this view is overly simplistic. Recent horror stories reporting excessive execu-
tive compensation and perks, such as the United Way scandal, have shaken public confidence in
charitable organizations. For a discussion of the United Way scandal, see infra note 322.
86. The ultra vires nature of corporate transfers to charity was frequently discussed in connec-
tion with the legislative proposal to permit a deduction for such transfers. For example, in re-
sponse to the 1928 proposal to enact the corporate deduction, Congressman John N. Garner ar-
gued strenuously against encouraging corporations to "handle the stockholders' money to the
extent of giving it away for charitable . . . purposes[.]" He demanded "to know under what law
corporations are authorized to make donations." 101 House Ways and Means Committee Reve-
nue Revisions 1927-1928. Report, supra note 77, at 101 (statement of John N. Garner).
Senator David A. Reed voiced a similar sentiment when he questioned a representative of the
National Retail Dry Goods Association as to whether Congress "should encourage officers of cor-
porations to be charitable with other people's money." 1928 Act, Revenue Act of 1928: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1928) (statement of Sen. David
A. Reed).
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lenge to charities which sought to attract and increase corporate
support.8"
One way charities dealt with the ultra vires issue was to charac-
terize the transfer to charity as a foregone dividend. During World
War I, the American Red Cross launched the first national corpo-
rate giving initiative and asked U.S. corporations to institute a "Red
Cross Dividend" program. 88 The "Red Cross Dividend" was an in-
novative approach to corporate giving designed to circumvent the
state ultra vires laws.89 A participating corporation requested each
of its individual shareholders to authorize the corporation to donate
all or a portion of the shareholder's dividend to the American Red
Cross.90 Thus, the corporation had the requisite authority to transfer
corporate funds to charity. The corporate participant was, as stated
in the sample board resolution circulated by the American Red
Cross, simply "enabling stockholders to contribute a portion of their
distributive interest in [the] corporation . ... 1
Outright corporate transfers to charity continued to increase after
the war. Advocates for the corporate charitable deduction reported
that in 1929 corporate giving accounted for approximately twenty-
two percent of the total funds raised by community chests. Advo-
cates of the deduction also boasted that corporations had given as
much as $12 million to community chests.92
87. See generally infra notes 273-444 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of corpo-
rate charitable giving).
88. ANDREWS, supra note 79, at 26-28 (reporting that 148 corporations participated in the
program); see also Karl, supra note 74, at 27 (stating that the "'Red Cross dividend' enabled
companies to request authorization from stockholders for a special dividend to be contributed to
the Red Cross").
89. The American Red Cross circulated a sample corporate resolution adopting the program.
The resolution read in pertinent part:
Whereas, the Board of Directors of this Company believes that in this time of war
generous contributions should be made to the Red Cross, by individuals, partnerships,
corporations and other associations throughout the country, not only as obvious mea-
sures of humanity but also as great and most important parts in the preservation of
the social and business structure of this country and other countries, and it is accord-
ingly the belief of the Board of Directors of this Company that it should aid as sub-
stantially as possible in this effort by enabling stockholders to contribute a portion of
their distributive interest in this corporation to those purposes.
ANDREWS, supra note 79, at 27.
90. The practice is similar to the shareholder giving program instituted by Berkshire Hathaway
program. For a discussion of the Berkshire Hathaway program, see infra notes 267-68 and accom-
panying text.
91. ANDREWS, supra note 79, at 27.
92. Oddly enough, the testimony did not specify the year or years in question. See NEIL J.
MITCHELL, THE GENEROUS CORPORATION: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC POWER 20
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(b) The 1935 enactment of the corporate charitable contribution
deduction
Congress finally enacted the corporate charitable contribution de-
duction in 19 3 5,91 after years of lobbying efforts94 by numerous bus-
iness leaders and fundraisers.9" President Franklin D. Roosevelt ini-
tially opposed the corporate charitable deduction because
"corporations should not be able to 'purchase' goodwill and . . .
charitable contributions were properly the domain of sharehold-
ers.""6 The official statement of the minority Republicans reported
that Congress incorporated the deduction in the 1935 Tax Act "over
the objection of our President."9 7
This new deduction was approved at a time when the federal gov-
ernment was assuming a greater role providing social services and
regulating the economy,98 the business community was struggling
through the Great Depression,99 and legal scholars were debating
(1989) (stating that corporate contributions to community chests increased during the 1920's to
almost $13 million).
93. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014 (adding subsection (r) to section
23 of the Revenue Act of 1934, thereby permitting a corporation to deduct charitable contribu-
tions to the extent of 5% of its income).
94. Congress debated a bill allowing a corporate charitable contribution deduction in connec-
tion with the passage of the 1919 Revenue Act and it expressly rejected the proposal. Karl, supra
note 74, at 28. A similar bill was introduced in connection with the 1928 and 1934 Revenue Acts.
Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562-70, 45 Stat. 791 (1928); Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L.
No. 216-73, 48 Stat. 680 (1934).
95. Hall, Business Giving, supra note I1, at 232-234 (listing corporations that lobbied for tax
deductions). For example, Gerard Swope, President of General Electric Company, was a particu-
larly vocal proponent of providing a tax incentive to increase corporate giving. In his classic article
"For Whom Are the Corporate Managers Trustees," Professor Dodd quoted Gerard Swope as
saying, "[o]rganized industry should take the lead, recognizing its responsibility to its employees,
to the public, and to its stockholders .... " E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1156 (1932). Professor Dodd relied on quotes from
Mr. Swope, and his colleague at General Electric, Owen Young, to prove that public opinion
demanded that "those who manage our business corporations should concern themselves with the
interests of employees, consumers, and the general public, as well as stockholders." Id.
96. CLOTFELTER. supra note 71, at 171.
97. Hall reported that President Roosevelt ultimately supported the corporate deduction. PETER
DOBKIN HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 60 (1992) (attributing President Roosevelt's
reversal to lobbying by Community Chest officials). The official GOP statement regarding the
passage of the corporate contribution deduction included several choice jibes directed at President
Roosevelt noting his "dictatorial powers . . . and . . . his individual control of unprecedented
sums of money." Id.
98. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The 'Hundred Days' of F.D.R., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1983, §3, at
I (discussing the enactment of 15 major laws between March and June, 1933).
99. See infra note 101 and accomapanying text (discussing Congressional reluctance to in-
crease tax rates).
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the nature of corporate purpose.' 0 Reluctant to increase tax rates,
the federal government sought voluntary transfers from the private
sector (i.e., nontax revenue) to fund needed social programs.101 Al-
though the corporate deduction clarified the federal tax treatment of
corporate transfers to charity,' 012 such transfers remained ultra vires
under the laws of many states.'03
2. The Ever-Changing Theory of Corporate Purpose
Legislative and judicial resistance to corporate giving underscores
the paradox inherent in the term "corporate giving." The notion of a
corporation making a "gift" to charity - giving away its assets -
may or may not make sense depending upon one's view of the corpo-
ration.1' - If the goal of a corporation is to maximize shareholder
profit and gain, then a corporate "gift" must advance that end. 05
On the other hand, if a corporation has responsibilities to constitu-
encies beyond its shareholders (or to society at large), then a corpo-
rate "gift" must address these responsibilities.' 6 While it may be
easier to justify a corporate "gift" under the latter more expansive
view of corporate purposes, as the proponents of corporate giving
illustrate, it is possible to justify a "gift" under the profit maximiza-
100. For a discussion of the Berle-Dodd debate, see infra notes 120-52 and accompanying text.
101. For example, the federal government had looked to business to address the growing prob-
lem of unemployment. The unemployment insurance system was not implemented until the enact-
ment of the Social Security Act in 1935. MITCHELL, supra note 92, at 23 (citing a 1929 Senate
Report determining that American business and not the federal government should provide insur-
ance against unemployment).
102. The testimony of advocates for the deduction stressed the need for uniform treatment of
corporate transfers to charity. In later years, the lobbyists focused on a 1934 Supreme Court
decision which held that only a transfer resulting in a direct benefit to the corporation was deduct-
ible as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Old Mission Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 289 (1934). See Proposed, supra note 77, at 123 (discussing Old Mission),
103. See supra note 77 (describing legislators' attitudes toward corporate giving).
104. See generally David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201 (discuss-
ing various theories of corporate purpose). This Article focuses only on the goals of the corpora-
tion and not its form, thereby intentionally sidestepping the debate as to whether the corporation
exists as a separate entity or an aggregate (whether of shareholders or autonomous contracting
agents). For purposes of corporate giving, the entity versus aggregate distinction appears irrele-
vant given that corporate giving can be justified under either conception. The central issue is
corporate purpose, even though a theory of corporate purpose is necessarily informed by one's view
of the nature of the corporate form.
105. See infra notes 120-52 and accompanying text (comparing the profit maximization model
of the corporation to the social responsibility model). The practice of "enlightened self-interest"
attempts to explain corporate giving in terms of corporate (and hence shareholder) benefit.
106. See infra notes 120-52 and accompanying text (comparing the social responsibility model
of the corporation to the profit maximization model).
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tion model of corporate purpose. 10
(a) Early conceptions of corporate form and purpose
By the mid-nineteenth century, a corporation was a well-estab-
lished form of business association.' 0 8 Legal scholars regarded a cor-
poration as an artificial entity created by the state.'09 States closely
regulated the ability to incorporate, generally requiring the issuance
of a corporate charter by the state legislature, and limiting corpo-
rate powers to those expressly granted by the state. Because corpo-
rate transfers to charity were not expressly granted by corporate
charter or relevant corporate code, they were ultra vires. As support
for the ultra vires nature of corporate transfers to charity, commen-
tators cited Lord Bowen's admonition that "charity has n'o business
sitting at the board of directors, qua charity."" 0
The legislative prerogative to grant corporate charters presented
the potential for corruption and monopolistic concentration in cer-
tain industries.' 1' The critics of the charter system advanced the no-
tion of "free incorporation" and urged the passage of comprehensive
incorporation statutes." 2 The pervasive enactment of state incorpo-
ration codes by the 1870's provided greater access to the corporate
form" 3 which in turn called into question the artificial entity model
107. See infra notes 333-444 and accompanying text (discussing the profit-oriented justifica-
tions for corporate giving). Corporate managers agree - social responsibility is good advertising.
See infra notes 333-91 (discussing corporate giving as advertising).
108. 4 RoscoE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 200 (1959) (listing commentators and articles discuss-
ing the corporation).
109. See id. at 214, 222.
110. Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co., 23 Ch.D. 654 (1883). Karl pointed out that the oft-
cited quotation is dicta from a case the facts of which did not involve charitable giving, but rather
a proposed payment to the board of directors prior to the dissolution of the company. Karl, supra
note 74, at 26-27 ("As is sometimes the case in judicial history, however, the words served a wider
purpose than the situation to which they had originally been directed. A judicial aside constituting
a critical attack on a highly questionable practice became a noble doctrine designed to measure all
corporate behavior.").
In fact, a close reading of Lord Justice Bowen's 1883 opinion supports the belief that corporate
giving can further the corporate goal of profit maximization: "There is, however, a kind of chari-
table dealing which is for the interest of those who practise [sic] it, and to that extent and in that
garb (I admit not a very philanthropic garb) charity may sit at the board, but for no other pur-
pose." Hutton, 23 Ch.D. at 673.
111. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (stating that "special charters were denounced for their encourage-
ment of legislative bribery, political favoritism, and above all, monopoly").
112. Id. (stating that these critics believed "free incorporation" would break the corruption).
113. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
of the corporation." 4
In place of the artificial entity model, legal scholars began to con-
ceptualize the corporation as the result of natural market forces
bringing together a group of individual property owners. A corpora-
tion was viewed as an aggregate of individual property owners - its
shareholders/owners. Professor Horwitz reported that this aggregate
private property model of the corporation was widely accepted by
the last quarter of the nineteenth century.11 5
In 1932, Professors Berle and Means published their study of cor-
porate governance which documented the growing power of corpo-
rate managers and the increasing separation of corporate control
from ownership. 1 6 The individual property model described above
could not accommodate the emergence of widely-held corporations,
institutional investors and the concomitant rise of the managerial
class." The Berle and Means study showed that the interests of
corporate managers (i.e., the expanding managerial class) did not
always coincide with the interests of the corporation/sharehold-
ers." '8 Corporate managers had discretion to advance their class-
specific goals, potentially at the expense of the interests of the cor-
poration/shareholders.I19
(b) Corporate purpose and the Berle-Dodd debate.
Berle later addressed his concern over unfettered managerial dis-
cretion in his debate-provoking article entitled Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust. 20 Berle believed that the managers of the corpo-
rate entity owed a fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders:
"through the very nature of the corporate entity, responsibility goes
with power."' 12 Based upon an application of the law of trusts, Berle
114. Id.
115. Id. at 182 (stating that the late 1800's corporation laws emphasized "the property rights
of shareholders").
116. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 37, at 47-68.
117. Id. at 47. An exception to this is a closely-held, shareholder-operated corporations.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g.. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management To Do Good at the
Expense of Shareholder Gain - A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13
CANADA-UNITED STATES L. J. 7, 13-15 (1988) (arguing corporate managers can and do make
transfers to charity that are at odds with corporate interests); MICHAEL USEEM, THE INNER CIR-
CLE: LARGE CORPORATIONS AND THE RISE OF BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. AND
U.K. 125-27 (1984) (citing ability to promote classwide goals through charitable contributions).
120. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1049
(1931) [hereinafter Berle, Corporate Powers].
121. Id., at 1050; see also Adolph A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers ARE Trustees: A
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proposed the existence of an "equitable limitation" on the exercise
of all corporate powers and stated such powers "are necessarily and
at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the share-
holders as their interest appears." '122 Under Berle's model of the cor-
poration, the sole purpose of the corporate enterprise was to maxi-
mize shareholder profit. 2
Berle's theory provoked a creative response from Professor
Dodd."" Dodd did not question Berle's application of fiduciary con-
cepts to the exercise of corporate powers, but he did reject Berle's
assertion that "business corporations exist for the sole purpose of
making profits for their shareholders." '25 Dodd redefined the fiduci-
ary responsibilities of corporate managers to encompass a social or
public component. As authority for his broader view of corporate
purpose, Dodd noted that "public opinion, which ultimately makes
law . . . view[s] ...the business corporation as an economic insti-
tution which has a social service as well as a profit-making
function.' 2 8
The Berle-Dodd debate as to the proper goal of the corporation
continues to the present day.2 7 At various times the different camps
have each declared victory or conceded defeat. 12 Under Dodd's
model of the corporate purpose, transfers to charity are viewed as a
necessary means to discharge a corporation's social responsibility.
Under Berle's model, transfers to charity are permissible, provided
they advance shareholder profit and gain.
3. Theory, Doctrine, and the Courts
Many commentators have chronicled the cases considering the le-
gitimacy of corporate giving, by noting that a given outcome of a
case reflects the acceptance of a particular theory of the corpora-
Note (emphasis in original), 45 HARV. L. REV, 1365 (1932) [hereinafter, Berle, Note] (stating
that "corporate managements are trustees for corporate security holders").
122. Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 120, at 1049.
123. Id. at 1049-50 (stating that corporate managers have a duty to always act for the benefit
of the shareholders).
124. Dodd, supra note 95, at 1148.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. For a retrospective on the debate, see Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the
Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964).
128. See, e.g., Berle, Note, supra note 121, at 1366 (acknowledging that "Professor Dodd's
argument is not only sound, but familiar").
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tion. 29 Commentators interpret Dodge v. Ford Motor Company30
and A.P. Smith v. Barlow,' the most often-cited cases on corpo-
rate giving, as representing opposing views of corporate purpose.'32
In such commentary, the outcome serves as proof of the ascendancy
of the particular theory of the corporation said to be represented by
the outcome.
Judicial approval of corporate giving was not the result of wide-
spread acceptance of Dodd's theory of social responsibility."' In-
stead, the courts simply expanded the type of activities or expendi-
tures recognized to enhance shareholder profit and gain to include
corporate giving tempered by "enlightened self-interest." This com-
promise achieves a balance between the Berle and Dodd models
without disturbing the premise that profit maximization is the goal
of the corporation.
Professors Berle and Dodd, as well as later commentators, cited
Dodge. for the limited proposition that the sole purpose of a corpora-
tion is to maximize shareholder profit and gain. T' In Dodge, the
Michigan Supreme Court prohibited Henry Ford from instituting
129. See generally Allen, supra note 9, at 264; Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility
and the Social Crisis, 50 B. U. L. REV. 157, 166-92 (1970); Davis, supra note 119, at 57; Green,
supra note 60, at 245; Kenneth J. Yerkes, Note, Corporate Charitable Contributions: Expanding
the Judicial Analysis in a Post-Economic Recovery Act World, 58 IND. L.J. 161, 165-68 (1982).
130. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
131. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
132. Dodge is cited as representing adherence to a profit maximization model of corporate pur-
pose. See infra note 134. A.P. Smith is cited as representing the acceptance of the social responsi-
bility model of corporate purpose. See infra note 150. Although their conclusions regarding the
practice of corporate giving differ widely, commentators adopt a generally consistent analysis of
the leading cases. Subject to some variations, the commentators, categorize the cases in this area
in three loosely defined stages leading to the eventual approval of corporate giving: ultra vires (i.e.,
giving not permitted), direct benefit (i.e., giving permitted if it provides a direct benefit for the
corporation), and indirect or long-term benefit (i.e., giving permitted if it provides an indirect or
long-term benefit for the corporation).
133. In addition to A.P. Smith, commentators cite Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson for
the proposition that corporations have unfettered power to engage in socially responsible actions.
257 A. 2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). Theodora involved the unusual situation where a corporation was
providing the initial funding for its affiliated charitable corporation. Id. at 399. See, e.g., Green,
supra note 60, at 253 (discussing Theodora).
134. Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 120, at 1061 n.33; Dodd, supra note 95, at 1146 n.3.
Later commentators cite Dodge as an example of the so-called "direct benefit rule" under which
corporate transfers to charity are allowed provided they directly benefitted the corporation. See,
e.g., Green, supra note 60, at 248-49 (citing Dodge for this proposition). Commentators compare
Dodge to later cases such as A.P. Smith which approve corporate transfers to charity where the
transfer produces a long-term benefit. Id. at 246-502 (comparing Dodge to A.P. Smith). The
doctrinal distinction between a direct benefit and a long-term benefit obscures the fact that the
purpose of the corporation remains the same under either rule; the maximization of shareholder
profit. The only variable is the type of activities which are considered to maximize profits.
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far-reaching social initiatives at the perceived expense of share-
holder profit.1"5 Henry Ford induced the Board of Directors of Ford
Motor Company to suspend further payments of a special dividend
in order to increase wages and reduce the price of the automobile. 30
In the prior four years, the special dividend had paid over $41 mil-
lion on only $2 million of capital.
The Dodge brothers, who would later become Ford's competi-
tors, 37 contested the Board action asserting that the corporation
owed its first duty to its shareholders, the owners of the corporation.
The court ordered the Ford Motor Company to pay the special divi-
dend 38' and it expressly rejected Mr. Ford's vision of the role of the
corporation:
There should be no confusion... of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives
that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which
in law he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders. A
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
135. Henry Ford's Social Initiatives: Ford's primary goal was to plow the excess assets
earmarked for special dividends back into the auto company so that Ford could realize his "ambi-
tion": "'My ambition,' said Mr. Ford, 'is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this
industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their
homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into the business.'" Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683 (Mich. 1919) (quoting Mr. Ford). The Court's response to
Mr. Ford's declaration was that Ford was taking the role that he knew better than the sharehold-
ers how their profits should be reinvested, (i.e. fully plowing back the profits for plant expansion
and employee growth). The Dodge Court continued:
The record, and especially the testimony of Mr. Ford, convinces that he has to some
extent the attitude towards shareholders of one who has dispensed and distributed to
them large gains and that they should be content to take what he chooses to give. His
testimony creates the impression, also, that he thinks the Ford Motor Company has
make too much money, has had too large profits, and that although large profits
might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public, by reducing the price of the
output of the company, ought to be undertaken.
Id. at 683-84.
The Court essentially found Ford's motives far to charitable as compared to how much profit was
being earned. Id. at 684. The Court held that the special dividend that had previously been dis-
tributed when profits were excessive be distributed again (based on federal statutory guidelines).
Id. at 679.
136. The Board voted to retain $58 million in profits to finance the reforms. The payment of
regular dividends were not effected by the action. Id. at 670-73.
137. John and Horace Dodge were born in the 1860s and formed the automobile firm of the
Dodge Brothers in 1914. Vern Parker, Auto Weekend; Out of the Past, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1991, at GI.
138. The Michigan Supreme Court distinguished the types of expenditures challenged in Dodge
from "an incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of the employees,
like the building of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for the betterment of
their condition." Id. (quoting Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684).
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attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the
reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits amoag stockholders
in order to devote them to other purposes.139
The conflict between Henry Ford's vision of the role of the corpora-
tion and the desires of dissenting shareholders for immediate pecu-
niary gain foreshadowed the debate between Professors Berle and
Dodd concerning the purpose of the corporation.14 0
In A.P. Smith,1 41 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
power of a corporation to transfer funds to charity. A shareholder
challenged a 1951 Board resolution authorizing the company to
transfer $1,500 to Princeton University. 42 The court interpreted the
implied or incidental powers 4 3 of a corporation in light of changing
social and economic conditions and upheld the transfer on both stat-
utory and common law grounds.' 4 The court reasoned:
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals,
they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating freely for chari-
table purposes. With the transfer of wealth to corporate hands and the im-
position of heavy burdens of individual taxation, they have been unable to
keep pace with increased philanthropic needs they have therefore, with justi-
fication, turned to corporations to assume the modern obligations of good
citizenship in the same manner as humans do.""
The court approved the transfer because it produced a benefit for
the corporation, albeit somewhat abstract. The New Jersey Supreme
Court linked corporate transfers to charity to the preservation of the
139. Id.
140. See generally Dodd, supra note 95, at 1156.
141. See Green, supra note 60, at 249 (stating A.P. Smith upheld transfers to charity whose
relationship to the corporation was at best uncertain).
142. See Hall, Business Giving, supra note 11, at 236 (suggesting that A.P. Smith was a test
case orchestrated by Standard Oil of New Jersey which was anxious to resolve any lingering ultra
vires concerns surrounding corporate transfers to charity).
143. "Implied or incidental powers" are used interchangeably. See. e.g., A. P. Smith, Mfg. Co.
v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 583 (N.J. 1953).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 585-86. Hall discussed changing social and economic conditions in similar terms and
noted the rise of a managerial class without private fortunes of their own. Hall wrote:
This separation of ownership and control led to major changes in business philan-
thropy. When owner-managers like Carnegie, Vanderbilt, or Pullman diverted corpo-
rate assets for charitable purposes, they were accountable to no one because they
were, in effect, giving away their own money. Usually modest gifts from their firms
were accompanied by generous ones from their private fortunes. . . .And, because
they were dealing with other people's money, they were not free to make corporate
gifts unless these could be justified on grounds of corporate well-being.
Hall, Business Giving, supra note 11, at 227-228.
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"free enterprise system."' 4 6
But even if we confine ourselves to the terms of the common law rule in its
application to current conditions, such expenditures may likewise readily be
justified as being for the benefit of the corporation; indeed, if need be the
matter may be viewed strictly in terms of actual survival of the corporation
in a free enterprise system. 47
A.P. Smith represents judicial endorsement of the use of corpo-
rate funds to invest in a future environment favorable to the corpo-
ration. The court upheld the power of corporations to make trans-
fers to charity in recognition of the fact "that their salvation rests
upon a sound economic and social environment which in turn rests
in no insignificant part upon free and vigorous nongovernmental in-
stitutions of learning."' 48 This is exactly the type of "enlightened
self-interest" advocated by corporate managers and fundraisers.149
Although commentators cite A.P. Smith as adopting Professor
Dodd's model of the socially responsible corporation, 50 the reason-
ing is much more modest. The court did not embrace a new theory
of corporate purpose. It never questioned whether the proper goal of
the corporation was to maximize shareholder profit and gain. It sim-
ply recognized that corporate transfers to charity can result in an
indirect or long-term corporate benefit.' 5' The holding advanced a
longer view as to what type of activities could benefit the corpora-
tion and ultimately, its shareholders - a view that is entirely con-
sistent with "enlightened self-interest.' ' 52
146. Throughout the Cold War period, the need to further the capitalist system of private own-
ership and protect "free enterprise" was a consistent theme in corporate giving. For a discussion of
the use of corporate transfers to charity to advance corporate political and economic interests, see
infra notes 469-87 and accompanying text.
147. A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586.
148. Id.
149. In fact, the term "enlightened self-interest" is attributed to the testimony of Frank W.
Abrams, former Chairman of the Board of Standard Oil of New Jersey, offered in connection with
the A.P. Smith case. Mr. Abrams remarked: "During the forty years of my business career, I
have observed a slow but steady transition in the attitude of corporate management from one of
more or less exclusive preoccupation with self-interest, to one of self-interest tempered with a
broadening sense of social consciousness." EELLs, supra note 74, at 1 (quoting Abrams).
150. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 119, at 63 (characterizing A.P. Smith as representing a fourth
stage in the development of corporate giving law providing that "the corporation has the power to
be altruistic and donate its funds irrespective of any prospect of quid pro quo, just as if it were an
individual.") (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 398, 401-02 (Utah 1958)).
151. A. P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 585.
152. See supra note 149 (discussing the term "enlightened self-interest").
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4. In Search of the Socially Responsible Corporate Citizen
The search for a socially responsible corporate citizen will not
yield many tangible results. Judicial decisions authorizing corporate
transfers to charity simply stretch the prevailing notion of profit-
maximization. They do not represent the judicial acceptance of the
social responsibility model of corporate purpose. 5 ' The enlightened
self-interest rationale of A.P. Smith is shared by corporate manag-
ers and fundraisers who assert that corporate giving inures to the
long-term benefit of the corporation's shareholders. 54 It also ap-
pears in contemporary management theory which merges issues of
social responsibility into profit maximization.' 5 5 Only the federal tax
code holds fast to the ideal of the socially responsible corporation. 56
Unlike the court in A.P. Smith, Congress seems to have accepted
Professor Dodd's new theory of social responsibility with the enact-
ment of the corporate charitable contribution deduction. In testi-
mony before various Congressional committees, supporters of the
deduction expanded President Roosevelt's call for assistance from
the private sector to include corporate citizens as well as individuals.
In 1934, a representative of the Community Chests and Councils of
New York noted the need to remove "the barrier against corporate
generosity":15 7
Private philanthropy has had a progressively more difficult task to hold up
its end of the national charitable responsibility during the depression. It has
needed every reinforcement and argument that could be made available. If,
153. To the contrary, social responsibility has been derided by law and economic scholars and
generally discredited. Allen, supra note 9, at 265 ("To law and economics scholars, who have been
so influential in academic corporate law, this model [social responsibility] is barely coherent and
dangerously wrong.") See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) ("Few
trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundation of our free society as the acceptance by
corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their sharehold-
ers as possible.").
154. As explained in Part II, this belief continues despite the absence of empirical evidence that
corporate giving or other socially responsible behavior actually increases profits. Allen, supra note
9, at 273. See also infra notes 273-99 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 273-332 and accompanying text (discussing possible business benefits of
being perceived as socially responsible).
156. As discussed in Part I, Section B, the social responsibility model is the basis for the section
170 deduction. The notion of social responsibility arises frequently in Congressional testimony and
the legislative history of the corporate charitable deduction. The explanation for this anomaly can
be found in the historical context of the enactment of the deduction. See supra notes 93-103 and
accompanying text.
157. Hearings, supra note 77, at 137. This statement is almost identical to one submitted the
following year by Frederic R. Kellogg, President of Community Chests and Councils, Inc. of New
York. See Proposed, supra note 77, at 120.
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as the President constantly states, private charity is to persist and carry its
share of the load of our less fortunate citizens, its approach to corporations
for contributions ought to be eased rather than made more difficult. Instance
after instance could be cited of where corporations this last year have with-
drawn their contributions with the taxation situation as one of their reasons.
Private charity cannot carry on without the help of the corporations to
which it has become accustomed."8
Thus, the language of the socially responsible corporation provided
the justification for the enactment of the deduction and added rhe-
torical force to the federal government's request for funds.
Curiously, the notion of the socially responsible corporate citizen
continued to inform the congressional debate over the 1981 amend-
ments liberalizing the corporate charitable deduction 159 long after
the theory had been discredited. 6 ° For example, Senator Byrd justi-
fied the increase in the ceiling limitation imposed on corporate con-
tributions by remarking: "I feel that the corporations of our nation
have an obligation . . . to the various charities of our coun-
try. . .""' Senator Kennedy expressed similar sentiments and as-
serted that it was time "the corporations of this country [were in-
volved in] the process of meeting the needs of the people of our
society."'6 2
Corporate image-makers express a strong belief that strategic cor-
porate giving is good for business. 6 ' As discussed in detail in Part
158. See Hearings, supra note 77, at 135 (emphasis added). As authority for his position, Mr.
Burns quoted from President Roosevelt's October 15, 1933 broadcast where the President stated:
I have spoken on several occasions of the vital importance to our country that private
charity in all that broad term covers, must be kept up at least to the levels, and I hope
beyond the levels, of former years. At this opening of the Four Week's 1933 Mobili-
zation for Human Needs, I want not only to reaffirm what I have said before, but to
stress the fact that the fine teamwork in the recovery program cannot be successful if
an important horse is lying back in the traces.
Id. Mr. Burns argued that encouraging corporate deductions would serve as "the best concrete
evidence that the Administration means to promote private charitable contributions to its utmost."
id.
159. The 1981 Economic Recovery Act increased the ceiling limitation of the deductibility of
corporate charitable contributions from 5% to 10% of the corporation's taxable income. I.R.C.
§ 170(b) (1988). See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing the 10% limitation).
160. One possible explanation is that the federal government continues to find utility in the
moral persuasion implicit in appeals based on social responsibility. From the standpoint of the
corporation, there is no cause to complain because public opinion surveys indicate a favorable
reaction to perceived acts of social responsibility. See infra notes 301-308 and accompanying text
(discussing marketing and fundraising literature which supports the notion that social responsibil-
ity improves public opinion).
161. 127 CONG. REC. S8353. (July 24, 1981) (statement Sen. Byrd).
162. Id. S5352 (statement Sen. Kennedy).
163. Corporate marketing executives strongly reject the notion of corporate altruism, implying
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II, contemporary corporate giving can be viewed in three different
categories: (i) advertising and marketing, (ii) public relations, and
(iii) investment in future markets and future employees."" Corpo-
rate transfers that represent advertising or marketing expenditures
are designed to provide the most immediate impact. Such expendi-
tures satisfy the goal of profit maximization as would any advertis-
ing or marketing expenditures. The difference is that such transfers
are paid to a qualified charity rather than an advertising agency. 66
Even Milton Friedman, a vocal opponent of corporate giving,166
recognized that at times corporate giving can further the goal of
maximizing corporate profits and shareholder gain. He remarked:
Charitable activity in some cases may contribute to a corporation's making
as much money as possible. It may be that an enterprise that needs goodwill
of the community, that it wants to have its workers motivated to regard the
enterprise as one that's worth sacrificing for, worth working hard for, and so
on, may find that the most effective way to promote that kind of an environ-
ment is to provide charitable assistance in its local community.0 7
Continuing in this vein, several corporate giving texts attempt to ap-
peal to the profit maximizer in us all, by invoking Adam Smith.
They quote with approval the following missive from The Wealth of
Nations:l"'
that such behavior would be irresponsible to the shareholders. Koch quoted Irving Kristol, then
resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who explained:
Some corporate executives seem to think that their corporate philanthropy is a form
of benevolent charity. It is not. . .. Charity involves dispensing your own money, not
your stockholders. When you give away your own money, you can be as foolish, as
arbitrary, as whimsical as you like. But when you give away your stockholders'
money, your philanthropy must serve the longer-term interest of the corporation. Cor-
porate philanthropy should not be, cannot be disinterested.
FRANK KOCH, THE NEW CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: How SOCIETY AND BUSINESS CAN PROFIT
129 (1979).
164. See infra notes 333-444 and accompanying text.
165. Because of the "halo effect," corporate advertising and marketing transfers to charity can
produce benefits far in excess of the original transfer. David A. Haimes, Note, Corporate Spon-
sorships of Charity Events and the Unrelated Business Income Tax: Will Congress or the Courts
Block the IRS Rush to Sack the College Football Games? 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1090
(1992). For example, "John Hancock Life Insurance Company estimated that it received $5.1
million of advertising services in exchange for its 1990 payment of $1.6 million to associate its
name with [a college bowl] game." Id. at 1090 n.59. The tax-exempt character of the transfer in
the hands of the donee charity also enhances the return. Id. at 1112-13.
166. See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text (discussing Milton Friedman's views on
corporate giving).
167. Willa Johnson, Freedom and Philanthropy: An Interview with Milton Friedman, Bus. &
Soc'Y REV.. Spring, 1989, at 11, 14. Actually, this sentiment is very similar to the view expressed
by Lord Bowen. See supra note 110 (discussing Lord Bowan's views on corporate giving).
168. See, e.g., ROBERT L. PAYTON, PHILANTHROPY: VOLUNTARY ACTION FOR THE PUBLIC
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By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known
much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an
affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words
need be employed in dissuading them from it.1 9
Corporate managers and fundraisers freely acknowledge that "[a]
corporation can't perform a charitable act any more than it can fall
in love."' 170 They embrace social responsibility only to the extent
that it reinforces the corporate bottom line and enhances the "halo
effect. ' 171 Thus, advocates of corporate giving successfully avoid
much of the criticism leveled at the theory of corporate social re-
sponsibility172 because they define such socially responsible behavior
as essential to corporate performance.1 73
Recent developments in management theory also take into ac-
count the perceived interrelation between corporate economic per-
formance and social responsibility. The result is an integration of
"the entire range of business responsibilities . . .: economic, legal,
ethical, and philanthropic. 1 74 This integrated model does not ques-
tion the goal of profit maximization. 75 Instead, it expands the types
GOOD, 86 (1988) (quoting the Adam Smith work).
169. ADAM SMITH. AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
456 (R. Campbell & A. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Pres 1976) (1776). The quoted language is
preceded by the famous passage describing the "invisible hand" of the marketplace. Id.
170. The quote continues: "[b]ut sometimes when corporations invest in charity - the way
they invest, say, in advertising or a new fleet of truck - the dividends can be immense." KOCH,
supra note 163, at 5.
171. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text (discussing the "halo effect").
172. The criticism of social responsibility comes not only from the profit-maximizers. Useem
argued that social responsibility represents an exercise in "classwide politics." Useem asserted the
consequences are evident in the area of "corporate responsibility" - whether manifest in philan-
thropic giving, advertising, or political subvention. All such programs help shape national political
culture, and all are partly the result of classwide not-corporate considerations. USEEM, supra note
119, at 16.
173. This reasoning allows the advocates to agree wholeheartedly with Professor Lashbrooke,
an opponent of corporate giving. Professor Lashbrooke argued, and corporate managers and fun-
draisers agree that: "Corporate social responsibility does not alter the goal of profit maximization.
Corporations have no affirmative duty to be charitable." Lashbrooke, supra note 9, at 241 (assert-
ing that corporate giving fails "[b]ecause a corporation is a nonhuman, artificial entity, it can not
have integrity and, hence, can not be held morally responsible as a citizen"). Professor Lashbrooke
continued "corporate social responsibility should be limited to the moral minimum: to do no un-
necessary harm while making a profit." Id. at 242.
174. Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral
Management of Organizational Stakeholders, Bus. HORIZONS, July-Aug. 1991, at 39, 40.
175. Carroll stressed that "[a]ll other business responsibilities are predicated upon the eco-
nomic responsibility of the firm, because without it others become moot considerations." Id. at 41.
Carroll continued:
The traditionalist might see this as a conflict between a firm's "concern for profits"
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of behavior which enhance profit maximization and recognizes that
stakeholder responsibility, as well as a more gradual view of social
responsibility, are essential elements for corporate success.1"6
C. The Structure of the Federal Income Tax Corporate
Charitable Contribution Deduction, Its Interpretation, And Its
Limitations
Charitable giving is fueled and encouraged by the federal income
tax charitable contribution deduction allowed under section 170 for
both individuals and corporations. The charitable deduction reduces
the cost of giving, thereby increasing the amount that a donor can
transfer to a qualified charity. In the case of a corporation which
makes a deductible transfer of $100x'" to a qualified charity, the
deduction reduces the corporation's taxable income by $100x.' 8
This reduction in taxable income produces a corresponding decrease
in the corporation's tax liability equal to the amount of the deduc-
tion multiplied by the corporation's top marginal income tax rate. In
1993, the current top marginal corporate tax rate was 35%.179
Thus, a transfer of $100x deductible in full in 1993 produces a tax
savings of $100x(35%) or $35x. The after-tax cost of the transfer
(i.e., the amount of the transfer reduced by the tax savings gener-
ated by the deduction) is $65x (i.e., $100x [deductible transfer] less
$35x [tax savings]).' 80
versus its "concern for society," but it is suggested here that this is an oversimplifica-
tion. A [corporate social responsibility] or stakeholder perspective would recognize
these tensions as organizational realities, but focus on the total pyramid as a unified
whole and how the firm might engage in decisions, actions, and programs that simul-
taneously fulfill all its component parts.
Id. at 42-43.
176. Id. Carroll concluded:
In summary, the total corporate social responsibility of business entails the simultane-
ous fulfillment of the firm's economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities.
Stated in more pragmatic and managerial terms, the [socially responsible firm] should
strive to make a profit, obey the law, be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen.
Id. at 43.
177. This assumes that the corporation transfers cash to a qualified charity. Special rules apply
to the deductibility of transfers of property. See infra note 183 (discussing charitable transfers of
property).
178. This further assumes that the corporation is able to "use" the entire amount of the deduc-
tion in the year of the transfer. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (explaining "ceil-
ing" limitation imposed on corporate charitable contributions).
179. I.R.C. § 11 (1988).
180. T = deductible transfer, r = top marginal tax rate. Tax savings equals T(r). After-tax
cost of deductible transfer equals T - (T(r)).
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The qualified organization receives $100x, but the after-tax cost
to the corporation is only $65. The "missing" $35x (i.e., the tax
savings generated under section 170) constitutes a tax expenditure
- an indirect funding process by which the federal government en-
courages certain social or economic behavior through the use of tax
subsidies. 81
1. Section 170: The Statute
Section 170(a) allows a deduction for certain transfers "to or for
the use of" organizations and entities described in section 170(c).182
The section 170 deduction is available to both individuals and cor-
porations, although individuals and corporations calculate the
amount of the deduction differently. 183 In order to qualify as a de-
181. The tax expenditure theory was proposed by Professor Surrey and gained wide-spread
acceptance by the early 1970s. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); STAN-
LEY S. SURREY AND PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1-31 (1984). Professor Zelinsky
wrote:
Few academic doctrines can claim the intellectual and political success of tax expen-
diture analysis. In roughly a generation's time, Professor Surrey's procedural and sub-
stantive critique of tax subsidies has become entrenched in the law school curriculum
and in legal scholarship. More impressively, the tax expenditure concept has been
enshrined in federal law and become part of the daily discourse of the national budget
process.
Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense
of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L. J. 1165, 1165 (1993).
As explained in Part III, the tax expenditure theory is by no means without its critics. See infra
notes 488-522 and accompanying text (discussing tax expenditure theory).
182. Section 170(a)(1) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contri-
bution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charita-
ble contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by
the Secretary." I.R.C. § 170(a)(l) (1988)(emphasis added). IRC § 170(c) defines the term
"charitable contribution." For the text of IRC § 170(c), see infra note 184.
183. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (1988). A corporation is entitled to deduct charitable contributions to
the extent that such contributions for a given taxable year do not exceed 10% of the corporation's
taxable income, computed without regard to any net operating loss or capital loss carryback. Fur-
thermore, a corporation may carryover any unused portion of total deductible contributions for
five years. Id. § 170(d)(2)(A).
The rules governing the deductibility ceilings for individuals are much more complicated and
vary depending upon the type of property transferred and the type of donee organization. See id.
§ 170(b)(l). In general, an individual is entitled to deduct cash charitable contributions to the
extent that such contributions to 'public charities' for a given taxable year do not exceed 50% of
the taxpayer's adjusted gross income (computed without regard to any net operating loss car-
ryback). Id. § 170(b)(I). See supra note 61 (explaining the distinction between public charities
and private foundations). Contributions of long-term gain capital property are deductible only to
the extent of 30% of the taxpayer's contribution base. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C) (1988). The tax-
payer, however, is entitled to deduct the full fair market value of the property as of the date of the
transfer and does not realize any gain on account of the transfer. Id. § 170(e)(1)(A). Additional
ceiling limitations apply to various transfers to private foundations. See id. § 170(b)(1)(C). Indi-
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ductible contribution, both the nature of the transfer and the donee
must satisfy the statutory requirements. Not only must the transfer
be "to or for the use of" a qualified organization, but the transfer
must constitute a "charitable contribution," defined as "contribution
or gift."'184 The determination of whether the transfer qualifies as a
"contribution or gift" is at the heart of the corporate giving para-
dox. The treasury regulations provide that a contribution must be
made with no "reasonable expectation of financial return commen-
surate with the amount of the transfer .. ."I" Yet, as explained in
Part II, corporations do not transfer assets to charity without the
expectation of receiving something in return.
Section 170(b) limits a corporation's aggregate charitable contri-
butions to 10 % of the corporation's taxable income, computed with-
out regard to the contribution deduction, any net operating loss car-
ryback, or capital loss carryback. 1 6  To the extent that a
corporation's otherwise deductible contributions exceed the 10%
limit, the corporation may carryover such excess amounts for up to
five years.'
viduals may carryover any unused portion of total deductible contributions for five years, subject
to the applicable ceiling limitations. Id. § 170(d)(l)(A).
184. Id. § 170(c). Section 170(c) provides, in pertinent part:
Charitable Contribution Defined.- For purposes of this section, the term "charita-
ble contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of -
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation -
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under
the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of
the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary,
or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competi-
tion (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason
of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.
185. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (as amended in 1990). The focus of this Article is the "con-
tribution or gift" requirement and it does not explore in any detail what constitutes a transfer "to
or for the use of" a qualified donee or what types of entities are qualified to receive tax-deductible
contributions. See infra notes 508-11 and accompanying text (discussing the tax exemption for
charitable organizations).
186. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (1988).
187. Id. 170(d)(2). The 10% limit assumes that some corporate giving approaches and indeed
exceeds the ceiling amount.
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2. The "Contribution or Gift" Requirement
In order to qualify as a charitable contribution deductible under
section 170, a transfer must be a "contribution or gift."' 88 The con-
tribution or gift requirement ensures that not every transfer to a
qualified charity is deductible. It also illustrates that the tax code
purports to distinguish between interested and disinterested corpo-
rate transfers. Without the "contribution or gift" requirement, re-
ceipt would determine deductibility.189 This could produce absurd
results given that many qualified donees provide services on a fee
basis. It would permit taxpayers to convert otherwise nondeductible
expenses into charitable contributions. 190 For example, a law student
who attends an educational institution that qualifies under section
170(c) would be entitled to deduct the amount of the tuition. The
same would be true for the patient who pays his bill to a qualifying
hospital, or the music-lover who purchases season tickets for certain
orchestras. The courts and the IRS have consistently held that such
transfers do not represent deductible charitable contributions, " ' ex-
cept to the extent that the taxpayer transfers more than the fair
market value of the benefit received. 92
188. The transfer must also be to or for the use of a qualified donee organization. As discussed
above, this Article focuses on the "contribution or gift" or requirement. The "to or for the use of"
requirement asks whether the transfer was complete and whether the donor/taxpayer retains any
dispositive control over the property transferred. In addition, the statutorily prescribed parameters
of qualified charitable donees raises certain fundamental issues about the social construction of
charity that extend far beyond the scope of this Article.
189. The Supreme Court, in Hernandez v. Commissioner, specifically rejected this destination
of funds argument with regard to religious institutions. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
190. The ability of a corporation to substitute a section 162 deduction mitigates this concern in
connection with corporate taxpayers. Individual taxpayers may not be able to classify as many
transfers as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Moreover, individuals are subject to various
limitations with respect to section 162 deduction that make the deduction less valuable.
191. Channing v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D. Mass. 1933), aff'd per curiam, 67 F.2d
986 (1st Cir. 1933), cert denied, 291 U.S. 686 (1934). This doctrine has been extended to include
instances where taxpayers attempt to characterize otherwise non-deductible payments as voluntary
"contributions." See, e.g., Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972) (hold-
ing a transfer to a church which funded school attended by taxpayers' children was a non-deducti-
ble tuition payment even though taxpayers were not expressly required to pay anything); Rev.
Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46 (providing test to determine "[w]hether a transfer of money by a
parent to an organization that operates a school is a (deductible] voluntary transfer.").
192. The classic example of a transfer to charity that is part purchase and part gift is the
purchase of a ticket to a "rubber chicken" fundraising dinner. If the ticket cost is $100, the donor
can only deduct as a charitable contribution the extent to which the purchase price exceeds the
fair market value of the dinner. The actual cost of the dinner to the charity is irrelevant, as is
whether or not the donor actually attends the dinner. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104
(explaining deductibility of a ticket to a charity ball).
19941
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1
In practice, the IRS and the courts rarely challenge corporate
transfers to charity except in the most obvious quid pro quo ex-
changes. 93 Although the courts and the IRS have consistently disal-
lowed blatant quid pro quo transfers, they have based the disallow-
ance on differing interpretations of the "contribution or gift"
requirement. Some courts focused on the "subjective" intent of the
donor. Others adopted a supposedly "objective" quid pro quo stan-
dard, examining what a the donor expected in return for the trans-
fer. Two recent Supreme Court cases resolve the differing judicial
conceptions of the "contribution or gift" requirement. 94 Read to-
gether, United States v. American Bar Endowment"9 O and Her-
nandez v. Commissioner,96 adopt a quid pro quo standard, recog-
nize the "dual-payment" character of certain transfers, and extend
the notion of a return benefit to include intangible benefits of a spir-
itual or religious nature. 97
193. See, e.g., Dockery v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 317, 321 (1978) (holding that
construction of a waterline connecting petitioners with a city's water system as required by local
ordinance was not a charitable deduction).
194. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 683 (1989); United States v. American Bar
Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 115 (1986). But see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 483 (2d ed., 1989) (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court applied
the Duberstein standard in United States v. American Bar Endowment"). Presumably, one could
argue that the existence of a quid pro quo shows that the donor did not make the transfer with the
requisite "detached and disinterested generosity."
195. 477 U.S. 105 (1986). American Bar Endowment held taxpayers who paid insurance pre-
miums were only entitled to claim a charitable deduction for the excess of the amount paid over
the fair market value of the insurance. Id. at 117 (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105).
The Court further stated that the excess must be paid with donative intent. Id. This second re-
quirement can be interpreted as incorporating a Duberstein-type test or perhaps it is simply
designed to exclude the bad bargain.
196. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
197. A subjective approach asked "Why do donors make transfers to charity?" This question
missed the point because it presupposed that the transfer was a gift. The relevant question is
whether the donor made a gift at all. Under the Duberstein standard the existence of a 'gift' is
determined by the donor's intent. The quid pro quo standard determines whether a gift was made
by asking "What do donors get when they make transfers to charity?" or, perhaps more accu-
rately, "What do donors expect to get when they make transfers to charity?" See Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286-92 (1960) (stating that the parties' expectations regarding the tax
treatment of their conduct has nothing to do with whether a transfer is a gift). This further
refinement recognizes that actual receipt of a benefit by the donor is not required. See Singer Co.
v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (stating that if the transferor merely expects to
receive a substantial benefit from his transfer, this is sufficient to make the transfer nondeductible
under section 170). Ironically, the focus on the donor's expectation reintroduces an element of
subjective intent.
1994] PARADOX OF CORPORATE GIVING
(a) The subjective standard
The "subjective" standard provided that a donor must transfer
property with "detached and disinterested generosity" in order for
the transfer to qualify as a "contribution or gift."19 Until recently,
many courts interpreted the statutory term "contribution" as synon-
ymous with "gift" '199 and applied the Duberstein00 "detached and
disinterested" standard to exclude a "gift" from a donee's gross in-
come under section 102.201 The Duberstein standard, as applied to
individuals, instructed the factfinder to determine the subjective in-
tent of the donor by reviewing the objective facts of the transfer. 202
A transfer was excluded as a gift only where it was the expression
by the donor of "feelings of detached and disinterested generosity
out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses."203
The factfinder was not bound by the donor's characterization of his
or her intent, but instead he or she was directed to make an "objec-
tive inquiry as to whether what is called a gift amounts to it in
reality."20 4 Thus, a court had to examine the "objective" facts of
each case in order to determine the donor's "subjective" intent. 0 5
198. DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding taxpayer's transfer
to a church which ran religious school attended by taxpayer's children only deductible to the
extent that the amount of the transfer exceeded the fair market value of their tuition). In DeJong,
the Ninth Circuit held that the "contribution or gift" requirement of section 170 was consistent
with the interpretation of "gift" for purposes of the exclusion from gross income of "gifts" under
section 102. Id. It expressly adopted the "detached and disinterested generosity" test enunciated
two years earlier in the section 102 context by the Supreme Court in Duberstein. Id.; see Duber-
stein, 363 U.S. at 285. In Duberstein, the Court interpreted the term "gift" under the predecessor
of section 102 (section 23(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939) exclusion of gifts from the
donee's gross income. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 280 n.l.
199. "The term 'charitable contribution' as used in § 170 has been held synonymous with
'gift'." GRAETZ, supra note 194, at 480.
200. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). "The notion that a deductible charitable contribution must meet the
Duberstein test for what constitutes a gift has been increasingly supported by the courts."
GRAETZ. supra note 194, at 482.
201. A criticism of the application of the Duberstein standard to the charitable contribution
deduction is that, taken out of the section 102 context, it was too narrow. Although a restrictive
standard is appropriate for an exclusion from gross income, it is not appropriate for a policy-based
deduction from gross income designed to encourage certain socially-desirable behavior. For fur-
ther discussion of the Duberstein standard, see infra note 208.
202. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 286 (stating that "the donor's characterization of [the purported
gift] is not determinative - that there must be an objective inquiry as to whether what is called a
gift amounts to it in reality").
203. Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
204. Id. at 286.
205. To further obscure the task at hand, the Court stated: "Decision of the issue in these cases
must be based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case." Id. at 289.
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Although followed in some circuits, 0 6 the application of the Du-
berstein standard to charitable contributions met with varied and
sustained criticism, because it was vague,207 too narrow for a policy-
driven deduction, 20 8 and inapplicable to a corporate donor.209 Even-
tually, the IRS abandoned the application of the Duberstein stan-
dard in the case of a charitable deduction.210
As an alternative to the "detached and disinterested" standard,
some courts ignored the taxpayer's subjective intent and applied a
variation of a quid pro quo test.21' This test used the language in the
206. Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1977); Winters v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1972).
207. In Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967), cert denied,
389 U.S. 976 (1967), the First Circuit lamented:
Were the deductibility of a contribution under section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 to depend on "detached and disinterested generosity," an important
area.of tax law would become a mare's nest of uncertainty woven of judicial value
judgements irrelevant to eleemosynary reality. . . . If the policy . . . favoring chari-
table contributions is to be effectively carried out, there is good reason to avoid unnec-
essary intrusions of subjective judgements as to what prompts the financial support of
the organized but non-governmental good works of society.
Id. at 146-47.
208. The Duberstein standard was developed in the context of a section providing an exclusion
from gross income. Traditional canons of construction provide that such provision should be nar-
rowly construed. See Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940)
("It has been said many times that provisions granting special tax exemptions are to be strictly
construed."). To the contrary, the charitable contribution deduction represents a public policy
decision to promote gifts to charity and it should not be narrowly construed. See Helvering v.
Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934) (stating that tax provisions allowing an exemption for income
devoted to charity were motivated by public policy concerns, and should not be narrowly con-
strued); see also Yerkes, supra note 129, at 179 (criticizing Duberstein for its "overwhelming
concern about the subjective intent of the corporation at the moment of transfer").
209. In United States v. Transamerica, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968), the same circuit that
decided Dejong, held that the Duberstein test was inapplicable to corporate donors thereby limit-
ing the holding in Dejong to individual donors. Id. at 524. The court reasoned, "[i]t does not seem
appropriate . . .to demand of a corporate entity such impulses as affection, respect or admira-
tion." Id. Recognizing the logical (or illogical) conclusion of such an application, the court mused,
"[flurther, an absolute requirement of detached and disinterested generosity or lack of any busi-
ness purpose would tend to render ultra vires substantially all charitable contributions and thus
frustrate congressional intent that corporations should enjoy such deductions." Id.
210. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34863 (April 28, 1972) (stating that the IRS should no longer use the
Duberstein standard in "rulings or litigation involving the deduction of charitable contributions").
211. Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) ("[A] payment is not a contribu-
tion or a gift under section 170 if it is made with the expectation of receiving a commensurate
benefit in return. ... ); Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F. 2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1972) ("The
more fundamental objective test is . . . [was the payment], to any substantial extent, offset by the
cost of services rendered to taxpayers in the nature of tuition?"); Crosby Valve, 380 F.2d at 149
(disallowing a tax-free distribution of earning to the sole shareholder); Singer Co. v. United
States, 449 F. 2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (stating that if the donor receives or expects to receive
substantial benefits, then he has received "a quid pro quo sufficient to remove the transfer from
the realm of deductibility under section 170").
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regulations under section 170 to help determine when a transfer is
properly characterized as a business expense rather than a charita-
ble contribution.212 According to the regulations, a transfer is not a
contribution if the donor had "a reasonable expectation of financial
return commensurate with the amount of the transfer ... .
(b) Hernandez and the quid pro quo standard
The notion of applying the "detached and disinterested generos-
ity" test to a corporation is intriguing, but the prior practice of the
IRS and the Hernandez214 decision render such an inquiry moot, at
least for purposes of section 170. In Hernandez, the Court disal-
lowed the deduction of amounts paid to the Church of Scientology
for religious "auditing" sessions essential to the practice of the tax-
payer's religious belief.2"5 The Court focused on the benefits re-
ceived in exchange for the taxpayer's transfer. Contrary to long-
standing IRS administrative practice,216 the Court refused to draw a
distinction between financial or economic benefits and intangible re-
ligious benefits.21 This disregarded the language in both the regula-
tions and the legislative history that requires the commensurate ben-
efit to be financial.
212. The irony is that this new external test requires the court to determine the donor's expec-
tations as shown by the facts and circumstances. The quid pro quo standard merely limited the
scope of the Duberstein subjective inquiry. One way to show the absence of "detached and disin-
terested generosity" is to prove the expectation of a commensurate benefit in return. The absence
of such an expectation may not be sufficient.to meet the Duberstein standard, but it would support
a finding of detached and disinterested generosity.
213. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (as amended in 1990).
214. 490 U.S. 680 (1989) ( Marshall, J., writing for Justices Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, and
Stevens). Justices O'Connor and Scalia dissented. Id. at 704. Justices Brennan and Kennedy took
no part in the decision. Id. at 703.
215. Id. at 683-84. Hernandez represents a chapter in the on-going feud between the IRS and
the Church of Scientology. For purposes of the Hernandez litigation, the IRS stipulated that the
Church of Scientology was qualified to receive tax-deductible contributions under section 170. Id.
at 686. For a summary of the controversy, see Carol A. Jones, Note, Hernandez v. Commissioner:
the Supreme Court Forces a Square Peg in a Round Hole, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 917 (1990).
216. As a matter of administrative practice, the IRS did not reduce the amount of a charitable
deduction for the value of any religious benefits received in exchange for the transfer. Rev. Rul.
70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49 (ruling that the cost of pew rentals, building assessments and tithing fully
deductible as a charitable contribution). Justice O'Connor's dissent in Hernandez was highly criti-
cal of this break with practice and listed numerous payments to religious organizations that would
fall under the scope of the majority's decision (e.g., pew rentals, high holiday tickets, torah read-
ings). Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 709.
217. The taxpayer argued strenuously that quid pro quo analysis applied only in the case of
economic benefits and that it should not apply to intangible religious benefits, like those the tax-
payer received as a result of the "auditing" sessions. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 692.
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Under this rule, a donor (individual or corporate) would be re-
quired to reduce the deductible value of any transfer to charity to
the extent the donor expects to receive even an intangible, nonfinan-
cial, benefit in return. Thus, the goodwill a corporate donor expects
in return for a $100x corporate contribution should prohibit the de-
ductibility of the transfer to the extent of the value of the
goodwill. 218
Since Hernandez, the courts and the IRS have refused to charac-
terize corporate transfers to charity as deductible contributions
where the corporate donor received an obvious benefit. The benefits
identified to date include: relief of maintenance costs, 219 goodwill
advertising, 220 increased market share,2 21 and necessary compliance
with state enabling legislation. 2  Generally, the disallowance of the
deduction under section 170 did not disadvantage the corporate tax-
218. See supra note 192 (discussing the computation of the deduction in the case of transfers to
charity that are part gift and part purchase).
219. Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 902 F. 2d 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In Transamerica.
the corporate donor sought to deduct over $ 10 million under section 170 for the transfer of certain
rights to "original film negatives of motion pictures on nitrate-based film" to the Library of Con-
gress. Id. at 1541. Under the terms of the transfer, the corporate donor reserved certain exclusive
rights of access to the film for commercial purposes and the Library of Congress agreed to under-
take the expensive preservation of the film. Id. at 1542. The federal circuit held that Transamer-
ica received substantial benefits in return because it reserved access to the preserved negatives and
it was relieved of the cost of storage. Id. at 1543. Transamerica is consistent with a pre-Her-
nandez line of cases involving the transfer of land or facilities to municipal authorities. See, e.g.,
Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (disallowing a deduc-
tion for the transfer of real estate to a school district not deductible as a charitable contribution
because the corporate donor's surrounding land would increase in value).
220. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9309006 (November 17, 1992). In PLR 9309006, a supermarket chain
intended to set aside 1 % of its sales each year for charitable contributions "as part of a promotion
and advertising program" and desired to deduct the expenses as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense under section 162. The ruling allowed the deduction finding that "the promotion is a
form of goodwill advertising which keeps the taxpayer's name before the public." Id.; see also
Rev. Rul. 63-73, 1963-1 C.B. 44 (permitting a deduction under section 162(a) where the donor
corporation identified the charitable donee in its advertising campaign); accord Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8515014 (January 7, 1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7843062 (July 27, 1978).
221. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9045015 (August 9, 1990) (concluding corporate transfers to charity "rea-
sonably calculated to maintain and improve [donor's] current business . . . as well as enlarge the
market.") This ruling is consistent with Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971)
where the court held that "enlarging the future potential market by developing prospective pur-
chasers of home sewing machines and more particularly, Singer machines," was a "reasonable"
expectation of financial return. Id. at 423. See also, Rev. Rul. 72-314, 1972-1 C.B. 44 (ruling that
it was reasonable to expect a transfer to a charity organized to promote community development
in the neighborhood where taxpayer's brokerage business was located to increase business).
222. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9011026 (December 18, 1989) (ruling that the payment of net earnings
subject to certain exceptions, by the operator of a racing facility required by state law are deducti-
ble as ordinary and necessary business expenses). See also Rev. Rul. 77-124, 1977-1 C.B. 39.
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payer because disallowance, in most cases,22 insured its deductibil-
ity under section 162.22
3. Intersection With the Section 162 Deduction for Ordinary and
Necessary Business Expenses
If a corporate transfer to a qualified charity does not constitute a
contribution or gift under section 170, it may be an ordinary and
necessary business expense deductible under section 162.225 The sec-
tion 170 regulations provide:
Transfers of property to an organization described in section 170(c) which
bear a direct relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business and which are
made with a reasonable expectation of financial return commensurate with
the amount of the transfer may constitute allowable deductions as trade or
business expenses rather than as charitable contributions. See section 162
and the regulations thereunder.22 6
Section 162(b)227 specifically prohibits the use of section 162 to cir-
cumvent the ceiling limitations imposed under section 170.228 The
acknowledged overlap of section 170 and section 162 highlights the
tax code's conviction that it can distinguish a corporate contribution
to charity (i.e., a charitable purchase of advertising or goodwill)
from a business expense (i.e., a commercial purchase of advertising
or goodwill).229
223. In Transamerica, the Court of Claims disallowed a charitable deduction because it found
a quid pro quo exchange. Transamerica, 902 F.2d at 1544. Presumably, a section 162 deduction
was not at issue because of the capital nature of the expenditure.
224. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (as amended in 1990).
225. I.R.C. § 162(b) (1988) (providing that any transfers which qualify for the charitable con-
tribution deduction must be deducted under section 170 and cannot be deducted under section
162). The reason for this preference is to prevent taxpayers from circumventing the ceiling limita-
tions imposed on charitable deductions. Ordinary and necessary business expenses deductible
under section 162 are not subject to any ceiling limitations. See infra notes 227-29 and accompa-
nying text.
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(c)(5) (as amended in 1990).
227. Section 162(b) provides: "No [ordinary and necessary business] deduction shall be al-
lowed under subsection (a) for any contribution or gift which would be allowable as a deduction
under section 170 were it not for the percentage limitations . . . set forth in such section." I.R.C.
§ 162(b) (1988). See infra note 229 (explaning the predecessor of section 162(b)).
228. Again, this assumes that a corporation's transfers to charity are near the 10% limitation.
Statistics indicate that this is not the case. See supra notes 63, 66 (showing that 1992 corporate
contributions were $6 billion and 1992 corporate pre-tax income was $371.6 billion).
229. The legislative history for the predecessor of section 162(b) attempted to provide guid-
ance. Section 23(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447. Section
23(a)(2) was later redesignated 23(a)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The House
Ways and Means Report stated:
As under present law, [the limitation contained in the predecessor of 162(b)] applies
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Under section 162(b), the courts and the IRS must determine
whether a corporate transfer to charity represents a quid pro quo
exchange.280 For example in Singer,231 the Court of Claims accepted
Singer's belief that the sale of its sewing machines to schools at a
discount would increase future sales. 2  The court held that Singer
could not deduct the value of the discount under section 170 be-
cause of its anticipated benefit. This perceived benefit revealed a
quid pro quo exchange, notwithstanding the long-term nature of the
benefit. 233 Furthermore, the court held that Singer did not have to
realize the anticipated benefits.234
Because a corporation can deduct a transfer to charity under sec-
tion 162, the repeal of the corporate section 170 deduction will not
end favorable tax treatment for corporate giving or increase the cost
of most corporate giving. 23 5 Accordingly, the repeal should have no
only to gifts, i.e. those contributions which were made with no expectation of a finan-
cial retun commensurate with the amount of the gift. For example, the limitation
would not apply to a payment by an individual to a hospital in consideration of a
binding obligation to provide medical treatment for the individual's employees. It
would apply only if there were no expectation of any quid pro quo from the hospital.
H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 196
(1954). The enactment of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code redesignated section 23 (a)(l)(B) to
its present section 162(b) and extended its coverage to include individuals. I.R.C. § 162(b)
(1988). No other substantive changes were made or have since been made.
230. In such cases, the corporate taxpayer wants to qualify the transfer as a section 162 deduc-
tion and must establish that it received a "commensurate financial benefit in return" for the trans-
fer. See e.g., Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 420 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (discussing the section
162 deduction requirement that "gifts are contributions made with no expectation of financial
return commensurate with the amount of the gift"). Contra Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8145020 (July 30,
1981) (ruling a contribution by local newspaper business to fund first grade reading program
results in only incidental business benefit and, therefore, thereby fails to show direct business
relationship as required by the regulations under section 162).
231. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
232. Part I1, Section B provides a discussion of corporate giving as a means to increase future
markets. See infra notes 410-34 and accompanying text.
233. "[l]n reference to the discounts granted to the school, [Singer] expected a return in the
nature of future increased sales. This expectation, even though perhaps not fully realized, provided
a quid pro quo for those discounts which was substantial." Singer, 449 F.2d at 424. The court
held that other charity discounts to hospitals and the like were charitable in nature because any
benefits to Singer were incidental. Id.
234. Singer introduced evidence that only 1.75 percent of its regular customers "were influ-
enced in buying a Singer machine by previous school training." Id. The court continued: "[t]his
fact, if one accepts survey results as fact, does not change our opinion because even if [Singer's]
expectations were not realized, the nature of the transaction is not changed from its initial charac-
ter." Id.; see also Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970) (stating that the
fact taxpayers never realized their anticipated economic benefits was not relevant under the sec-
tion 70 analysis).
235. CLOTFELTER, supra, note 71, at 278 ("If the deduction for charitable contributions were
limited or eliminated, corporations would have the incentive to substitute other deductible expend-
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appreciable effect on federal revenue.236 This, however, does not di-
minish the need for the repeal of the corporate charitable deduction.
Although the repeal may not impact the federal fisc, it will remove
the current reinforcement of the "halo effect" provided by section
170 and its underlying rationale that corporations give assets away
out of a sense of disinterested social responsibility. This reinforce-
ment of the "halo effect" increases the benefit associated with a cor-
porate transfer to charity due to the mischaracterization of a trans-
fer as a contribution or gift (i.e., not a quid pro quo exchange). In
fact, the halo effect insures that corporations cannot make transfers
to charity without expecting a commensurate benefit in return.
From a strictly doctrinal standpoint, the overlap between section
170 and section 162 is not complete and in many instances a corpo-
rate "charitable" transfer receives more favorable tax treatment
than a business expense. With the exception of avoiding the 10%
limitation imposed under section 170,237 a taxpayer has little incen-
tive to classify a transfer as a section 162 business expense, rather
than a section 170 charitable contribution.
(a) The nondeductibility of goodwill
The section 162 deduction only applies to ordinary and necessary
business expenses. This means that capital expenditures (i.e., gener-
ally those expenditures that produce a benefit beyond the taxable
year, with an exception for most advertising costs)238 are not imme-
diately deductible. Capital expenditures must be capitalized (i.e.,
added to basis).2 39 Thus, in the case of a transfer to charity consti-
tuting a capital expenditure, a corporation cannot "substitute" an
immediate section 162 deduction for an immediate section 170
deduction.
In several reported cases, the IRS successfully recharacterized a
corporate transfer to charity as a purchase of goodwill and further
itures for corporate gifts.") See Lashbrooke, supra note 9, at 222 (stating that if section 170 did
not exist, state statutes authorizing corporate charitable contributions would become meaningless).
236. Compare Lashbrooke supra note 9, at 246 (discussing the proportionality of corporate
charitable contributions to after tax income).
237. See supra notes 63, 66 (discussing studies showing that corporate giving does not ap-
proach the level such that the ceiling would act as a limitation).
238. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-14 (1969).
239. See generally I.R.C. §1016 (1994) and the addition to basis provisions. Section 197
adopted by the 1993 Act provides for the amortization of intangible property, including goodwill,
on a straight-line basis over 15 years. Id. § 197.
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classified the transfer as a nondeductible capital expenditure. 40 This
highlights the disparate tax treatment of a commercial purchase of
goodwill as compared to a charitable purchase of goodwill. 4'
(b) Transfers of appreciated or inventory property
Section 170 also provides more favorable treatment than section
162 where a corporation transfers either appreciated property or in-
ventory property to charity. Under section 170, a taxpayer is enti-
tled to deduct the full current fair market value of appreciated long-
term capital gain property.242 The taxpayer does not realize any
gain on account of the transfer. 43 Under section 162, a taxpayer is
entitled to deduct the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property and
the taxpayer realizes gain equal to the difference between the tax-
payer's adjusted basis24 4 in the property and the full fair market
value of the property on the date of the transfer.2 5
Under section 170, a taxpayer generally is entitled to deduct only
its basis or cost in inventory property transferred to charity.24 6 How-
ever, section 170(e) provides corporations an enhanced deduction2 47
for certain types of inventory property 248 transferred to specific
240. See, e.g., Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 504, 515 (N.D. CA. 1966)
(finding a transfer of real estate to the City of Oakland was a capital expenditure because the
benefits received "(e.g., accessibility to an adjoining street and the elimination of annual resurfac-
ing costs) indicates a capital expenditure the benefits of which will extend for more than one year
- the usual dividing line between deductible expenses and capital expenditures"), affid 392 F. 2d
522 (1968); Dockery v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 317, 321 (1978) (holding the cost of
construction of a waterline subsequently transferred to city served a business purpose and must be
capitalized under section 263). Yerkes, supra note 129, at 169 n.57 ("[C]ourts will often classify
a denied corporate charitable contribution as a capital expenditure, which is a non-deductible
expense under § I.R.C. 263 (1976).").
241. For a discussion of corporate transfers to charity as a purchase of goodwill, see supra note
96 and accompanying text.
242. The property is valued at its fair market value on the date of the transfer. I.R.C.
§ 170(e)(1)(A) (1988).
243. See supra notes 202-03 (discussing the relevance of the donor's gain to deductibility).
244. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)(1988) (defining gain as the excess of the 'amount realized' as de-
fined in section 1001(b) over the adjusted basis as defined in section 1011).
245. This assumes that the property is used to 'purchase' a benefit of equal value.
246. I.R.C. § 170(e)(l)(A) (1988).
247. See id. § 170(e)(3)(B) (permitting a taxpayer to deduct an amount equal to the tax-
payer's adjusted basis or cost plus one-half of the unrealized appreciation, provided such amount
does not exceed twice the amount of taxpayer's basis).
248. See id. § 170(e)(4)(B) (providing favorable treatment for "qualified research contribu-
tions."). In addition to other requirements, such contributions must consist of "scientific equip-
ment or apparatus substantially all of the use of which by the donee is for research or experimen-
tation . . . or for research training, in the United States in physical or biological sciences." Id.
§ 170(e)(4)(B)(v).
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charitable organizations for particular purposes.24 9 For qualifying
transfers, section 170(e) permits a corporation to deduct its basis or
its cost plus one-half of the difference between its basis or cost and
the property's market (or sales) value.250 Under section 162, a tax-
payer is only entitled to deduct its basis or cost and the taxpayer
may realize ordinary income on account of the transfer.25'
4. The Corporate Level Deduction
If a corporation is authorized to make a transfer to charity, it
follows that the deduction for the transfer should be claimed at the
corporate level.252 Critics of the corporate deduction maintain that a
corporate transfer to charity is a substitute for an individual contri-
bution, on behalf of either the shareholder/owners or the corporate
managers. 53
(a) A constructive dividend?
A corporate transfer to charity is deductible by the corporation.
The value of the transfer is not included in a shareholder's gross
income even where the shareholder owns a controlling interest in the
corporation and has the authority to determine the identity of the
charitable donee. 54 Commentators suggest that corporate transfers
to charity are constructive dividends to the shareholder/owner. 55
249. Id. § 170(e)(3)(A)(i) (providing favorable treatment for transfers of inventory to a quali-
fied charity where "the property is to be used by the donee solely for the care of the ill, the needy,
or infants").
250. Id. § 170(e)(3)(B).
251. Id. § 162(a).
252. Of course, this is not the case with a Subchapter S corporation defined generally under
section 1361 as a closely-held corporation with 35 or fewer shareholders. Id. § 1361(a)(1),
(b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1994). The shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation report their pro
rata share of most items of deduction, profit and loss. Id. § 1366(a). With the certain limited
exceptions, the corporate entity is disregarded for tax purposes and there is no tax at the corporate
level. Id. § 1363(a).
253. Davis, supra note 119, at 15. See Earl F. Davis and Walter C. McGill, Jr., Corporate
Charitable Contributions and the Constructive Dividend Problem, 8 J. CORP. TAX'N 323, 330
(1982) (calling corporate contributions "assignments of income").
254. Rev. Rul. 79-9, 1979-1 C.B. 125 holds that a corporate charitable contribution is not
treated as a constructive dividend taxable to a controlling shareholder even where the shareholder
has the right to select the charitable donee. The only exception is where the shareholder (or his or
her family) receives an economic benefit by reason of the transfer. Revenue Ruling 79-9 also
explains the acquiescence of the IRS in Knott v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 681 (1977). See also
GCM 37282 (September 30, 1977) (recommending that the IRS acquiesce to the decision in
Knott).
255. Davis, supra note 119, at 67 (stating that corporations are the "charitable agents" of their
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If a corporate transfer to charity is a perfect substitute for a
transfer by a shareholder/owner, 56 then the ability to claim the de-
duction at the corporate level produces a favorable tax benefit for
the shareholder/owner. For tax purposes, the shareholder/owner
benefits from the corporate level deduction provided the alternative
is for the corporation to declare a dividend of $100x to the share-
holder/owner which the shareholder/owner then transfers to a qual-
ified charity. 5 In such case, the dividend is not a deductible ex-
pense of the corporation and the shareholder/owner must include
the $100x in gross income. 5 " Although the shareholder/owner is en-
titled to deduct the transfer under section 170, the $100x he or she
transfers to charity does not offset gross income on a dollar for dol-
lar basis because the individual charitable contribution deduction is
an itemized deduction, subject to certain limitation for high income
individuals.259
Milton Friedman, who is not otherwise a fan of corporate giv-
ing, 6 0 cited this favorable tax treatment as one of the few justifica-
tions for corporate giving. 1
stockholders).
256. This assumes that shareholders may not make charitable donations if the corporation has
already contributed.
257. Davis, supra note 119, at 67 (stating that "permitting the corporation to make donations
from pre-tax dollars effectively increases the federal tax subsidy from one-to-one to three-to-one");
Davis & McGill, supra note 253, at 323 (stating that closely held corporations should consider
corporate contributions rather than personal contributions); Yerkes, supra note 129, at 167 n.358
("[1It is more advantageous for the controlling shareholder in a closely held corporation to make
charitable contributions through the corporation rather than personally.").
258. Davis, supra note 119, at 67 n.271 (illustrating the potential tax savings generated by the
deduction at the entity level assuming that corporate transfers are a perfect substitute for trans-
fers by shareholder/owner).
259. The charitable contribution is an itemized deduction which reduces adjusted gross income.
I.R.C. §§ 63(d), 67(b)(4) (1988) (defining "itemized deductions"). Such itemized or so-called
"above-the-line" deductions are subject to certain phase-out limitations for high income individu-
als. See id. § 68(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The extent of the phase-out is limited to 20% of the tax-
payer's otherwise allowable itemized deductions. Id. § 68(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1992). An individual
taxpayer whose itemized deductions do not exceed the standard deduction (defined in section
63(c)) cannot claim any of his or her otherwise allowable itemized deductions. Id. § 63(b) (1988).
260. See Johnson, supra note 167, at II (discussing Friedman's views on corporate giving). In
response to the question of what is the fundamental role of the corporation in society, Mr. Fried-
man stated:
To produce goods and services to satisfy the demands of the public. The role of the
corporation is to serve an as intermediary between individuals in their capacity as
workers, providers of capital, providers of organizational ability, and so on - that is
to say, as resources - and individuals as consumers.
Id. at 14.
261. Id. The other justification is, of course, profit maximization. Id. ("Charitable activity in
some cases may contribute to a corporation's making as much money as possible.").
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[T]he tax laws enable a corporation's stockholders to make larger gifts
through the corporation than they can make on their own because corporate
contributions are deductible for corporate tax purposes and dividends are
not. As a result, the corporation may serve its stockholders by acting as a
conduit through which stockholders can use their money most effectively.2 16
The conclusion that the corporate level deduction is a benefit for the
shareholders/owners assumes that the corporation is an aggregate
of, or "conduit" for, its shareholders.2" 3 The separation of control
from ownership,2 6 mandates that the corporate managers and not
the shareholder/owners develop corporate giving policy. Thus, the
charitable choices of a corporation, as expressed by its managers,
may not reflect the choices of its shareholders.265
Despite the concern raised generally over the separation of the
control of corporate decisions from corporate ownership, research in-
dicates that very few shareholders object to corporate transfers to
charity.2 66 At least one corporation has attempted to introduce a di-
rect correlation between shareholder dividends and corporate contri-
butions.267 In 1981, Berkshire Hathaway began allowing each share-
holder to allocate a portion of his or her dividend to one of three
preselected charities.268
262. Id.
263. Davis, supra note 119, at 67 (stating that corporations are the "charitable agents" of the
stockholders).
264. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 37, at 119-26. See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text
(discussing some commentators' belief that corporate contributions are part of corporate manag-
ers' compensation packages).
265. This assertion is one of the principal concerns expressed by Professor Davis. See Davis,
supra note 119, at 65 (asking "[w]hy should the wealth of corporations permit them to preempt
the charitable choices of the very shareholders to whom that wealth could otherwise be
distributed?").
266. KoCH, supra note 163, at 27 (reporting that 98% of IBM shareholders voted against a
measure that would adversely affect corporate contributions). Of course, the failure of sharehold-
ers to object could support the notion of "shareholder abdication" over matters of corporate
governance.
267. This approach bears a striking resemblance to the Red Cross Dividend Program. See
supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Red Cross Dividend Program). How-
ever, in the case of Berkshire Hathaway the purpose is not to circumvent states laws restricting
corporate actions. Rather, the intent is to vest the shareholder/owners with some control over
corporate giving. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
268. Davis, supra note 119, at 65; Johnson, supra note 167, at 14-15. In addition, many corpo-
rations have instituted "matching gift" programs where the corporation matches an employee's
contribution to limitations on dollar amounts and the type of charitable recipients. See infra note
420 (explaining General Electric's introduction of matching gift programs in the area of educa-
tional institutions).
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(b) Compensation to the manager?
Recognizing that corporate managers and not shareholders/own-
ers have dominion and control over the expenditure of a corpora-
tion's charitable giving budget, some commentators suggest that
corporate transfers to charity represent part of the compensation
package of corporate managers.26 9 If a corporate transfer to charity
is really a substitute for a transfer by a corporate manager, then the
ability to claim the deduction at the corporate level produces a
favorable tax benefit for the corporate manager. For tax purposes,
the manager benefits from the corporate level deduction provided
the alternative is for the corporation to pay the manager an addi-
tional $100x in compensation which the manager then transfers to a
qualified charity. In such case, the additional compensation is a de-
ductible expense of the corporation, but the manager must include
the $100x in gross income. Although the manager is entitled to de-
duct the transfer under section 170, the $100x he or she transfers to
charity does not offset gross income on a dollar for dollar basis be-
'cause the individual charitable contribution deduction is an itemized
deduction, subject to certain limitation for high income
individuals. 2 °
Absent a direct payment of the $100X from the corporation to
the manager, current interpretation of the tax laws does not charac-
terize the $1.00x as compensation because the manager is "merely
performing administrative duties for the corporation by suggesting
specific qualified recipient organizations. '27 1 Such interpretation
does not recognize the potential for corporate managers to use-cor-
porate giving as a form of social currency. 272
269. See Davis, supra note 119, at 16 ("corporate managers as arbiters of social welfare").
270. The charitable contribution is an itemized deduction which reduces adjusted gross income.
I.R.C. §§ 63(d), 67(b)(4) (1988) (defining "itemized deductions"). Such itemized or so-called
"above-the-line" deductions are subject to certain phase-out limitations for high income individu-
als. See id. § 68(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The extent of the phase-out is limited to 20% of the tax-
payer's otherwise allowable itemized deductions. Id. § 68(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). Individuals
whose itemized deductions do not exceed the standard deduction (defined in section 63(c)) cannot
claim any of their otherwise allowable itemized deductions. Id. § 63(b) (1988).
Unlike the corporation, the manager would have little incentive to substitute a section 162 de-
duction because unreimbursed employee business expenses are miscellaneous itemized deductions.
See id. § 67(b). The manager is entitled to deduct such expenses only to the extent that in the
aggregate they exceed 2% of the manager's adjusted gross income, subject to the phase-out dis-
cussed above. See id. §67(a); 68(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
271. Rev. Rul. 67-137, 1957-1 C.B. 63.
272. See infra notes 455-68 and accompanying text (discussing corporate giving as social
currency).
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II. CORPORATE GIVING: ITS MANY EXPLANATIONS AND
MANIFESTATIONS
A. The "Halo Effect" and What Corporations Say They Expect
to Get When They Give
1. Tax Deductibility as the Sine Qua Non of Corporate Giving
Many legal commentators and economists believe that the
favorable federal income tax treatment afforded corporate transfers
to charity explains the paradox of corporate giving.171 However, the
history of corporate philanthropy and the failure of economists to
predict changes in corporate giving patterns, illustrates that the de-
ductibility of corporate transfers to qualified organizations is not
sufficient to explain the persistent practice of corporate giving.274
Legal scholars and economists assume that corporate giving involves
a transfer of corporate assets without the expectation of receiving a
commensurate benefit in return. Accordingly, they look only to the
tangible tax benefits in an effort to explain what they perceive as
irrational corporate behavior.
Legal scholarship mistakenly accepts and advances tax deductibil-
ity as the sine qua non of corporate giving.275 For example, Profes-
sor Green asked and answered, "What is the motivation for such
[corporate] philanthropy? Admittedly, many individuals and busi-
nesses give simply to realize the tax benefits. 276 No other explana-
tion is offee. But, as explained more fully in Part I, Section9i2 h
"tax benefits" associated with corporate giving melrey reduce the
cost of such giving.277 Despite deductibility, each dollar transferred
to charity represents a dollar not distributed to shareholders- or oth-
e Professor Lashbrooke
vigorously advocated the repeal of the corporate charitable deduc-
tion under section 170 because it would "require corporations to jus-
tify all expenditures in terms of profit maximization and business
273. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 129 (discussing business participation involving the use of
corporate funds); Green, supra note 60 (discussing corporate contributions, benefits, and motiva-
tion behind giving); Lashbrooke, supra note 9 (discussing the existence of the section 170 deduc-
tion for corporations and its relation to resources, social responsibility, and moral welfare).
274. See supra notes 73-176 and accompanying text (discussing the history of corporate chari-
table giving).
275. See supra note 273 (citing examples of works which advocate this view).
276. Green, supra note 60, at 240.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 177-272 (discussing the structure of the federal in-
come tax corporate charitable deduction).
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purpose. 21 7 8 He concluded:
Repeal of section 170 with respect to corporate charitable contribution de-
ductions would effectively stop corporate charitable giving, whether author-
ized by state statute or justified on the basis of corporate social responsibil-
ity, because corporate giving is bottom line oriented. In the absence of a tax
deduction, corporations would have no incentive to give corporate assets to
charity.
17 9
Similarly, Professor Blumberg contended that corporations under-
take social responsibility programs, including transfers to charity,
only to the extent that such expenditures receive favorable tax treat-
ment.280 Blumberg stated: "[T]he tax test may . . . be the decisive
test of validity in a tax-oriented business world. It is plain that, as a
practical matter, corporate activities in the social sphere will be un-
dertaken only if the expenditures are tax-deductible."28
Congress enacted the corporate charitable contribution deduction
in 1935 to encourage existing behavior, not to create new expres-
sions of corporate action. Corporate giving existed in the absence of
the deduction, and despite the fact that corporate transfers to char-
ity were considered ultra vires under the laws of many states.2 82
Given that corporate giving pre-existed the enactment of the deduc-
tion, the motivation for corporate giving cannot lie solely within the
four corners of section 170.283
278. Lashbrooke, supra note 9, at 223. "These [individual and corporate charitable giving]
statistics reflect the altruism and generosity of the American people. Corporations, however, do
not give based on altruism or generosity but on tax consequences." Id. at 227.
279. Id. at 248 (emphasis added). Professor Lashbrooke continued, "Some limited corporate
giving might still be justified as ordinary and necessary business expenses and, hence, would be
deductible under section 162; however, if section 170 were repealed the courts would scrutinize
such expenditures more carefully." Id. Despite Professor Lashbrooke's recognition of the section
162 potential substitution, he argues for repeal on the basis of lost federal revenue. Professor
Lashbrooke states, "Given the state of the federal budget and the now expressed need to raise
taxes, we can not afford to continue to let as much as $1.7 billion dollars annually leak out of the
federal treasury through the section 170 corporate charitable deduction." Id. at 222.
280. Blumberg, supra note 129, at 180.
281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. See supra notes 71-116 and accompanying text (discussing how transfers to charity were
ultra vires in many states and the ways Congress, corporations, and charities addressed the issue);
see HALL, supra note 97, at 58 (describing extensive corporate transfers to charity during the first
half of the twentieth century). Hall cited a survey of corporate contribution to various charities in
37 cities during the 1920s and reported that corporate gifts accounted for an average of 20% of
the total funds raised. Id. Hall concluded: "Although there was no tax incentive for charitable
giving by corporations, and under the law in many states such giving was illegal, the practice
continued on a surprisingly large scale." Id.
283. See id. (describing corporate giving prior to the enactment of section 170). Hall criticized
the assertion by Andrews that the creation of corporate foundations was "clearly related to corpo-
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Beyond the legal academy, the prevailing explanation of corporate
giving identifies business benefits as the motivating force. The tax
treatment of corporate contributions is considered an ancillary fac-
tor.2 84 For example, in 1956, Richard Eells, one of the first commen-
tators on corporate giving, observed correctly that corporate trans-
fers to charity still "cost the shareowners something"'28 and,
therefore, tax treatment alone could not explain corporate giving. As
Eells explained, the threshold question confronting a corporation
contemplating a transfer to charity is "whether to make it at all."286
While a corporation may transfer more because of the deduction,
the steady rise in corporate giving despite fluctuating tax rates con-
futes any assumption that the amount of corporate transfers corre-
lates directly to the real, after-tax cost of the transfer. 87
Economists predicted that the 1986 reduction of tax rates2 88
would cause a decline in charitable giving.2 9 For example,
rate tax chronology." Id. at 61 (citing ANDREWS, supra note 79, at 29). Hall cautioned, "Al-
though the increases [in the formation of corporate foundations] may be accounted for solely in
terms of tax chronology, it is worth noting that there were other powerful forces influencing corpo-
rate givers ...." Id.
284. For a discussion of a survey of CEO's concluding that the tax treatment is not a signifi-
cant consideration, see infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text (citing a survey conducted in
1981 and 1982).
285. EELLS, supra note 74, at 150. Eells explained:
The philanthropic responsibilities and opportunities of corporations arise indepen-
dently of tax-exemption privileges and cannot properly be made to depend upon cur-
rent tax policies alone. Corporate giving has its own quid pro quo. The fact that a
company-donor gets a good "tax bargain" is not the real justification for a tax-exempt
gift. The gift, after all, does cost the shareowners something. The question is whether
to make it at all. If there is good ground for the expenditure, it should be made
whether or not it is tax exempt.
Id.
286. Id.
287. See supra notes 62-67 (describing a steady increase in corporate giving throughout the
1980's despite the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act).
288. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top marginal rate of tax on corporate income
from 46% to 34%. I.R.C. § 11 (West 1994). As a result, the after-tax cost of a fully deductible
$100x corporate transfer to charity increased from $54x to $66x. See infra notes 294-96 and
accompanying text (discussing the Tax Reform Act's corporate tax reduction impact on corporate
giving).
289. Clotfelter addressed the impact on corporate giving of the 1986 Tax Reform Act reduction
in the top marginal corporate tax rate from 46% to 34% and concluded: "Based on available
econometric evidence, the resulting increase in the net cost of making gifts will result in a modest
decline in corporate giving, on the order of 5 percent." Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy
and Charitable Giving, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS, supra note
11, at 115; see also Jerald Schiff, Tax Policy, Charitable Giving, and the Non Profit Sector:
What Do We Really Know?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS,
supra note 11, at 128, 137-38 (citing estimated reduction for total giving but concluding: "Tax
reform will affect the charitable sector in ways that are much more far reaching than simply
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Clotfelter projected a 5 % decline in corporate giving2 90 and a 15 %
decline in charitable giving by individuals.2 91 This econometric anal-
ysis assumed that tax policy is the primary factor in determining the
amount to give, affecting corporate giving in two ways: (1) the char-
itable deduction reduces the after-tax cost of the transfer, and (2)
the rate of tax determines the after-tax income of the donor.2 92
Thus, a reduction in a donor's rate of tax increases the after-tax cost
of the transfer, but also increases the donor's after-tax income.2 93
Corporate transfers continued to increase annually between 1987
and 1991,294 despite the recession and an inconsistent trend in cor-
porate pre-tax income.2 95 Econometric projections failed to antici-
pate the post-1986 increase in corporate giving"' because changes
in income cannot explain corporate giving patterns.
A recent survey of chief executive officers concerning their com-
panies' corporate giving programs confirms that tax benefits are not
the primary consideration of corporate donors. 97 In fact, the CEOs
responded overwhelmingly that tax incentives do not significantly in-
fluence their corporate giving patterns. When specifically asked
reducing donations of money by individuals.").
290. See supra note 67 (citing Clotfelter's 5% decline projection).
291. Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, in PHILANTHROPIC GIv-
ING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS, supra note 11, at 114; see also Jerald Schiff, Tax Policy,
Charitable Giving, and the Non Profit Sector: What Do We Really Know?, in PHILANTHROPIC
GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS supra note 11, at 132 (summarizing the reduction
estimates for individuals which ranged from 14.2% to 17.7%). The expected higher reduction in
individual giving was due, in part, to the expiration of the above-the-line charitable deduction for
nonitemizers. As a result of the expiration of the provision, an individual whose aggregate item-
ized (below-the-line) deductions (including any transfers to charity) do not exceed the standard
deduction can no longer claim a charitable deduction. Id.
292. Tax policy also determines the extent of the reduction in the cost of the transfer. See
supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
293. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 71, at 172 ("ITlhe tax affects a corporation's after-tax net
income as well as its price of giving.").
294. See supra note 63 (citing corporate giving statistics).
295. See supra note 66 (citing corporate pre-tax income statistics).
296. See supra notes 288-93 and accompanying text (discussing economists predictions of the
1986 reduction of tax rates). This Article is concerned solely with corporate giving and argues
that corporations make transfers to charity to realize a return benefit in the form of advertising
services, public relations efforts to enhance goodwill, or an investment in future markets and fu-
ture employees. Additional factors that could account for the increase in giving include increased
fundraising efforts on the part of charitable organizations, and intensified public emphasis on giv-
ing and volunteerism.
297. Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More Than a Market-
ing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS supra note 11, at
246, 251 (citing a survey of 219 chief executive officers conducted in 1981 and 1982 when the top
marginal corporate tax rate was 46% and, therefore, the after-tax cost of a $100x transfer to
charity was only $54).
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whether tax laws are an incentive to giving, the response was equiv-
ocal: "Only 26 percent of [the] respondents said that tax laws pro-
vided 'great' or 'substantial' incentives, 36 percent said 'some' incen-
tives, and 36 percent said 'very slight' or 'no' incentives. ' 298 Only
12% of the CEO's surveyed stated that tax savings is an "ex-
tremely" or "very important" goal.299
2. The Perceived Business Benefit of Corporate Giving
Because corporations do not make transfers to charity merely "to
realize the tax benefits",300 another reason must exist to explain why
corporations transfer billions of dollars to charity each year. Mar-
keting and fundraising literature explains that a corporate transfer
to charity increases corporate/shareholder profit and gain.30 1 Asso-
ciating with a charity or a charitable cause can enhance a corpora-
tion's image much the same way as advertising or public relations
initiatives.30 2 Studies of corporate budgets confirm this perception
and suggest that a corporation may use transfers to charity to com-
plement or supplement its advertising/marketing budget. 303
There is some evidence of an association between industry type
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See supra notes 273-99 (discussing corporate giving as not directly related to realization
of tax benefits). But see Green, supra note 60, at 240 (discussing the view that the primary
motivation behind corporate transfers to charity is the realization of tax benefits).
301. Nearly forty years ago, Eells asserted that corporate giving produces valuable benefits
beyond that of the tax deduction. EELLS, supra note 74, at 33. Eells wrote, "Charitable contribu-
tions carry important advantages for the donor. The fact that these disbursements may be eligible
for tax exemption is becoming a secondary consideration. Philanthropy provides tangible good will
and recognition of the company as a good corporate citizen." Id.
302. See infra notes 333-409 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between cor-
porate giving, advertising, and public relations).
303. Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More Than a Market-
ing Strategy? in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS supra note I1, at
246, 247. Galaskiewicz described three studies establishing "an empirical association between ad-
vertising and contributions expenditures" and "argu[ing] that the two are really indistinguish-
able." Id. Useem also noted the connection between advertising and corporate giving. He wrote:
A final indicator of the importance of philanthropy for purely company advance is its
association with advertising. Comparison of interindustry variations in expenditures
for advertising and philanthropy finds a high correlation between the two, implying
that philanthropy is treated in part as an extension of marketing. Similarly, a study
of America's 55 largest electric utilities in 1976 reveals that the level of their charita-
ble contributions is closely tied to their spending on customer services and advertising.
USEEM, supra note 119, at 125-26 (emphasis added). Useem suggested that classwide interests
provide a strong secondary consideration in corporate giving patterns. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 455-61 (describing corporate giving, classwide interests, and the inner circle).
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and size and the level of corporate giving, further suggesting that
corporate managers perceive that corporate giving produces a busi-
ness benefit. In a study of the corporate giving patterns of certain
industry groups, Clotfelter reported a correlation between consumer
contact and corporate giving.304 The study found that corporations
in service industries with direct consumer contact (e.g., "banking,
retail trade, and food products") contributed a higher percentage of
net income than corporations with little direct consumer contact.306
Clotfelter noted that industries without direct consumer contact
(such as holding companies and mining concerns) exhibited the low-
est level of corporate giving. 06 Using a profit-maximization model
of corporate purpose,307 Clotfelter explained that well-placed corpo-
rate transfers to charity can increase corporate revenue because the
community targeted by the transfers is more hospitable to the cor-
poration and its employees.30 8 The more exposure an industry has to
the public, the more dependent it is upon public relations efforts. If
the industries that spend the most on corporate giving are the same
industries that have the most consumer contact (and are the most
dependent on public relations), then corporate giving must have ei-
ther advertising or public relations benefits.
Clotfelter also reported studies analyzing the relationship between
304. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 71, at 173-76 (documenting the study which involved corpo-
rate giving patterns for 1980 and measured giving as a percentage of corporate net income).
305. Id. at 173.
306. Id. This correlation between corporate giving and contact with consumers is supported by
the studies described by Galaskiewicz. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (referring to
the studies). Galaskiewicz concluded that the level of corporate giving is "directly associated with
the percentage of sales to households." Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity:
Nothing More Than a Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES
AND GOALS supra note 11, at 246, 247.
307. In general, a profit-maximization model assumes that the purpose of a corporation is to
maximize shareholder profit and gain. See supra notes 120-52 and accompanying text (comparing
the profit-maximization model of corporate purpose to the social responsibility model). Clotfelter
also considered corporate giving under a model of utility maximization where managers and
shareholders "derive utility from making contributions" and noted that managers often make cor-
porate giving decisions with reference to "rules of thumb" based on past giving and industry
norms. CLOTFELTER, supra note 71, at 190-92.
308. Clotfelter wrote:
One way costs may be reduced is if contributions have the effect of making a commu-
nity a more desirable place in which to live and work and if this reduces the level of
wages a company must pay. Or a company's good public image may reduce other
costs, for example, by making zoning changes easier or reducing the costs of
vandalism.
Id. at 188.
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industry concentration and the level of corporate giving.30 9 The orig-
inal hypothesis of one study stated that monopolistic firms would be
more inclined to act as good corporate citizens.3 10 Instead, oligo-
polistic or "rival" firms had the highest percentage of corporate giv-
ing, suggesting that rival corporations use transfers to charity to
gain a "comparative advantage."3 "
This perceived comparative advantage is just one way corporate
managers justify, and fundraisers encourage, corporate giving.3 12
They also describe corporate giving as the equivalent of (or substi-
tute for) various types of corporate expenditures, based on how di-
rectly the corporation enjoys the anticipated benefit. From most to
least direct, these corporate expenditures fall into three categories:
advertising and marketing, public relations, and an investment in
future markets and future employees."'3
Marketing and fundraising texts assert that each type of corpo-
rate giving provides a financial benefit to the corporate donor.314
309. Id. at 201 (citing Orace Johnson, Corporate Philanthropy: An Analysis of Corporate
Contributions, 39 J. Bus. 489 (1966)). Clotfelter noted that a 1981 study by Maddox and Sieg-
fried based on 1963 data from certain minor industries indicated that the level of corporate trans-
fers to charity rise with an increase in industry concentration. Id.
310. The hypothesis was that monopolistic firms would place a greater emphasis on corporate
giving as a means of exercising or illustrating the social power inherent with industry concentra-
tion. Id.
311. Id. (quoting Johnson, supra note 167, at 497). Useem cited the correlation between adver-
tising and corporate giving to illustrate that corporate managers use transfers to charity to ad-
vance the direct economic interests of the corporation. USEEM, supra note 119, at 125-26.
312. See Craig Smith, Giving is More Than Its Own Reward, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, §3,
at 25 (discussing various ways philanthropy can benefit a corporation). Fundraisers must "aban-
don advocacy in favor of a new approach that demonstrates explicitly how philanthropy can bene-
fit the company in the long run." Id.
313. Various commentators have categorized corporate transfers based on the underlying busi-
ness motivation. For example, Useem constructed an elaborate critique of corporate giving as a
vehicle for the transmission and advancement of certain classwide interests shared by corporate
managers. UsEEM, supra note 119, at 121-26. Incorporating Useem's "social currency" theory,
Galaskiewicz analyzed corporate giving as advertising, public relations, enlightened self-interest,
tax strategy, and "social currency." Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity:
Nothing More Than a Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES
AND GOALS supra note 11, at 246, 246-52. Haley discussed the "strategic uses of contributions in
social systems" and identified three such uses for corporate transfers to charity: "First, managers
use contributions to acquire audiences by capturing the attention of key stakeholders. Second,
managers use contributions to mime messages by symbolically transmitting corporate interests to
other stakeholders. Finally, managers use contributions to vend values by institutionalizing them
in society." Usha C. V. Haley, Corporate Contributions as Managerial Masques: Refraning Cor-
porate Contributions as Strategies to Influence Society, 28 J. MGMT. STUD. 485, 494 (.1991).
314. Galaskiewicz differentiated public relations from advertising on the basis that public rela-
tions "target[s] the entire public and [is] not aim[ed] specifically at increasing sales. Its goal is to
show that the firm is a good corporate citizen." Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to
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Thus, the ultimate goal of corporate giving (regardless of type) re-
mains that of profit maximization. 1 5 Interestingly, there is no em-
pirical evidence indicating that corporate giving increases corporate
profits.316 Useem stated, "there is practically no evidence of any
strong association among socially relevant behaviors, whether desir-
able or undesirable, and any of the usual indicators of economic suc-
cess."3 17 Still, the belief that corporate giving is good for business
persists, and marketing and fundraising literature urges managers to
operate corporate giving programs as they would any other corpo-
rate undertaking."1 8
Charity: Nothing More Than a Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN
VARIETIES AND GOALS supra note 11, at 246, 248. See infra notes 392-409 and accompanying text
(discussing the relationship between corporate giving and public relations).
315. See Alex J. Plinio & Joane B. Scanlan, Total Resource Leveraging and Matching: Ex-
panding the Concept of Corporate Community Involvement, in THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
HANDBOOK, supra note 74, at 283-84 (advocating an integrated approach to corporate giving
programs which recognizes the need to include "marketing, issues management, direct contribu-
tions, foundation management, employee matching contributions, scholarships, and external com-
munications"); see also Smith, supra note 63, at 25 (noting that 40% of leading corporate donors
have applied total "quality-management" to their giving programs); Lois Therrien, Corporate
Generosity is Greatly Depreciated, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1992, at 118 (noting study of 100 large
corporate donors, 38 of which had adopted "strategic plans" thereby "abandoning their traditional
passive, scattershot approaches and consolidating a hefty portion of their donations in a few
causes").
316. See Haley, supra note.313 (discussing how corporate contributions are used to promote
managerial corporate interests). Like Useem, Haley believed that corporate managers use contri-
butions in various strategic ways to secure power and influence. Id. Haley offered the following
critique of the corporate giving decision-making process:
Many managers publicly claim that they use contributions to enhance corporate im-
age, to improve sales, to ease recruitment, to constitute necessary public relations, to
provide obligatory evidence of corporate responsiveness to society, and therefore to
improve profits. Substantiations of such claims do not exist. There is practically no
evidence to indicate that managers enquire into the profit implications of contribu-
tions . . . [C]ontribution decisions lack structure, standardization, and objectivity:
anecdotal reporting and poor documentation permeate these decisions . . . Despite
managerial claims, there are almost no corporate data to verify that contributions
affect corporate profits.
Id. at 491-92 (citations omitted).
317. USEEM, supra note 119, at 147 (citing Lee E. Preston, Corporate Power and Social Per-
formance: Approaches to Positive Analysis, in RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
AND POLICY 1-16 (1981)). Advancing his conviction that classwide considerations influence corpo-
rate giving, Useem continued: "If not company profits, what it is that does count, according to the
present analysis, is the extent to which a firm is responsive to classwide considerations in reaching
its decisions on matters of public concern." Id.
318. See Haley, supra note 313, at 492-94 (promoting integration of economic and social
dimensions of contributions). Fundraising and marketing literature stresses the need for more
cost-effective management of corporate contribution programs. See KOCH, supra note 163, at 13
("The corporate contributions dollar must come up to the same measure of cost-effectiveness that
is expected from the corporate dollar invested in research, marketing, production, or administra-
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3. The "Halo Effect"
Corporate America's desire to capitalize on the goodwill associ-
ated with charity and charitable causes is central to the notion that
corporate giving results in a benefit to the corporate donor.3 19 In-
deed, corporate giving relies on this goodwill - known in the mar-
keting industry as the "halo effect"320 - and it quite consciously
trades on it. Marketing and fundraising literature blatantly advises
corporations on how to take advantage of the privileged status af-
forded charity in contemporary society. The introductory
paragraphs of a recent book entitled Doing Best by Doing Good pro-
vide a characteristically upbeat description of the mechanics of the
"halo effect" and its many benefits.
People trust nonprofits. It's almost as simple as that. We tend to believe in
what they do, and almost more importantly, in how they do it. They are
tackling the most pressing problems of our time for reasons other than per-
sonal gain. For this, we tend to grant them respect. We acknowledge their
integrity. We give them our trust. Business, of course, is not so fortunate.
We all know that business's bottom line is profit . . . However, companies
that associate closely with nonprofits . . . find that an interesting thing hap-
pens. The goodwill accorded the nonprofit rubs off on them. Supporters of
the organization begin to look favorably on the company, even to buy its
products if that will help the cause. The public at large may see the com-
pany in a different light - as one that cares about people as well as profits.
The company's self-centered image is softened; its appeal to consumers
tion.") (emphasis omitted). The literature also urges corporations and their corporate grantmak-
ing officials to resist the marginalization of corporate giving officers and to operate in a more
business-like manner. See Therrien, supra note 315, at 118 (quoting foundation executives who
refer to contributions as "social investments" from which they anticipate "strong returns").
319. The view that corporate giving produces corporate benefit is not universally held. For ex-
ample, Milton Friedman expressed concern over what he considered irresponsible corporate fund-
ing of projects that are detrimental to "our system of private property." Milton Friedman, The
Adam Smith Address: The Suicidal Impulse of the Business Community, Bus. EcON., Jan. 1990,
at 5, 8-9. Commentators to the left of Friedman counter that corporations give to potentially
troublesome organizations in an attempt to domesticate them. For a discussion of the delicate
balance required of corporate giving, see infra notes 435-44 and accompanying text.
320. James W. Harvey & Kevin F. McCrohan, Changing Conditions for Fund Raising and
Philanthropy, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 59 (Jon V. Til & Assoc. eds.,
1990). The authors described the "halo effect" as follows:
Increasingly, corporate giving is seen not solely as philanthropy but rather as an es-
tablished part of doing business, being present in the community and acting in the
corporation's own self-interest. An additional benefit of corporate giving, regardless of
the efficiency level of the philanthropy supported, is that perceptions of corporate so-
cial responsibility are higher for firms with greater levels of giving, even for those that
had earlier violated the antitrust statutes. This finding supports the notion that corpo-
rate giving provides a halo effect that can overcome prior transgressions.
Id. (emphasis added).
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grows.321
The "halo effect" is a function of the positive public perception of
charity and charitable endeavors, including the simple act of writing
a check.3 22 The halo effect attaches to a corporation when it makes
a transfer to charity and its name (or product or service) becomes
associated with that charity. By publicizing its transfer, the corpora-
tion "generates favorable attitudes among employees, customers and
the electorate. 31 23 The "halo effect" makes corporate giving a rela-
tively effortless investment because "the corporation's only burden is
to publish its efforts. 3 24
Many corporations engage in strategic corporate giving to mask
321. STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 13-14.
322. In recent years, the charitable sector has experienced a series of scandals generating bad
publicity and risking a decline in donor confidence. Kristin A. Goss, A Crisis of Credibility for
America's Non-Profits, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 15, 1993, at 1. The questionable
fundraising practices of certain organizations has prompted renewed interest in state laws regulat-
ing the solicitation of charitable funds. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy:
Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (1991) (discussing
fund-raising cost regulation); Grant Williams, Charity Fraud. States Intensify the Battle, THE
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 8, 1991, at 30 (discussing the increasing problem of fraudulent
charities which exist only to assist corporations in acquiring goodwill). New federal income tax
provisions impose stricter substantiation rules for contributions to qualified charitable organiza-
tions. See I.R.C. §§ 170, 501, 2055 (West 1994) (discussing charitable contributions and gifts,
exemptions from tax on corporations, and transfers for charitable uses respectively). The publicity
surrounding the questionable compensation package and spending patterns of the former President
of the United Way focused public attention on excessive administrative expenses. See Bruce Mil-
lar & Jennifer Moore, United Way: A Year Later, Controversy Lingers, THE CHRON. OF PHILAN-
THROPY, Mar. 9, 1993, at I (discussing the United Way scandal). One of the most comprehensive
accounts of the charitable sector was a 1993 seven part series of articles in the Philadelphia
Inquirer entitled "Warehouses of Wealth: The Tax-Free Economy." The series has since been
published. GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT ECONOMY
(1993).
323. Green, supra note 60, at 259. Fundraisers stress the importance of securing adequate press
coverage. Steckel and Simons provided characteristically candid advice concerning publicity for
corporate transfers to charity. STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 199. Speaking to would-be
corporate donors, the authors advised:
Let's be honest. You do public purpose partnerships because you want to a make a
difference. You want to contribute to a worthy cause. You want your employees to
feel proud. And you want the world to know. If the world doesn't know - if you
don't broadcast your campaign message loud and clear - you'll miss out on a lot of
the benefits that can come from your good works. To get those benefits, you need to
plan a strategic publicity campaign that will get you the kind of attention you want.
This will be a little different from planning your conventional promotional campaign
because with a public purpose partnership there are more angles open to you, and you
want to take them all.
Id.
324. See supra note 323 (discussing publicizing corporate donations to induce the "halo
effect").
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or compensate for questionable social or environmental records.325
Consumer surveys indicate that the "halo effect" (or lack thereof)
may influence purchasing patterns of many consumers. A 1990 sur-
vey shows that 52% of the consumers asked would pay 10% more
for a product that was "socially responsible." '26
Many corporations are reluctant to fund an organization advocat-
ing the regulation of their industry. Other corporations choose to
support charitable organizations that might criticize the corporation
or its policies. 27 For example, the Seagram Beverage Company
sponsored golf tournaments for the benefit of the Kidney Founda-
tion. At least one commentator suggested that the sponsorship was
an effort to counteract the association between drinking and kidney
disease. 2 8 Regardless of Seagram's intent, the speculation illus-
trates how a charity's autonomy, 829 reputation, or goodwill can be
compromised by ill-suited corporate sponsorship.330
On the other hand, some socially undesirable corporations report
325. USEEM, supra note 119, at 120 ("Exxon and other companies in the politically sensitive
petroleum industry are among the most active supporters of arts on public television and
elsewhere.").
326. STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 48 (citing a 1990 Roper poll in which 67% replied
that they considered the manufacturer's social record when purchasing). The lack of a "halo ef-
fect" can create a negative reaction among consumers. A poll of New Yorkers revealed that 25%
had refused to purchase products based on the environmental performance of at least one manu-
facturer. Id. Consumers also seem to be aware of corporate giving or social responsibility pro-
grams. Useem reported a survey that indicated consumers could correctly identify those industries
which spend more on social responsibility initiatives. USEEM, supra note 119, at 120 (citing Arthur
H. White, Corporate Philanthropy: Impact on Public Attitudes, in CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY
IN THE EIGHTIES 17-19 (1980)).
327. A. H. Robins pushed this reasoning to the extreme when it offered evidence of its corpo-
rate giving program during a criminal trial to demonstrate that it could not have known about the
Dalkon Shield. PAYTON, supra note 168, at 22-23. One public opinion survey indicates that even
among antitrust violators, the corporations with active giving programs enjoyed a more favorable
rating. STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 48.
328. Joe Mullich, Sweet Charity, Bus. J. N.J., April, 1992, at 21, 23.
329. This statement should not be read to imply that the charitable sector is an autonomous
segment of the economy. Hall convincingly illustrated the dependence of the charitable sector
(also known as the "independent sector") on both the private and the public sectors. Hall wrote:
"The starting point for any serious consideration of the place of nonprofits in the American polity
is to accept the policy implications of the scholarly recognition of sectoral interpenetration: that
the nonprofit sector is a dependent sector, not an independent one." HALL, supra note 97, at 106.
330. Mullich, supra note 328, at 23 ("[Mlany charities are loathe to link up with alcohol and
cigarette companies."); Holly Hall, Joint Ventures With Business: A Sour Deal?, THE CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPHY, Apr. 6, 1993, at 21 [hereinafter "Hall, Joint Ventures"] ("Many charities re-
fuse to accept money from companies that they believe jeopardize the welfare of people or the
environment . . .[M]any groups won't take donations from oil, timber, tobacco, and other indus-
tries because they are linked to environmental and public-health problems.").
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difficulty finding charities to accept contributions,3"' and activist or-
ganizations critical of industry may have difficulty attracting corpo-
rate support."3 2
B. The Discourse of Corporate Giving
1. Advertising and Marketing
Corporate managers often justify corporate transfers to charity as
advertising expenses. 333 In particular, cause-related marketing and
corporate sponsorship have emerged as two very popular ways for a
corporation to use the association with a charity or charitable cause
to enhance sales and improve their public image. The success of the
highly-publicized American Express 1983 sponsorship of the resto-
ration of the Statute of Liberty and Ellis Island334 captured the at-
tention of corporate managers and advertising executives. Since the
American Express sponsorship, corporations have scurried to associ-
ate themselves with various charitable causes335 and the marketing
and advertising industries have aggressively promoted corporate
331. Cf Hall, Joint Ventures, supra note 330, at 21 (discussing insincere commitments to char-
ity). Jane Goodhall, a conservationist known for her work with chimpanzees in their natural habi-
tats, advocates accepting such funding. Ms. Goodhall reportedly believes the existence of even a
funding relationship increases the charity's ability to influence corporate policy. Id.
332. See Mark Feinberg, Starving for Good PR: Corporations Force-Feed the Poor, Bus. &
Soc'Y REV:., Summer 1989, at 36 (discussing activists' view that corporations are giving money to
promote their image and not to solve hunger). Contra Jennifer Moore, Patagonia's Unorthodox
Corporate Philanthropy, The Chron. of Philanthropy, June 1, 1993, at 6 (discussing Patagonia's
pride in "financing" activist environmental groups that other companies shun). Patagonia, the
upscale outdoor clothing manufacturer, is remarkable for its support of environmental activists
groups including the radical group, Earth First. Patagonia's founder explained that a major reason
he started the company was to make significant contributions to charity. The founder personally
gives away 50% of his annual income to charity and Patagonia transfers 1% of its gross annual
sales to charity. Id. at 6, 12.
333. Generally, advertising is designed to produce an immediate favorable result on corporate
sales and profits. See Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More
Than a Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS
supra note 11, at 246, 246-48 (discussing the relationship between transfers to charity and mar-
keting). "Companies ...usually pay more for sponsorships aimed at increasing product sales
than they do for promotions to enhance their image." Holly Hall, Putting Together Sponsorship
Deals With Corporations, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 1, 1993, at 28 [hereinafter
"Hall, Sponsorship"].
334. For a discussion of cause-related marketing, see infra notes 355-66 and accompanying
text.
335. This trend among U.S. corporations has warranted comment in a British trade magazine.
See, e.g., Robert Dwek, Doing Well By Giving Generously. MARKETING, July 23, 1992, at 16
(coining the term "'caring corporatism' - soft and gooey on the outside, hard as an almond on
the inside").
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transfers to charity as a means to increase corporate profits,33 6 or to
improve their corporate image with a targeted group of
consumers.
33 7
Corporate managers believe that they can use transfers to charity
strategically to appeal to specific groups of consumers and open new
markets for their products. For example, the Adolph Coors Com-
pany has long suffered from an image problem among certain con-
sumer groups (e.g., African-Americans, gay men and lesbians, union
members), due to the conservative views expressed by members of
the Coors family on various social and political issues.338 Coors re-
cently launched a campaign to combat illiteracy among American.
women, specifically designed to make inroads among female con-
sumers.3 9 The scope of the campaign, entitled "Literacy. Pass It
On" is ambitious and Coors has committed $40 million to advance
the cause. As a means of getting the message out, Coors plans to
run ads in 750,000 copies of romance novels and print ten million
brochures. The message is two-fold: learn to read and drink Coors
beer. 4o
The eagerness of corporations to embrace charitable causes has
not been lost on charitable organizations seeking to expand their
funding base or make-up for cutbacks in government funding. 4 A
case in point is the Puerto Rican Traveling Theater located in New
York City.4 2 After New York State drastically reduced its funding,
the theater's director sought support from companies doing business
with the Hispanic community. Her efforts were successful, particu-
larly with Anheuser-Busch. An Anheuser-Busch executive explained
its support of the theater "as a way of investing in the community
336. See Steven A. Meyerowitz, Making a Mark Through Charity or Politics, Bus. MARKET-
ING, Mar. 1991, at 54 ("Marketing today requires that companies spend money on more than just
advertising, brochures or marketing personnel.").
337. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text (describing a Coors campaign aimed at
female consumers).
338. Stuart Elliott, Coors Tries to Polish Image With Campaign For Literacy, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1992, at D17.
339. One in five adult women in the United States cannot read. Id.
340. "[T]he Coors campaign typifies ...a growing predilection among advertisers to try to
burnish their images by adopting causes, which are promoted separately from, and in addition to,
their product-selling pitches." Id.
341. See infra notes 342-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Puerto Rican Traveling
Theater's reaction to a New York State funding reduction).
342. See William H. Honan, After State Cutbacks, What One Theater is Doing to Survive,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1992, at CII (discussing the theater's efforts to survive after funding
decreased).
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that has made us [Anheuser-Busch] No. 1 in the Hispanic
market."343
Fundraising literature advises charitable organizations to become
more business-like by emphasizing how the funding will help the
bottom line of the targeted corporation.-"4 Charities in search of
corporate sponsors can advertise their interests free of charge in
trade publications such as Advertising Age, Brandweek, and
Promo.45 Despite this level of interest and activity, relationships be-
tween charitable organizations and corporations are subject to rela-
tively little regulation. The current application of federal tax laws
-denies favorable tax treatment only to the most blatantly commer-
cial relationships.4 6 Often state laws governing the solicitation of
charitable funds do not cover "commercial co-ventures" and are
sporadically enforced.
In addition, there is no significant self-regulation. The Philan-
thropic Service of the Council of Better Business Bureaus adopted
guidelines for "joint-venture marketing" schemes between corpora-
tions and charitable organizations."' The guidelines are designed
principally to protect a charity's financial interest, 8 and to insure
that any promotional efforts accurately describe the scope of the
joint-venture. 49 The guidelines do not cover any of the possible ethi-
cal concerns that may arise when corporate managers, driven by
"enlightened self-interest," forge partnerships of mutual advantage
with charitable organizations.
343. Id. at C16.
344. See Smith, supra note 312, at 25 (referring to how charities should tone down the advo-
cacy and stress what they can do for the corporation).
345. Imagine, if you will, the ad of the week: National charity ISO stable caring corporation
for exclusive relationship . . . mutual advantage, long promotions . . . halo polishing ....
346. For a discussion of the deductibility of a corporate transfer to charity, see supra notes 73-
176 and accompanying text. In addition, the donee charity is generally exempt from taxation and
federal tax laws do not subject the receipt of most corporate donations to unrelated business in-
come tax. See infra notes 508-11 and accompanying text.
347. Hall, Sponsorship, supra note 333, at 29.
348. For example, the guidelines require a written agreement and suggest that the agreement
specify the duration of the promotion, the mode of distribution, and the resolution of any disputes.
Id. The right to use a charity's name and logo can be quite valuable. Harry Abel, vice-president
for corporate relations at the Arthritis Foundation (former national sales director for the Coca-
Cola Company) explained, "[W]e think the use of our logo has a minimum $100,000 value be-
cause we have credibility and a good reputation, both locally and nationally." Id. at 28. This
means that a corporation would have to pay at least $100,000 in order to advertise that it gave
$100,000 to the Arthritis Foundation.
349. Id.
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A "community relations officer"3 50 (i.e., a marketing executive),
described this phenomenon of corporate giving when he remarked
"The wave of the future isn't checkbook philanthropy . . . It's a
marriage of corporate marketing and social responsibility. '"3 51 Crit-
ics of this "marriage" charge that corporate giving is not real phi-
lanthropy,352 and that it can impair the autonomy of charitable or-
ganizations. 53 Increasingly, such critics take issue with two popular
practices both of which use strategic corporate giving for advertising
advantage: cause-related marketing and corporate sponsorship of
350. Presumably, this is a more charitable sounding title for the "public relations officer."
351. The marketing and fundraising literature often cite this quote from the Wall Street Jour-
nal with obvious approval. See, e.g., PAYTON, supra note 168, at 72 (quoting this phrase in the
context of philanthropy as a vocation). Justin Fink incorporated the quote in the following
passage:
In the United States, if a "kinder, gentler nation" comes about, it is likely to be at
least partly a function of concern for impending labor shortages and a need to com-
pete more effectively with a trained work force in the new international economic
order . . . Internationally, a more humane order that seeks to relieve the misery of
the less developed nations . . . may reflect a recognition of the need to seek new
industrial and consumer markets. The underlying sensibility was well articulated by
a corporate community relations officer who said that "the wave of the future isn't
checkbook philanthropy. It's a marriage of corporate marketing and social
responsibility."
Justin Fink, Philanthropy and the Community, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY
supra note 320, at 133, 159 (emphasis added).
352. Dan R. Dalton & Catherine M. Daily, The Constituents of Corporate Responsibility:
Separate, But Not Separable, Interests?, Bus. HORIZONS, July-Aug. 1991, at 74. Dalton and
Daily expressed the growing disinterest in this question:
Some would be concerned that corporate behavior of this type is somehow tainted, as
it is only done because it may result in good publicity, increased markets, and other
presumably positive outcomes from the corporation's view. We do not count ourselves
among those. That such behavior may be in the interests of the corporation does not
constitute a problem. On the contrary, our point from the onset is that the interests of
the corporation and those of society are not separable. That such behavior may not be
altruistic or even philanthropic is not even interesting.
Id. at 77.
U.S. Sprint put the concluding thought another way in a television commercial when Candice
Bergen said, "Is Sprint doing this to get your business? What difference does it make? We're
doing it." STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 55.
353. James P. Shannon, former executive director of the General Mills Foundation, rejected
complaints of philanthropic "purists":
[A]n increasing number of companies are using corporate dollars, sometimes taken
from advertising or marketing budgets, to underwrite their grantmaking program.
This is a perfectly legitimate use of company money, even though several purists have
charged that this kind of funding cannot seriously be called corporate philan-
thropy. . . . I know of no company that calls its grantmaking purely altruistic.
Clearly the trend today is away from altruism and toward practices that tie
grantmaking in some way to a company's marketing strategy.
James P. Shannon, Successful Corporate Grantmaking: Lessons to Build On, in THE CORPORATE
CONTRIBUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 74, at 343, 353.
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athletic and cultural events. 354
(a) Cause-related marketing
American Express coined the term "cause-related marketing" in
connection with its corporate giving promotion involving the restora-
tion of the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island. During the three-
month campaign, American Express promised to make a "contribu-
tion" to the restoration effort each time a cardholder made a
purchase with his or her American Express card or used certain
other American Express services. Public response was extraordinary.
In one quarter, American Express reported a rise in new card appli-
cations and a 28% increase in card usage.3 55
Even a quick trip to the supermarket reveals that cause-related
marketing is quite popular with manufacturers," 6' and fundraising
statistics indicate that it is on the rise. In 1990, corporations paid $3
billion for various cause-related marketing schemes, representing a
significant increase from the $1.75 billion corporations spent on sim-
ilar promotions in 1988. 857
In its characteristically glowing terms, Steckel and Simons in
their book Doing Best By Doing Good, offered the following descrip-
tion of cause-related marketing:
If there is such a thing as a win-win-win proposition, cause-related market-
ing (CRM) is it. Corporations earn money and goodwill. Nonprofits gain
money and exposure. And consumers get to spend money and feel good
about it. In cause-related marketing, capitalism has actually become a phil-
354. Such focused corporate giving "helps corporations target desirable segments of the market
for their advertising while putting nonprofits in the position of converting their donors to custom-
ers of a particular business." Elizabeth T. Boris & Teresa J. Odendahl, Ethical Issues in Fund
Raising and Philanthropy, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY, supra note 320, at
188, 198.
355. STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 77; Haley, supra note 313, at 496. In connection
with the promotion, American Express 'contributed' $1.7 million to the restoration fund. STECKEL
& SIMONS, supra note 7, at 88; see also Haley, supra note 313, at 496 (discussing American
Express's success with this promotion).
356. For example, many food manufacturers reference some charitable cause near the name of
the product. See Haley, supra note 313, at 496 (discussing contributions influencing consumers).
Thus, the purchase of milk or trash bags can be associated with anything from saving the rain
forest, stopping domestic violence, or finding missing children. From the consumer's perspective,
the purchase of milk means that at least some of the profits will be used to bring that baby home.
From 1986 until 1991, Scott Paper Company transferred a portion of the proceeds from the sale
of each item in its Helping Hand line to six children's charities. STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7,
at 86-87.
357. Mullich, supra note 328, at 23.
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anthropic tool.358
Under a typical cause-related marketing agreement, the corporate
"donor" agrees to transfer a specific sum (sometimes based on the
sales of a particular product) to a charitable organization. The
transfer represents the payment of a licensing fee for the corpora-
tion's use of the charitable organization's name and logo in connec-
tion with the promotion. Thus, cause-related marketing is a com-
mercial quid pro quo arrangement devoid of "charitable" intent.3 59
This observation is not lost on marketing executives or fundraisers.
For example, Patricia Caesar, president of a management and de-
velopment consulting firm for charitable organizations, wrote:
"Most corporate proponents of cause-related marketing argue that
it is not a threat to philanthropic giving because corporations view it
as a marketing strategy, not a channel for charitable giving."3 60
The repeal of the corporate provisions of section 170 will not im-
pact on the tax treatment of such arrangements. Typically, a corpo-
ration is not entitled to a section 170 deduction for amounts trans-
ferred to charity in a cause-related marketing program because of
the obvious quid pro quo nature of the exchange - the amounts
transferred represent payment for the use of the charity's name and
logo. The corporation is entitled to deduct such amounts under sec-
tion 162 as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The donee
organization is entitled to exclude any amounts paid for the use of
its name and logo from its unrelated business income as a passive
activity, provided that it is not required to perform any substantial
services under the cause-related marketing agreement. 61 If the
charity is required to perform substantial services, the funds re-
ceived are subject to unrelated business income tax.8 2 However, the
major risk to the donee charity is not exposure to federal income
tax, but rather associating with an unpopular corporate image or
over-selling its own goodwill.6'
358. STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 75 (emphasis added).
359. In this way, the fee paid for the use of a charity's name and logo is the same as any other
commercial transaction.
360. Patricia Caesar, Cause-Related Marketing: The New Face of Corporate Philanthropy,
Bus. & Soc'y REV., Fall 1986, at 15, 18.
361. See supra notes 225-37 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between the
section 170 corporate contribution deduction and the section 162 business expense deduction).
362. For a discussion of unrelated business income tax, see infra notes 386-91 and accompany-
ing text.
363. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the charitable purchase of goodwill).
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Corporate donors are attracted to cause-related marketing be-
cause the association with charity appeals to consumers."" From a
federal tax standpoint, it makes no difference whether the corpora-
tion pays the fee to a charity for its name and logo, or it pays a fee
to an advertising firm. The consumer still pays the same amount for
the product. Assuming the consumer identifies with the cause, the
only difference is that the consumer is left with a "warm and fuzzy"
feeling concerning the product (and its manufacturer). This warm
feeling is likely due to the consumer's mistaken impression that the
manufacturer has chosen to forego a portion of its profit in order to
benefit a charitable cause. Yet, the corporation simply substituted
the "donation" for a portion of its advertising budget, and possibly
gained a customer that would not have been attracted by traditional
advertising.
The consumer is not entitled to deduct the portion of the purchase
price paid to charity because the consumer pays full fair market
value for the product.36 5 The consumer can only claim a charitable
deduction to the extent he or she overpaid for the product.36 All
that the corporation has done is disclose (or advertise) that a portion
of the purchase price bears the cost of the use of the charity's name
and logo.
(b) Corporate sponsorship
Although not as significant as cause-related marketing, corporate
sponsorship of charity events, particularly athletic events, has re-
ceived considerable attention over the last several years. In 1991,
364. Steckel and Simons indicated that:
According to a 1990 Roper poll, 52 percent of U.S. consumers would pay 10 percent
more for a socially responsible product; 67 percent are concerned about a company's
social performance when they shop. A 1990 survey by Century Research of 600 New
Yorkers found that 25 percent had stopped buying the products of at least one com-
pany because [of environmental concerns].
STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7, at 48.
365. See infra notes 365-66 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of overpaying for a
charity function).
366. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (determining what constitutes part sale, part gift); see
supra note 192 (explaining generally the rules governing the deductibility of admission to charity
auctions, dinners and the like). Many states regulate the solicitation of charitable contributions as
a form of consumer protection for unwitting donors and require charities and those soliciting for
them to register with a central agency or otherwise comply with the disclosure requirements. For
example, under New York law, a corporation engaged in a cause-related marketing program is
considered a "commercial co-venturer" and it must disclose the exact amount of the purchase
price it "donates" to charity. N.Y. [ExEc.] LAW § 172-d (McKinney 1993).
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corporations paid charitable organizations $1.1 billion in fees to
sponsor charity events, including $64 million for the right to sponsor
college football bowl games.3 67 Conceptually, corporate sponsorship
differs from cause-related marketing because the corporation lends
its name to a charity event instead of the charity lending its name to
a corporate product. For tax purposes, the results are the same, but
for different reasons.
The attention focused on corporate sponsorship was the result of a
1991 technical advice memorandum 8 in which the IRS classified
sponsorship payments as unrelated business income to the donee
charitable organization.3 69 TAM 9147007 applied a quid pro quo
analysis to determine whether the corporate sponsor made the spon-
sorship payment with an expectation of receiving substantial benefit
in return.70 The IRS concluded that "the [sponsorship] agreement
clearly shows that the . . . payment is commensurate in value with
the benefits the [corporate sponsor] expects to receive from the
[o] rganization. ' 37 1
In response to an intense lobbying effort by charitable organiza-
367. Dennis Zimmerman, CRS Reports of Taxing Corporate Sponsorship Payments to Col-
lege Bowl Games, 92 TAx NOTES TODAY 41-18, Feb. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li-
brary, TNT File; see Haimes, supra note 165, at 1079 (discussing corporate sponsorship of college
football bowl games and recent IRS and congressional responses).
368. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9147007 (Aug. 16, 1991). TAM 9147007 involved corporate payments
to an exempt organization for the sponsorship of a college football bowl game where the charity
renamed the game to reflect the corporate sponsorship. It was common knowledge that TAM
9147007 applied to the Cotton Bowl which was renamed Mobil Bowl. Haimes, supra note 165, at
1079 n.l (reporting that 12 of the 18 college bowl games in 1991-92 had title sponsors, including
the John Hancock Bowl). TAM 9147007 concluded that corporate payments to the charitable
organization were subject to UBIT (Unrelated Business Income Tax) because the charitable or-
ganization provided a valuable good or service to the corporate sponsor. Id. at 14. Including such
payments in unrelated business income would have reduced the value of the sponsorship payments
by the top marginal unrelated business income tax rate of the sponsoring charity, taking into
account the allocation of certain expenses. In addition to tax liability, a substantial amount of
unrelated business income can jeopardize a charitable organization's exempt purpose, and there-
fore, its exempt purpose.
369. Haimes, supra note 165, at 1079; I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51 (pro-
posed examination guidelines).
370. Haimes, supra note 165, at 1086-87 (discussing the application in the unrelated business
income tax context of the "quid pro quo" test used to determine deductibility of transfers to
charity).
371. Id. at 1087 (alteration in original) (citing Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007, at 14 (Aug. 16,
1991 ))(emphasis added). The IRS rejected an argument on the part of the charitable organization
that the benefit to the corporate sponsor did not require substantial effort on its part. "[T]he
relative ease . . . does not overcome the fact that [the corporation received] ...a very valuable
package of benefits;" much more than "mere recognition of ... generosity." Id. (quoting Tech.
Adv. Mem. 91-47-007, at 14 (Aug. 16, 1991)).
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tions, the IRS issued proposed regulations 72 in 1993 that signifi-
cantly narrowed the reasoning of TAM 9147007 .8 The proposed
regulations discontinue the quid pro quo analysis of TAM 9147007
and focus, just as the exempt community had urged, on the services
required to be provided by the donee organization a4 They classify
the services provided as either "advertising" or "acknowledgements"
and include only payments received for "advertising" in the unre-
lated trade or business income of the charitable donee.3 75
"Acknowledgements" are described as "mere recognition of spon-
372. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(e) [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 22, 781A (Jan.
22, 1993); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512-4 [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 22,793B (Jan. 22,
1993). A review of the differences between TAM 9147007 and the Proposed Regulations and the
unprecedented procedure by which the Proposed Regulations were drafted reveals the influence
that charitable organizations can exert over the legislative and regulatory process. This seems to
question, at least with respect to exempt organizations, Professor Zelinsky's conviction that tax
institutions are "less capturable" than direct funding programs. Zelinsky, supra note 181, at 1167,
1194.
373. Prior to the issuance of the Proposed Regulations, the IRS released proposed examination
guidelines to implement its ruling in TAM 9147007. I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B.
51; Haimes, supra note 165, at 1102. The proposed examination guidelines were published for
public comment in an apparent departure from standard IRS procedure. Id. at 1102 n.125. The
guidelines provoked a swift and negative reaction from the exempt community and its supporters
in Congress. The IRS held three days of public hearings and it received over 300 comments.
Outraged members of Congress introduced several bills expressly excluding corporate sponsorship
payments from unrelated business income. Elizabeth A. Purcell, assistant branch chief in the IRS
Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations) referred to the
heated public comment as "a tremendous outpouring of ideas and comments" while speaking at
the 10th Annual Nonprofit Organizations Institute at the University of Texas School of Law.
Marlis L. Carson, IRS Representative Discusses Evolution of Corporate Sponsorship Regs, 93
TAX NOTES TODAY 26-17, Feb. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
374. This is despite the strong doctrinal basis for the quid pro quo approach (i.e., for UBIT
purposes, incorporating a sponsor into a charity event seems less passive than licensing the char-
ity's name and logo, and therefore, outside of the scope of the policy supporting the exclusion from
UBIT for certain passive activities). See Lee A. Sheppard, The Goldberg Variations, or Giving
Away the Store, 93 TAx NOTEs TODAY 31-17, Feb. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File (criticizing the about-face of the IRS); accord Paul Streckfus, IRS' Pre-Inaugural Gift
for Charities. 93 TAX NOTEs TODAY 17-11, Jan. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File. Russlyn Guritz, an IRS projects specialist speaking at the 10th Annual Representing
and Managing Tax-Exempt Organizations conference sponsored by Georgetown University Law
Center, described the proposed regulations as "a great example of how well government can work
when it works in partnership with those that it must govern." Marlis L. Carson, Guritz Praises
Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regs., 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 96-6, May 4, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
375. The distinction is based loosely upon the separation of the corporate sponsor from its prod-
ucts or services. The proposed regulations borrow heavily from the Federal Communications rules
regarding when a public television or radio station is permitted to acknowledge a sponsor in return
for a payment. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-I [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 22,781A
(Jan. 22, 1993); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4 [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 22,793B (Jan.
22, 1993).
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sorship payments"' ' 7 6 and may include:
sponsor logos and slogans that do not contain comparative or qualitative de-
scriptions of the sponsor's products, services, facilities or company; sponsor
locations and telephone numbers, value-neutral descriptions, including dis-
plays or visual depictions, of a sponsor's product-line or services; and sponsor
brand or trade names and product or service listings." '7
The examples set forth in the proposed regulation illustrate that the
definition of "acknowledgements" is quite expansive. 8  Moreover, it
encompasses many activities commonly considered advertising. 379
"Advertising" involves messages that incorporate a "call to ac-
tion" or an "inducement to buy,"38 but its scope is very narrow. For
example, the charity or the sponsor can sell or distribute a sponsor's
product to the general public at a sponsored event.381 Such distribu-
tion is not considered an "inducement to buy." '382 Although the pro-
posed regulations8 3 purport to establish a bright-line test to distin-
376. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1) [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 22,793B (Jan. 22,
1993).
377. Id. The proposed regulations do not apply to advertising in periodicals or to the activities
of organizations exempt from tax under a different section than 501(c)(3). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(West 1994).
378. Example 4 illustrates just how far a charitable donee's activities can go without being
considered advertising. The example concludes that the donee's activities in connection with the
sponsorship of a college football bowl game are acknowledgements. Under the sponsorship agree-
ment, the charity agrees to change the name of the game to include the name of the exclusive
corporate sponsor. In addition, "the corporation's name and special logo will appear on players'
helmets and uniforms, on the scoreboard and stadium signs, on the playing field, on cups used to
serve drinks at the game, and on all related printed material." The contract further specifies that
"television cameras will focus on the corporation's name and logo on the field at certain intervals
during the game." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), example 4, [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
(CCH) 22,793B (Jan. 22, 1993).
379. Lee Sheppard correctly pointed out that although the regulatory definition of advertising
is very broad, the exceptions set forth under the term "acknowledgements" render the first term
meaningless. He aptly termed this "the exception that eats the rule." Sheppard, supra note 372.
Tax Notes Today reported that Marcus S. Owens, director of the IRS Exempt Organization
Technical Division acknowledged that the proposed regulations permit activity usually character-
ized as advertising. Marlis L. Carson, Corporate Sponsorship Regs Provide "Clear Line" for
IRS, Charities. Says Owens, 93 TAx NOTES TODAY 87-16, Apr. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File.
380. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2), [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 22,793B (Jan.
22, 1993).
381. Id.
382. The IRS acknowledges that it cannot justify this exclusion on the basis of the substance.
Instead, it relies on "the principle of administrative simplicity", admitting that "the lines drawn
between activities constituting advertising and acknowledgements may not relate to the substance
of the activities." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1, 58 Fed. Reg. 5687 (1993).
383. The proposed regulations under I.R.C. § 512 contain some examples of advertising activi-
ties to illustrate the very favorable rule regarding the allocation of expenses between related and
unrelated activities. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(e), examples 2-4, [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax
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guish between "advertising" and "acknowledgements," they include
numerous examples of acknowledgements and only two examples of
advertising activities. 84 The two examples are blatantly commercial
and as such provide little guidance in close cases.885
The effect of the proposed regulations is to exclude from Unre-
lated Business Income Tax (UBIT) all but the most patently com-
mercial sponsorship agreements under which the charity agrees to
participate actively in promotion of a sponsor's product or service.
Hence, charities can easily avoid tax on sponsorship payments and
corporations can deduct the cost of the payment. Excluding most
sponsorship payments from UBIT ignores the existence of the "halo
effect" and the fact that many fundraisers actively trade on the
charitable goodwill of their organizations. It also ignores the case
law recognizing that corporate donors receive goodwill advertising
simply by the acknowledgement of corporate giving, and that such
advertising constitutes a financial benefit for purposes of section 162
and 170.'88
The corporate sponsors of college bowl games receive a substan-
tial benefit from the sponsorship. In fact, corporate sponsors may
receive benefits far in excess of the sponsorship payment. John Han-
cock estimated that it received $5.1 million of advertising services in
exchange for its 1990 payment of $1.6 million to be associated with
the college bowl game that now bears its name.3 87 As discussed in
Part I, Section A, this "more bang for the buck" feature of corpo-
rate giving is the result of the "halo effect" which surrounds a cor-
porate sponsor (and its products or services) with the charity's
goodwill.
Given the similarity between advertising and sponsorship expendi-
tures, the potential competitive advantage provided by the tax ex-
Rep. (CCH) 22,781A (Jan. 22, 1993).
384. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), examples 7, 8, [1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
22,793B (Jan. 22, 1993).
385. For example, the Treasury Department believed that it was necessary to warn charitable
organizations that the following message crossed the line and constituted advertising: "'This pro-
gram has been underwritten by the Record Shop, where you can find all of your great hit music.
The Record Shop is located at 123 Main Street. Give them a call today at 555-1234. This station
is proud to have the Record Shop as a sponsor.'" Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), example 7,
[1994] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 22,793B (Jan. 22, 1993).
386. See supra notes 225-39 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between the
corporate contribution deduction and the section 162 business expense deduction).
387. Haimes, supra note 165, at 1090 n.59 (citing Dennis Zimmerman, Corporate Title Spon-
sorship Payments to Nonprofit College Football Bowl Games: Should They Be Taxed?, 92 TAx
NOTES TODAY 41-18, Feb. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File).
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emption strongly suggests that sponsorship payments should be in-
cluded in the unrelated business income of the charity. The
argument for inclusion goes to the heart of the rationale for UBIT
- to prevent unfair competition by subsidizing the commercial ac-
tivities of exempt organizations.
Unlike commercial advertising agencies, the charity operates free
of federal income tax on its net receipts.888 The exemption of spon-
sorship payments from UBIT provides "subsidized advertising rates
for sponsoring corporations"389 and John Hancock can receive ad-
vertising services far in excess of the sponsorship fee. The social
good provided by the subsidy is arguably insignificant. The subsidy
provides an incentive for corporate sponsorship which may reduce
the cost of admission to the event, thereby providing a benefit for
the consumer - the sports fan.390 Accordingly, the exclusion of
sponsorship payments from UBIT subsidizes corporate advertising
and the price of tickets to charity events at the expense of millions
of dollars of foregone federal revenue. 91
2. Goodwill and Public Relations
One-step removed from cause-related marketing and sponsorship
promotions are corporate contributions designed to advance the
long-term interests of the corporation and generally enhance corpo-
388. This is subject to the possible application of UBIT on income from a trade or business
regularly carried on that is not substantially related to its exempt purpose. Id. at 1089. Even
where the activity is not exempt, tax exempt organizations are able to achieve " ' economies of
scope by engaging in a business activity that, while not in itself an exempt function .... can be
undertaken at lower cost because it exhibits cost complementarities with the non-profit's exempt
functions.'" Id. at 1112 n.179 (quoting Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unre-
lated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 626-27 (1989)).
389. Id. at 1111 (quoting Zimmerman, supra note 367, at 2).
390. A Library of Congress Congressional Service Report expressed the issue in terms of bal-
ancing competing policy interests requiring the comparison of "the detrimental effects of arguably
unfair competition (subsidized advertising rates for sponsoring corporations) and the sacrifice of
Federal revenue against the potential loss of social benefits." Id. (citing Zimmerman, supra note
367, at 8). The Report, adopting a public goods analysis, identified the benefits as follows:
[1] lower ticket prices and/or an increased quantity of college football bowl games
(which would benefit primarily consumers of college football bowl games); (2] lower
advertising rates or, phrased differently, smaller sponsorship payments (which would
benefit primarily corporate sponsors); or [3] increased funding for universities (whose
primary beneficiaries might include several different activities and groups).
Id. at 1114 (footnote omitted) (quoting Zimmerman, supra note 367, at 10).
391. Id. at 1090, 1111 (reporting a 1991 estimate of $281 million in lost federal revenue as a
result of corporate sponsorship, $5 million of which was attributable to college bowl games).
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rate goodwill. 92 These types of corporate transfers are comparable
to public relations expenditures.393 For example, Robert Haas, chief
executive officer of Levi Strauss & Company, speaking of his com-
pany's commitment to corporate giving, explained how a corporation
is dependent on community goodwill:
[H]owever small or large our enterprise, we cannot isolate our business from
the society around us. Nor can we function without its goodwill. We may
need the goodwill of a neighborhood to enlarge a corner store. We may need
well-funded institutions of higher learning to turn out the skilled technical
employees we require. We may need adequate community health care to
curb absenteeism in our plants. Or we may need fair tax treatment for an
industry to be able to compete in the world economy.' "
The chairman and chief executive officer of Monsanto, Richard Ma-
honey, expressed similar views emphasizing community involve-
ment 95 and the fact that his business "cares."
We earn our right to operate by doing the right thing - whether the arena
is the competitive marketplace, Wall Street, the workplace or the communi-
ties in which we do business . . . Doing the right thing in our communities
means accepting our responsibility to be a good citizen - a reliable neigh-
bor who works to improve educational, cultural and civic vitality, while con-
ducting our business in a responsible, forthright manner. We care about and
392. In a slightly different context, the Treasury Department subscribed to the view that a
corporate transfer to charity constitutes "a purchase of goodwill." In 1991, the Treasury Depart-
ment issued proposed regulations under section 861 concerning the allocation of deductions to
foreign source income. The Proposed 861 Regulations described a corporate transfer to charity as
a "purchase of goodwill" and reasoned that a contribution for use in a foreign country represented
a corporate purchase of goodwill in that country. Accordingly, the proposed regulations required
the corporate donor to allocate any deductions for such contributions against foreign source in-
come. The practical effect was to deny U.S. corporations with foreign source income any tax
benefit for foreign contributions because of excess foreign tax credits. This ignited fierce criticism
from the charitable community. As a result, the Treasury Department has been forced to rethink
the allocation requirement. It has not, however, discarded its premise that a corporate transfer to
charity represents a purchase of goodwill. See Ruth A. Flynn, Comment, The Impact of U.S. Tax
Laws on the Future of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 319, 337-42 (1993)
(discussing Proposed Regulation 861).
393. EELLS, supra note 74, at 172; see HALL, supra note 97, at 108 (stating that "corporations
today view contributions programs primarily as . . . public-relations devices").
394. James A. Joseph, The Corporate Stake in Community Involvement: Has Business Lost its
Social Conscience?, in THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONs HANDBOOK supra note 74, at 3, 4-5.
395. Generating goodwill in the community in which a corporation does business is considered
a desirable way 'to reduce costs. See supra note 308 (discussing ways in which a company can
reduce costs by contributing to the community); Alex J. Plinio & Joane B. Scanlan, Total Re-
source Leveraging and Matching: Expanding the Concept of Corporate Community Involvement,
in THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONs HANDBOOK, supra note 74, at 283-84 (noting that corpora-
tions often ignore the ability to get "substantial services and assistance from the community to
assist the corporation").
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share in the quality of life in every community where we do business.3 96
Both managers and fundraisers are aware of the ability of corpo-
rate giving to generate corporate goodwill through favorable public
relations. It is not surprising that both groups seek the positive ef-
fects of such giving. 97 For example, the title of an article in a bank-
ing industry trade magazine reads: Getting Your Dollar's Worth
from Donations.98 The article advises bankers how to get the most
mileage out of their charitable dollars. For starters, the article tells
the donative banker to "[s]pread donations out over the year and
have each recipient agree to do a press release on the contribution
received." '99 In addition, the banker should "give things", not just
money. 400 After all, "[a] newspaper story about a donation of a new
respirator for an ambulance will attract much more attention if it
appears with a photograph of the bank's CEO helping paramedics
lift it on board. ' 0 1
Corporate contributions to public television or radio are one of the
more visible examples of corporate giving. 02 Corporate managers
and fundraisers cannot say enough good things about the public re-
lations and corporate goodwill benefits associated with supporting
public television.403 Corporate support for public television is so
commonplace that the comment to the A.L.I. Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance40 4 specifically mentions corporate contributions to
public television. 03
396. James A. Joseph, The Corporate Stake in Community Involvement: Has Business Lost its
Social Conscience?, in THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS HANDBOOK supra note 74, at 3, 5.
397. See STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 7 (discussing how corporate managers can benefit
their corporation and community through corporate contributions).
398. Charlotte LeGates, Getting Your Dollar's Worth From Donations, BANKERS MONTHLY,
Feb. 1992, at 34.
399. Id.
400. Id. "[C]ustomers will remember the local news program showing their bank's CEO and
the community's fire chief trying on the newly donated flameproof suits [better than they will
remember the presentation of a $300 check]." Id.
401. Id.
402. See Green, supra note 60, at 239, 255-57 (describing contributions by major corporations
to public television and other socially beneficial programs using the mass media).
403. See, e.g., KOCH, supra note 163, at 264 ("The corporate public relations benefits are more
immediate and varied than from support of just about any other nonprofit entity or service.").
404. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNENCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 com-
ment i (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter A.L. PRINCIPLES].
405. Davis, supra note 119, at 66 (referring to AL.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 404, § 2.01 com-
ment i, at 39). The comment further recognizes that support for public television is the functional
equivalent of commercial advertising. The comment states that "'a donation to public television
may be made for reasons comparable to those for sponsoring a commercial.'" Id. (quoting AU.
19941
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
Managers and fundraisers also describe corporate giving to the
arts as public relations, particularly where the charitable purpose of
the donee charity is seemingly remote from the business goals of the
corporate donor. Such giving reaches elite audiences and has the
added bonus of fostering an air of respectability and sophistication.
It [corporate giving to the arts] can provide a company with extensive pub-
licity and advertising, a brighter public reputation, and an improved corpo-
rate image. It can build better customer relations, a readier acceptance of
company products, and a superior appraisal of their quality. Promotion of
the arts can improve the morale of employees and help attract qualified
personnel. 06
A corporate contribution to public broadcasting or a community
fund for an arts program qualifies as a charitable contribution under
section 170,407 provided the corporation makes the expenditure with-
out the expectation of receiving a commensurate benefit in return
(other than the intangible goodwill created by the contribution and
its acknowledgement). 08 If the expenditure does not qualify under
section 170, it may constitute a capital expenditure, not immediately
deductible under section 162.09
From the standpoint of the charitable recipient, the transfer is not
included in unrelated business income. The consumer is exposed to
the corporate donor's name and its charitable proclivities. Compared
to cause-related-marketing and corporate sponsorship, it is less
likely that the consumer will associate the charitable cause with a
specific product or services.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 404, section 2.01 comment i, at 39). This distinction may be due in part to
the FCC regulation of the acknowledgement of corporate giving within the context of public
broadcasting. Id. The comment also acknowledges other uses of corporate giving: "'[A] contribu-
tion to local Red Cross or Community Chest activities may be made for reasons of employee well-
being and morale.'" Id. (quoting AL.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 404, § 2.01 comment i, at 39).
406. KOCH, supra note 163, at 240 (quoting David Rochefeller, president of the Chase Man-
hattan Bank, in an address given by him in 1966).
407. I.R.C. § 170 (West 1994); see supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevant portions of section 170).
408. The fact that the section 170 quid pro quo analysis does not consider the goodwill inten-
tionally created and purchased by the corporate transfer to charity is inconsistent with the Her-
nandez decision where the expectation of an intangible religious benefit satisfied the quid pro quo
requirement. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (finding that the expectation
of an intangible religious benefit satisfied the quid pro quo requirement). A corporate public rela-
tions expenditure that is paid to a commercial agency is made with the expectation of receiving a
commensurate benefit in return. There is no rational basis for treating a purchase of goodwill from
a charitable organization differently.
409. See supra notes 225-39 and accompanying text (discussing section 162).
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3. Investment in the Future: Future Markets and Future
Employees
Marketing literature discusses the "strategic" use of corporate do-
nations to secure future employees for the corporation and future
markets for its products or services. Commentators sometimes ex-
press corporate giving as an investment in the future and draw a
strict analogy between corporate giving and corporate research and
development expenses.4 10 Commentators advocating increased pro-
fessionalism in corporate giving stress that just like other corporate
projects, corporate giving requires long-term planning and organiza-
tion: "Each corporation should develop its own strategy for corpo-
rate giving and community involvement in the same way that it de-
velops an acquisitions strategy or product development strategy."""1
An immediate way for a corporation to expand its market is to
gain access to the membership, patrons, supporters, or donors of a
popular local charity. Fundraisers are aware of this benefit and they
urge that a charity should include detailed information about its
constituency (e.g. gender, age, income level) with its appeal for cor-
porate funds. 2 For example, the development staff at the Franklin
Institute Science Museum (the "Institute") in Philadelphia ana-
lyzed the demographics of its visitors and then used this information
to make the museum more attractive to corporate sponsors.4"3 The
Institute's Director of Development, Donald Smith, noted that the
Institute had one million visitors annually and boasted in an appeal
for corporate sponsors that "no one else in Philly [sic] can deliver
the audience that we can."4 4 Thus, a transfer to the Institute pro-
vides a corporate sponsor not only benefits from the traditional press
releases, but it also gains very specific information about the over
one million people who will view the acknowledgement of the corpo-
ration's generosity.
410. For example, Dalton and Daley argued that corporate giving is necessary to produce new
markets and a new labor force and that it is just as essential to the success of a business as
research and development efforts. "They [transfers to charity] all have an element of risk; they
are all relatively long-term (advertising to a lesser extent) in impact. And, they are all absolutely
fundamental to the future of the corporation and all of its constituencies." Dalton & Daily, supra
note 352, at 77.
411. KOCH, supra note 163, at 12.
412. Hall, Sponsorship, supra note 333, at 28. "Companies are particularly impressed when a
non-profit group provides demographic information [with a proposal] compiled by an outside com-
pany." Id.
413. Id. at 27.
414. Id.
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The emphasis on future markets and future employees was the
central theme of President Bush's education reform initiative,
America 2000. In 1991, Mr. Bush, the self-proclaimed "Education
President,"' unveiled his comprehensive plan to revitalize the edu-
cation system in the United States - America 2000,41 6 which was
heavily dependent upon corporate funding. Central to the plan was
the creation of an independent nongovernmental nonprofit organiza-
tion called the New American Schools Development Corporation
("NASDC").417 President Bush characterized the NASDC as a pri-
vate sector research and development ("R & D") institute that
would use the results of its "R & D" to establish 535 new schools
(at least one in every Congressional District). NASDC was organ-
ized and operated as a corporation exempt from federal income tax
under section 501(c)(3) and qualified to receive tax-deductible
contributions.
From its inception, Mr. Bush expected NASDC to raise its own
funds in the form of private charitable contributions. Mr. Bush esti-
mated that initially NASDC would raise somewhere between $150
million and $200 million from private industry.418 President Bush
stressed:
There's a special place in inventing the new American school for the corpo-
rate community, for business, and labor, and I invite you to work with us
415. On October 14, 1987, then-Vice President Bush announced in a campaign speech to Re-
publican supporters in Dearborn, Michigan, "I'd like to be known as the education president"
because "education is going to be the top priority for me." Bush Puts Education as Top Priority,
UPI, Oct. 14, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. He reiterated this desire
in a debate in New Hampshire during the Presidential Republican primary race. Vice President
Bush remarked, "My vision? I want to be the education president." Frank Clifford, Conservatives
Attack Bush, Dole in Lively N.H. Debate, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1988, at Al.
416. In President Bush's 1990 State of the Union Address, he listed the six goals for American
education developed by the National Governors Association Task Force on Education. Bush's
State of the Union Address, UPI, Jan. 31, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS
File. President Bush, however, did not propose a funding source or any cost estimate. Id. President
Bush did not offer a solution to the funding riddle (i.e., how to increase services without increasing
the demand on tax revenues) until the following year.
417. Bush announced the creation of the New American Schools Development Corporation at
an address on education before invited congressmen and business leaders. President Bush Address
on Education to Congressmen, Business and Community Leaders, Federal News Service, Apr. 18,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File [hereinafter President Bush Address
on Education]. Bush restated the six goals for American education that he announced during his
State of the Union address on January 31, 1990. Id.
418. Id. This is an oversimplification. As discussed in Part 1I, Section C, from a tax-expendi-
ture standpoint, a portion of every corporate dollar transferred to charity represents foregone fed-
eral income tax revenue. See infra notes 445-87 and accompanying text (discussing agenda and
corporate giving). In addition, Congress did appropriate start-up funds for the organization.
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not simply to transform our schools but to transform every American adult
into a student. . . . The corporate community can take the lead by creating
a voluntary private system of world class standards for the work place.41 9
Mr. Bush's message was clear. It was time for private industry to
hear the call and recognize that education was a key component to
economic recovery because it insured a never-ending supply of edu-
cated workers and, perhaps more importantly, educated consumers.
The promise of the high technology marketplace of the future will
require highly-skilled workers. Educated consumers are essential to
create a demand for the high technology products of the future.
Traditionally, a significant portion of corporate giving has been
directed toward education.42 ° The corporate action approved by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in A.P Smith Manufacturing Company
v. Barlow42 was a contribution to Princeton University. The court
not only approved the contribution, it remarked that a corporation
had a "solemn duty" to support higher education:
[T]he contribution here in question is towards a cause which is intimately
tied into the preservation of American business and the American way of
life. Such giving may be called an incidental power, but when it is consid-
ered in its essential character, it may well be regarded as a major, though
unwritten, corporate power. It is even more than that. In the court's view of
the case it amounts to a solemn duty.'2
In addition to direct financial assistance, corporate support for edu-
cation includes the donation of products,42 3 research funding of uni-
versity laboratories,424 scholarship support for the children of em-
419. President Bush Address on Education, supra note 417.
420. The bulk of contemporary corporate giving is directed towards higher education. Recent
trends indicate a growing interest in secondary and primary education. Fundraisers estimate that
corporate giving to education has increased by 11 % in recent years. An example of this long
connection between business and education is General Electric's "matching gift" program. In
1955, General Electric instituted the first "matching gift" program for employee contributions to
educational institutions. The rationale for the program was to permit employees to share in corpo-
rate giving decisionmaking, support where the employees went to school, and to provide a strong
incentive for employees to participate. See supra note 268 (discussing how many corporations
followed General Electric's lead by initiating their own "matching gift" programs).
421. 97 A.2d 186 (1953), aff'd 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
422. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co., 97 A.2d at 192.
423. Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More than a Market-
ing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS, supra note 11, at
246, 247 (describing direct benefit from donation of computer hardware by IBM and Apple to
establish a user base).
424. Katherine Bouton, Academic Research and Big Business: A Delicate Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1983, § 6, at 62.
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ployees, and exclusive product relationships.2 6
A popular way for corporations to pursue future markets is to
donate their products to a charitable organization for use by its
members, volunteers, employees, or, in the case of educational insti-
tutions, its students. 21 A fundraising executive writes:
In many ways, gifts-in-kind is a better way for a corporation to donate to
charity. First, the company knows that its donation -its products - will be
used for the purpose intended. Second, the product has "built-in goodwill."
Every time a recipient uses that product, he sees the logo or recognizes the
company. It is like giving away a little part of yourself. And finally, these
products, once tested and used by the nonprofit and its clients or students,
can often expand a market base. A student who uses a donated computer
and likes it may later decide to buy one for home.428
The executive concludes: "From a business perspective, it is a smart
thing to do; from a humanitarian perspective, it is the right thing to
do."
42 9
Under section 170(e), the contribution by corporations of certain
products to certain charities results in more favorable tax treatment
than simply liquidating or dumping the products.43 0 The opportuni-
ties presented by section 170(e) have led to the creation of organiza-
tions designed to match manufacturers with qualified charities. 3 '
Financial advisers, always quick to exploit a "tax break," vigorously
advocate section 170(e) gifts. One such adviser wrote: "Excessive
buildup of inventory, which ties up cash, can be a real risk in an
economic downturn. Here's a solution: donate your excess inventory
425. See Jim Jones, Aftermath of the Exodus, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 1, 1989, at
49, 50 (noting that South African business owners are improving their work force, allowing em-
ployees' children to benefit from corporate funding to schools).
426. A recent example of an exclusive product relationship is the 1992 agreement between
Penn State University and Pepsi. Under the 10-year contract, Penn State agreed to sell only Pepsi
soft drinks on its 21 campuses, and Pepsi agreed to transfer $14 million for scholarship funds and
a new athletic stadium. Cola Cum Laude, TIME, June 22, 1992, at 30.
427. See Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (recognizing in certain
instances that the donation of sewing machines to schools to secure futures sales constitutes the
expectation of a commensurate benefit).
428. Gary C. Smith, Corporations Turning Charity Into Cash, Bus. & Soc'Y REV., Spring
1989, at 42, 45.
429. Id.
430. See supra notes 242-51 and accompanying text (discussing the tax treatment a corpora-
tion receives under section 170 when it transfers either appreciated property or inventory property
to charity).
431. The text of an advertisement for a company identified as "EAL" in Time magazine reads:
"Turn your excess inventory into a substantial tax break and help send needy kids to college as
well . . . . [L]earn how donating your slow moving inventory can mean a generous tax write-off
for your company." TIME, June 22, 1992, at 17.
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...under Section 170(e)(3) .... ,432
The needs of the donee charity are sometimes overlooked in the
rush to donate (i.e., unload) slow moving (i.e., obsolete) excess in-
ventory. For example, in Starving for Good PR: Corporations
Force-Feed the Poor, Feinberg states that the food industry uses
food banks "as dumping grounds for unusable, unsalable food. ' 433
The corporation is entitled to the deduction regardless of the suita-
bility of the property transferred. 4
4. The Delicate Balance Required
A consistent theme throughout the marketing and fundraising
literature is the need for corporate philanthropy to achieve a "bal-
ance" between economic self-interest and altruistic social responsi-
bility." 5 Eells expressed the desire to achieve this balance as the
"dilemma" presented by corporate giving.
The basic justification for corporate giving, then, is a philosophy of enlight-
ened self-interest. For if a company merely engages in "charity qua char-
ity," it reflects an altruism more laudable than defensible as an exercise of
corporate authority. Yet, if its gifts fail to serve the broader interests of
mankind, they cease to qualify as philanthropy, with implications that will
concern the tax collector. Corporation philanthropy, in short, must get in
between the horns of a rather difficult dilemma. 30
To the extent that corporate giving achieves the delicate balance
between self-interest and altruism, its proponents can justify the
practice as entirely consistent with a profit maximization model of
the corporation while capitalizing on the "halo effect" which inures
to socially responsible corporations. This suggests that the criticism
of corporate giving from the profit maximization camp 437 has influ-
432. Jill A. Fraser, Charitable Donations With a Big Payoff, INC., May 1991, at 99.
433. Feinberg, supra note 332, at 38 (noting the donation of "microwave browning spray and
crumbled candy bar innards").
434. The substantiation rules require the charitable donee to acknowledge receipt of the prop-
erty, but the donee is not required to attest to the fair market value of the property received.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170-13 (1994).
435. A fundraiser remarked, "Some corporate marketing executives complain that non-profits
waste their time by talking about charitable programs instead of how they could help the company
reach new customers. . . . 'We're talking about cold advertising and marketing people who
couldn't care less about your cause.''" Hall, Sponsorship supra note 333, at 27 (quoting Don
Smith, director of development at the Franklin Institute Science Museum in Philadelphia).
436. EELLS, supra note 74, at 7.
437. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 167, at 14 ("There is a very real social responsibility, and
that is to make as much money as they can subject to staying within the law and within the
appropriate ethical standard.").
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enced the conception and expression of corporate philanthropy. "8
As explained below, it is difficult to achieve the necessary balance.
Reports from the field, however, suggest that it is easier to accom-
modate these two seemingly divergent goals in theory than in prac-
tice. Individuals working for charitable organizations, report that
"dual agenda giving" can create tension. At a recent non-profit con-
ference, a fundraising consultant warned exempt organizations to
beware of corporations that offer "insincere commitments" and try
to take advantage of a charity's goodwill and lack of business
experience. "39
Professor Karen Paul researched corporate philanthropy and its
impact on South Africa in light of the Sullivan Principles. " ° Her
observations vividly underscore the complexity inherent in corporate
grantmaking.
The corporate officers engaged in the philanthropic effort seem to me to be
persons of integrity who desire to do good with their efforts. But they em-
brace a number of conflicting expectations. They want to do good for those
people who are the targets of projects supported, but they also want to do
good for the corporation. They want to support authentic community lead-
438. To accommodate this "dual agenda giving", Payton proposed the creation of "a revised
paradigm [to] identify a new balance point between altruism and self-interest and define parame-
ters for corporate giving that tap and blend the best of both motivations." PAYTON, supra note
168, at 201. Professors Harvey and McCrohan described a similar conception of "dual-agenda
giving":
Dual-agenda giving is the concept of requiring a fit between corporate objectives and
the objectives of the philanthropic organizations they support. This type of giving is
based on a market-driven approach to company goals by generating support from a
target customer base. Whether a cause is supported is determined by the alignment of
corporate and customer needs.
Harvey & McCrohan, supra note 320, at 47.
439. Hall, Joint Ventures, supra note 330, at 21 (quoting Lesa Ukman, president of Interna-
tional Events Group).
440. In 1977, an African-American Baptist minister from Philadelphia and a member of the
Board of directors of General Motors Corporation wrote guidelines that sought to improve the
working standards of non-white employees of American firms in South Africa. These guidelines
became known as the "Sullivan Principles", and when companies agreed to abide by them they
promised to:
1) Bar racial discrimination in all company eating, toilet and work facilities; 2) Pro-
vide equal and fair employment practices for all employees; 3) Ensure equal pay for
equal and comparable work; 4) Develop training programs to prepare non-white em-
ployees for supervisory, administrative and technical jobs; 5) Increase the number of
non-whites in management; and 6) Improve the quality of the employees' lives outside
the workplace by a variety of means, including the development of good schools and
better housing.
Donald W. Gallagher, The Sullivan Principles: A Code for Companies in South Africa Not an
Anti-Disinvestment Movement, UPI, Sept. 9, 1985, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNWS File.
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ers, but they also want to support individuals who come from the community
but who will cut a dashing figure for visiting corporate officials and in the
eyes of the media. They want projects to make a difference in the lives of
blacks, but they also want projects that would serve corporate interests.4 4 '
Critics of corporate giving have identified a similar conflict in the
case of U.S. hunger relief.442 Recognizing that hunger relief is a
popular cause for corporations, Feinberg asserted that corporate do-
nors fund short-term emergency food relief programs, but shy-away
from long-term solutions.44 Hunger activists explain that corporate
giving is not "motivated by a desire to solve the problem of hun-
ger. . . . [Rather, the purpose is] to promote a shining corporate
image."
4 44
C. A Final Caveat - To Look Beyond The Stated
In large part, the conclusions set forth in this article are based on
the construction of corporate giving as expressed in the marketing
and fundraising literature. These conclusions are incomplete without
an acknowledgement that they are based on the statements of indi-
viduals actively engaged in the practice of corporate giving, many of
whom may have a vested interest in the continuation and institu-
tionalization of the practice."6 Clearly, statements by proponents of
corporate giving may be inherently self-serving, and may carry un-
spoken meanings with wide-reaching social, political, and economic
impact. 4 6
1. Dual Agenda or Hidden Agenda Giving
The contemporary discourse of corporate charitable giving at-
441. Karen Paul, Corporate Philanthropy, Soc'v, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 15, 16.
442. See Feinberg, supra note 332 (criticizing corporate giving as building up short-term relief
for hunger, but ignoring long-term results).
443. Id. at 37-38. Feinberg concludes: "Emergency food relief is appropriate for Third World
countries where food is scarce. But emergency relief is inappropriate here because food is abun-
dant. The problem underlying hunger is not scarcity, but poverty." Id. at 38.
444. Id. at 36.
445. One thing that is striking about the discussion is that it is phrased in a business vocabu-
lary which seems somehow mismatched with philanthropic endeavors. For example, grants are
termed "investments" and corporate grantmakers are said to "manage" "portfolios" of grants.
Sibyl Jacobson, Monitoring the Results of Grantmaking, in THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
HANDBOOK, supra note 74, at 265, 267; see infra note 304 (citing advice from marketing and
fundraising literature that managers conduct corporate giving in a more business-like manner).
446. MITCHELL, supra note 92; USEEM, supra note 119; and Haley, supra note 313.
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tempts to balance the conflicting theories of corporate purpose. " 7
Critics on the right assert that the very notion of corporate giving is
inconsistent with the overriding goal of the corporation - profit
maximization. Observers on the left warn that too much "corpo-
rate" negates the "giving." Moreover, they assert that corporate giv-
ing is a means by which corporations exercise social/political power.
Milton Friedman speculated that corporate managers consciously
mislabel certain advertising expenses as charitable contributions,
presumably to take advantage of the "halo effect."""' Friedman
responded:
I don't want to blame the corporation for doing that [calling advertising
expenses charitable contributions]. The corporation's managers have to be-
have in a way that will promote the interest of their corporation. It's the rest
of us, who make it worth their while to talk that nonsense, to whom I
object.44 '
Professor Blumberg, who appears to believe in corporate altruism,
wrote that corporate managers "disguise corporate philanthropy in
terms of pretended self-interest. 480 Once again, the dual (and ar-
guably duplicitous) nature of corporate giving complicates the anal-
ysis of the practice, revealing the contradiction inherent within the
term "corporate giving."
Andrews recognized the practical problems presented by this
"dual agenda" giving.451 In 1952, he reported:
One corporation keeps two sets of files, a public file on the needs and accom-
plishments of various agencies and the contributions made, and a private file
on the special concern of the corporation with these agencies, such as inter-
locking board memberships, customers prominent in the charity, and the
need to placate or please special groups.4 52
Marketing and fundraising literature expresses corporate giving
447. See supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which corporate
giving has attempted to balance the theories of corporate purpose).
448. Johnson, supra note 167, at 14-15. In addition, Friedman remarked, "A lot of what they
call charity is really tax-deductible expenses . . . . [I]t may well be in the self-interest of a corpo-
ration to profess to be socially responsible, whether it is or is not in any meaningful sense." Id. at
15.
449. Id. Friedman reiterated this remark by stating, "I don't believe they ought to be contribut-
ing at all, unless it's in their immediate, direct pecuniary interest, except insofar as they're doing
it at the behest of their stockholders." Id.
450. Blumberg, supra note 129, at 171.
451. See supra notes 333-444 and accompanying text (discussing various justifications for cor-
porate transfers to charity).
452. ANDREWS, supra note 79, at 114.
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as the latest trend in profit maximization . 5 Empirical studies, how-
ever, show no correlation between socially responsible corporate be-
havior and profits. 54 The shared belief that corporate giving is good
for the corporate bottom line encourages managers and fundraisers
to promote giving as apparently socially responsible and always
profitable. Thus, individuals engaged in the practice of corporate
giving balance competing theories of corporate purpose.
2. Corporate Giving as Social Currency
Corporate transfers to charity can be viewed as an exercise of
corporate power designed to advance far-reaching corporate social,
political, and economic goals.4 5 Capitalizing on the "halo effect,"
corporations use corporate giving to effect the symbolic transmission
of corporate values to various stakeholders. 6 Useem described the
use of corporate giving to further classwide interests as a kind of
social currency.4 5 He theorized that an "inner circle" was created
by "intercorporate networks through shared ownership and director-
ship of large companies. 458 Useem contended that "corporations
more integrated into the inner circle display a greater commitment
to culture, 4 5 9 because charitable giving promotes the common in-
terests of both the business and cultural elite. Accepting the profit
453. See supra notes 333-444 and accompanying text (discussing advertising, marketing, public
relations, and future investments).
454. See supra notes 300-18 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between corpo-
rate giving and business success).
455. USEEM, supra note 119, at 3; Haley, supra note 313, at 492-94; see generally MITCHELL,
supra note 92 (arguing that corporations are political institutions that must justify their power).
456. Haley, supra note 313, at 494, 497-99.
457. USEEM, supra note 119, at 3 ("I will argue that a politicized leading edge of the leadership
of a number of major corporations has come to play a major role in defining and promoting the
shared needs of large corporations in two of the industrial democracies, the United States and the
United Kingdom."); see also HALL, supra note 97, at 97 (noting that contributions serve class
interests of large donors and businesses); Haley, supra note 313, at 491-92 (discussing corporate
contributions as social currency).
458. USEEM, supra note 119, at 3. According to Useem, the inner circle emerged with the rise
of institutionalized capitalism in the first half of the twentieth century. Id. at 3-4. In 1913, the
Pujo Committee, named for Democratic member of Congress from Louisiana, Arsene Pujo, con-
ducted an investigation of the extent of concentration in U.S. industry. MITCHELL, supra note 92,
at 98. Mitchell cited the Pujo Committee and its findings to question Useem's time-line which
places social responsibility as a by-product of "institutional capitalism." Id. at 153. "The histori-
cal evidence, however, suggests a different evolution than the one Useem describes, or at least a
different chronology." Id. Mitchell pointed out that interlocking directorships were uncovered by
the Pujo Committee and that J.P. Morgan testified he held 39 such positions. Id. at 98, 153.
459. USEEM, supra note 119, at 121-22, 126.
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maximization model of the corporation,' 60 Useem described the pro-
motion of "classwide profit growth" as a "second, distinct calculus
that guides some corporate decisions. '"461
Useem reported that a corporate manager will give to charitable
projects endorsed by a peer at another corporation, regardless of the
relevance of the charitable cause to his or her corporation. 462 This
assertion is supported by a study involving the CEO's of firms lo-
cated in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. The survey indicated that
contributions to local charitable causes increase when the corporate
managers socialize with the directors and leaders of the charitable
organizations. 468 This supported Useem's construction of an elite
overlapping group of corporate, charitable, and governmental repre-
sentatives who direct and influence social policy outside of the gov-
ernmental framework. 46 This elite group directs social policy deci-
sions without the checks and balances imposed on the governmental
decision-making process465 because this elite group determines
which cause is worthy of financial support which in turn is subsi-
dized by current federal tax policy."66
Haley expanded on Useem's concept of corporate giving and ar-
gued that "managers use corporate contributions to influence vari-
ous stakeholders including stockholders, consumers, employees, in-
vestors, [and] public[] and societal institutions. 4 67 Thus, Haley
viewed corporate giving as a symbolic means to influence stake-
holder opinion and secure access to policy makers who "can insulate
corporations from regulation and taxes, and can inform managers of
460. Useem noted that "profit growth is the overriding objective of corporate action." Id. at
148.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 123. Useem observed, "[E]xecutives who are targets of the [charitable] campaigns
report that it is virtually impossible to reject the personal appeal of another corporate manager,
despite the irrelevance of the contribution from the standpoint of the company's operations." Id.
at 123-24.
463. Haley, supra note 313, at 492.
464. USEEM, supra note 119; Haley, supra note 313, at 492 (noting that "[the establishments
that receive contributions often become privileged places for corporate entertainment.").
465. See Lashbrooke, supra note 9, at 242 (concluding that "[c]orporate social responsibility
shifts the decision from the government to the corporation-in other words, to the corporate direc-
tors and officers who are not accountable to the public nor even to the shareholders"); Davis,
supra note 119, at 69 (stating that "[wjouldn't the kinds of comparative advantages enjoyed by
the large corporation also be realized, and to a much greater degree, by turning the matter over to
the federal government, to serve as the central disperser of, and assessor for, charitable largesse").
466. For a discussion of tax expenditures, see infra notes 488-522 and accompanying text.
467. Haley, supra note 313, at 485.
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environmental changes."' 8
3. Corporate Giving as a Defensive Strategy
Discussions of corporate transfers to charity reverberate with the
conviction that "[t]he major objective of corporation giving is to
preserve and maintain the vital private sectors in the corporate en-
vironment. '4 9 Throughout recent history, the corporate environ-
ment has been subject to many perceived threats, the most funda-
mental of which was the fear of encroaching Communism. Indeed,
corporations dedicated to profit maximization could not exist in the
absence of private property. The Marxist promise to collectivize the
ownership of the means of production and institute a dictatorship of
the proletariat posed a direct threat not only to corporate legiti-
macy, but to continued corporate survival. 70
Mitchell described corporate giving as a defensive strategy - "a
response to threats to corporate legitimacy"'' 71 necessary to forestall
"legislation and regulation" that would restrict or limit corporate
power.'7 Mitchell believed that corporate social responsibility
emerged in response to the critique of corporate power advanced
(and popularized) 473 during the Progressive Era.47 4
468. Id. at 496. Haley added, "[C]ontributions become cultural, warning systems, indicators of
changing environments and threats to corporate stability." Id. at 497.
469. EELLS, supra note 74, at 137. Eells wrote: "[C]orporate giving is essentially an allocation
of certain corporate assets to uses regarded as best in the long run for both the corporation and
the society on which it depends . . . . Corporate giving is an investment in a favorable corporate
environment . I..." d. at 189.
470. To Eells, the danger of communist expansionism presented a challenge to corporate lead-
ers. Id. at 190-91. Attempting to sound the alarm, he wrote:
Today, corporate managers find themselves at the core of a "twentieth-century capi-
talist revolution"-a humane movement that stands in contrast to inhumane collectiv-
ist drives in some other parts of the world. Many business leaders will take in their
stride the responsibilities inherent in this position at the heart of our "capitalist
revolution."
Id.
471. MITCHELL, supra note 92, at 53. Mitchell defines legitimacy as "the belief among groups
within the affected population-workers, consumers, stockholders, and managers themselves-that
the exercise of power is justified." Id. at 56.
472. Id. at 62. Mitchell expressed the nexus between legitimacy and power as follows: "Failure
to establish legitimacy jeopardizes power; it may prompt legislation and regulation, and even en-
danger the corporation's survival." Id.
473. See id. at 88 (discussing political party platforms criticizing each other surrounding the
issue of the large corporation). Mitchell stated that the Progressive era did not constitute "a new
order of criticism, but rather . . . existing criticisms were transformed into popular beliefs." Id. at
107.
474. Citing the Presidential election of 1912 as "the high noon of Progressivism," Mitchell
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Early corporate giving texts support Mitchell's theory regarding
threats to corporate legitimacy. 47" The classic corporate giving texts
by Andrews and Eells wholeheartedly embraced Cold War senti-
ments dedicated to preserving the free enterprise system. 7 Both
Andrews and Eells continually advanced corporate giving as a
means to stem the Red Tide, stressing the nexus between the main-
tenance of capitalist free market hegemony and continued corporate
existence. As Eells wrote, "The corporate philanthropist must decide
to throw his weight on the side of the legitimate preserves of human
freedom in this critical struggle. 4 77
The sanctity of private property is a persistent theme throughout
Eells' 1956 book entitled Corporation Giving in a Free Society.7 8
In an especially impassioned passage, Eells described private
property:
It goes to the roots of constitutionalism as a theory of government in our
western political tradition.
The constitution of a society of free men must preserve the vital private
sectors as a counterpoise to tyranny. If they were to be progressively ab-
sorbed into the State, the corporate environment of free enterprise for indus-
try would rapidly disappear.?' 9
In a somewhat less desperate tone, Eells advocated that a corpora-
tion must regulate itself or be regulated.
It would be a matter of good fortune if an excessive growth of the power of
the State could be stopped at the threshold of corporate enterprise, or any
other "private governing power," simply by the development of a "corporate
discussed various governmental and social initiatives that constituted a threat to corporate legiti-
macy. Id. at 88-91. In particular, Mitchell noted the rise of trade unionism. Id. at 43-51. A
traditional explanation of "welfare capitalism" describes it as a response to the use of trade union-
ism. Id. at 43 (citing IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS 187 (1966), and STUART BRANDES,
AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM 32 (1976)). Mitchell conceded that corporate social policy "was
not simply the product of a moment in history-although particular historical circumstances gave
substance to the problem of corporate legitimacy and the solution chosen-but of a continuing
dynamic." Id. at 51; see also Horwitz, supra note 11 (examining the history of corporate theory
and arguing that the natural entity theory emerged a decade after 1886 and was gradually ab-
sorbed); Millon, supra note 104 (considering how corporate theories have changed over the last
150 years).
475. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 79 (The Russell Sage Foundation underwrote the publish-
ing of Andrews' classic text). This showed clear financial motivation on the part of a charitable
organization and a desire to package charity for the corporate consumer).
476. ANDREWS, supra note 79; EELLS, supra note 74, at 188 ("The corporate donor with 'the
far vision and the near look' has it within his power to aid in securing the survival of free enter-
prise and in toughening the sinews of our liberating way of life.").
477. EELLS, supra note 74, at 106.
478. Id. at 105.
479. Id.
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conscience," or by constitutionalizing the internal arrangements of these pri-
vate associations.4 80
Congressional activity during the 1950's further supports the link
between threats to corporate legitimacy and transfers to charity. In
1952, the House of Representatives formed the Cox Committee to
investigate private foundations for alleged "subversive" and "un-
American" activities.481 When the Cox Committee announced that
private foundations did not pose a threat to the American way of
life, 82 a disgruntled minority member of the committee, B. Carroll
Reece, pressed for a more probing investigation. The Reece Com-
mittee convened in 1954 to investigate private foundations which
Representative Reece believed were involved in "a diabolical con-
spiracy" for "the furtherance of socialism in the United States. 483
Writing only two years after the conclusion of the Committee's in-
vestigation, Eells remained sensitive to the bad publicity.484
The corporation occupies a prominent place in the power structure of Amer-
ican society; and before corporations enter upon far-reaching programs of
philanthropy this fact must be fully understood. For philanthropy itself is an
exercise of power which is susceptible of misunderstanding and even of
abuse, as the recent Congressional investigations demonstrate. The problem
is not simply one of using charitable contributions as an expression of the
"corporate conscience. ' '4 85
Eells reported that "[tihe leading foundations became alarmed" and
they went to great lengths to counteract the negative image of the
charitable foundations fostered by the hearings before the Cox
Committee and the Reece Committee. 86
Post Cold War geopolitics require corporations to consider a host
480. Id. at 99.
481. Id. at 46-52.
482. Id. at 47. Eells described the results of the Cox Committee as unremarkable. Id. at 47-48.
He mentioned that its report "sought to quiet the fears of 'many of our citizens' who are skeptical
about foundation work in the field of the social sciences, and who 'confuse the term 'social'.
with socialism.'" Id. at 47.
483. Id. at 49.
484. This is evident from the fact that Eells devoted a chapter in his book on corporate giving
to the topic of the hearings and their effect on the charitable community. See id. at 44-71 (dis-
cussing the hearings and their implications).
485. Id. at 87.
486. Id. at 52-58. Eells provided a very colorful account of the antics of Congressman Reece.
See id. at 49-52 (discussing this account of Reece). Apparently, Chairman Reece had particular
difficulty accepting the foundation-sponsored Kinsey report on human sexuality. Id. at 65-66. Eells
stated that "one committee member seemed to find the very discussion of the Kinsey report a
repugnant subject." Id. at 66 (referring to Reece).
1994]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
of threats to corporate legitimacy, and not simply fixate on a single
evil. Consequently, corporate giving must go global. Mitchell pro-
vided an example of this global perspective with the following ex-
cerpt from the stated social policy of the International Bank of
America.
No matter how well an international bank performs on a global scale, if it
fails to listen actively and respond visibly to the social needs prevalent in
individual markets, it can become a broad target for strangling legislation,
regulation, nationalization, or even for violent mob or terrorist attacks. All
multinational corporations, and banks in particular, must reinforce the pub-
lic perception that business is serving society's needs."
87
III. TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS REDUX
The recognition that corporate giving is the functional equivalent
of advertising and public relations expenditures fundamentally al-
ters any analysis of the tax expenditure (i.e., foregone federal tax
revenue) for corporate transfers to charity. This is because the cor-
porate income tax deduction for advertising and public relations ser-
vices488 under section 162 is considered a normative adjustment and
not a tax expenditure.
The tax expenditure theory starts from the basic premise that
within a given tax system, 89 in this case the federal income tax sys-
tem, certain normative adjustments (i.e., deductions, exclusions,
credits) are necessary to measure the tax base. All other adjust-
ments represent tax expenditures - a policy decision to subsidize
certain activities by foregoing federal revenue - revenue that would
have been collected under the normative provisions. 90 In the case of
the charitable contribution deduction, a $100x corporate charitable
deduction removes $100x from the corporation's taxable income, '91
487. MITCHELL, supra note 92, at 59 (citation omitted).
488. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text (discussing the nondeductibility of
goodwill).
489. Tax expenditure analysis is equally applicable to federal transfer taxes and other excise
taxes.
490. An enduring criticism of the tax expenditure theory is that it is not possible to differenti-
ate between normative deductions and policy-driven deductions. SURREY & McDANIEL, supra
note 181, at 196. Beyond this objection, some commentators propose alternative normative as-
sumptions. Calling the current normative assumptions in tax policy 'realist,' Professor Griffith
analyzed the taxation of personal injury recoveries under various models of alternative tax policy
norms. Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analy-
sis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 Wls. L. REV. 1115.
491. This assumes that the corporate donor is entitled to deduct the entire $100x in the year of
the transfer.
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resulting in $35x of foregone federal revenue."92 The tax expendi-
ture theory identifies this lost revenue as an indirect federal subsidy
to the charitable recipient administered through the Internal Reve-
nue Code. 93 Since 1974 tax expenditures have been reflected in the
federal budget.494
A tax expenditure analysis of a particular deduction presupposes
an ability to describe the behavior sought to be encouraged by the
deduction. A misdescription of the behavior in fact subsidized by
the corporate charitable contribution distorts the budgetary review
process 95 and makes any resulting consensus concerning the equity
or efficiency of the corporate charitable contribution deduction
meaningless. The approval of a subsidy for corporate transfers to
charity without the expectation of any commensurate benefit in re-
turn is not transferrable to a subsidy for the purchase of corporate
goodwill. However, once corporate giving is recast, traditional tax
expenditure analysis is no longer applicable496 because the corporate
income tax deduction for advertising and public relations services
under section 162 is considered a normative adjustment.
The mischaracterization of corporate giving reinforces the "halo
effect" by insuring that the public debate surrounding the deduction
never questions the "charitable" nature of the transfer. Instead, ar-
guments pro and con drift to broader policy issues, such as the need
to increase federal tax revenue and general principles of equity and
efficiency. The public and the legislature, however, cannot evaluate
492. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of a charita-
ble contribution made by a corporation in the top marginal tax bracket).
493. Viewed as an indirect subsidy, tax expenditures are considered the equivalent of direct
spending programs. SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 181, at 86.
494. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 308, 88 Stat. 297, 313 (1974)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 639(c)(3)(1988)). Professor Surrey argued persuasively that tax
expenditures should be reflected in the federal budget and subject to the same level of review as
direct federal subsidies. SURREY, supra note 181, at 3-4. The 1974 Congressional Budget Act
required the federal budget to include these "hidden" federal expenditures.
495. When first proposed, the goal of the tax expenditure theory was to expose indirect federal
expenditures concealed as favorable tax treatment for certain taxpayers or certain expenditures.
The favorable tax treatment was designed to encourage specific behavior and thereby implement
economic or social policy. Professor Surrey argued persuasively that such indirect expenditures
should be subject to debate and scrutiny "on the books" as federal expenditures. See supra notes
181 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Surrey's views).
496. Except perhaps in the few instances where transfers deductible under section 170 enjoy
more favorable treatment than those deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses (e.g.,
capital expenditures, inventory property, gifts of long-term capital gain property) under section
162. See supra notes 225-51 and accompanying text (discussing situations where traditional tax
expenditure analysis may be applicable).
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these broader policy issues until the practice of corporate giving is
understood as a corporate expenditure for advertising or public rela-
tions services.
The classic tax expenditure analysis measures the equity and effi-
ciency of the tax provision against that of an equivalent direct
spending program.497 Particularly in the case of the charitable con-
tribution deduction, the equity inquiry illustrates the "upside-down"
nature of a tax expenditure.4 98 Higher income taxpayers receive a
greater benefit because the value of the subsidy is a function of the
taxpayer's top marginal rate of tax. In the case of a taxpayer in the
15 % top marginal tax rate, a $100x transfer to a qualified charity
costs the taxpayer $85x ($100x less $15x [$15% of $lOOx]). 4'" The
same transfer, however, costs a higher income taxpayer in the
39.6% top marginal tax rate only $60.4x ($100x less $39.6x
[39.6% of $100x]). This means that higher income taxpayers can
direct (and benefit from) a disproportionate share of the tax expen-
diture budget. Non-taxpayers do not participate at all.500 Professor
Surrey noted that this upside-down impact of tax expenditures is
"the primary cause of the perceived tax inequity" on the part of the
public.501
From an efficiency standpoint, the corporate charitable deduction
does not fare well when compared to a direct spending program es-
tablished to fund the activities of charitable organizations. 50 First,
the individual giving patterns of corporations determine the extent
to which organizations (and causes) receive funding. 503 In addition,
there is a hidden cost in such transfers because the charitable recipi-
497. Professor Surrey generally favored direct expenditures over tax expenditures citing numer-
ous inefficiencies and inequities. SURREY, supra note 181, at 126-54. Contra Zelinsky, supra note
181, at 1167 (defending tax expenditures by portraying "tax institutions as more pluralist and less
capturable").
498. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 181, at 72 (noting that "[t]he overwhelming majority
of tax expenditure programs disproportionately benefit the upper-income groups.").
499. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing this formula). In 1993, there were
five different individual rates, ranging from 15% to 39.6%. I.R.C. § l(a) (West 1993).
500. SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 181, at 72. The phrase "non-taxpayers" includes all
individuals below taxable levels, loss proprietorships, and loss corporations. In the case of the
individual charitable deduction, it also includes non-itemizers because the section 170 deduction
reduces adjusted gross income. Id. at 81.
501. Id. at 72. Tax expenditures "fail to achieve what most Americans would perceive to be a
fair distribution of funds, measured by criteria applied to direct spending programs." Id.
502. Id. at 82-87.
503. Certain commentators contend that corporations will not make transfers to controversial
causes. See supra note 329-30 and accompanying text.
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ent receives the funds in exchange for the provision of services. The
quid pro quo nature of the transaction requires the charitable recipi-
ent to divert its resources from the fulfillment of its charitable pur-
pose, thereby decreasing the value of the transfer.504 Clearly, this
approach is not as efficient as a direct federal subsidy unless the
contemplated federal policy is to encourage charitable organizations
to become more entrepreneurial and learn how to earn their own
funds.""o
A sustained criticism of the tax expenditure theory relates to its
central premise, namely that certain adjustments to income are nor-
mative (i.e., required by the nature of the particular tax base).
Commentators differ as to which adjustments are indeed norma-
tive5°6 and, on a more fundamental basis, differ as to whether any
meaningful distinction can be made between items classified as nor-
mative adjustments as opposed to those classified as tax
expenditures.5 o7
A case in point is the exemption from federal income tax for
charitable organizations. °50  The tax exemption for charities is not
included in the tax expenditure budget presumably because the
charitable exemption from federal income tax is considered a nor-
mative provision.509 A corporate transfer to charity is first deducti-
ble to the corporation and then excludable from the taxable income
of the charity. The second subsidy is not currently reflected in the
tax expenditure budget. Ironically, the first subsidy is included, but
not accurately described. When corporate giving is viewed as a
504. Obviously, charities have administrative costs associated with any fund-raising effort. In
addition, the corporation benefits from purchasing the services free of tax.
505. Non-profit organizations believe that they are under considerable pressure to be more en-
trepreneurial. See, e.g., Richard Steckel, Developing an Entrepreneurial Vision, NONPROFIT
WORLD, May-June 1993, at 20 (reporting how one charity developed a way to become self-
sufficient).
506. See supra note 490 (citing criticism of the distinction between normative adjustments and
tax expenditures).
507. See infra note 509 (discussing the unexplained failure to classify tax exeption of charitable
organizations as a tax expenditure).
508. Charitable organizations entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions under section
170(c) are exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) on income substantially re-
lated to their exempt purpose. Income generated from a trade or business regularly carried on and
not substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose is subject to unrelated business
income tax imposed under section 511, subject to certain exclusions and modifications.
509. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 181, at 219 ("U.S. tax expenditure lists have not in-
cluded any item related to non-profit, tax-exempt organizations, nor have they given any reason
for this omission. As the following analysis indicates, the U.S. tax treatment of nonprofit organiza-
tions should be classified as a tax expenditure.").
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purchase, the donee's exemption from federal income tax on the re-
ceipt of the transfer could constitute a tax expenditure. To illustrate,
assume that a corporation transfers $100x to a qualified charitable
donee in connection with a corporate sponsorship program. 1 The
corporation's after tax cost of the $100x transfer is only $65x with
the remaining $35x of the transfer representing a tax expenditure.
The donee receives $100x and is exempt from federal income tax on
that amount. The exemption produces a second tax savings of $35x
which is not reflected as a tax expenditure under traditional tax ex-
penditure theory. 51' Thus, the $100x transfer is subject to a double
tax subsidy: (1) the corporation's deduction ($35x); and (2) the do-
nee's exemption ($35x).
The second tax subsidy is easier to see when the tax treatment of
the $100x sponsorship fee is contrasted with the treatment of a
$100x corporate advertising expense. 5 2 The corporation is entitled
to deduct the advertising expense51 s and the after-tax cost of the
$100x transfer is $65x.51 Unlike the donee charitable organization,
however, the advertising agency must include the $100x in its gross
income and pay federal income tax on that amount, subject to al-
lowable deductions, at its top marginal rate of tax.
The recharacterization of the corporate charitable deduction as a
normative adjustment shifts attention to the unacknowledged tax
expenditure enjoyed by the charitable donee. Even if one accepts the
classification of the charitable exemption as a normative feature, 15
the exemption from federal income tax only applies to amounts sub-
stantially related to the performance of the organization's exempt
function.516 An otherwise "exempt" organization is subject to unre-
510. For a discussion of corporate sponsorship of charitable causes and events, see supra notes
333-43 and accompanying text.
511. SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 181, at 219.
512. See supra notes 333-91 and accompanying text (discussing the similarity between corpo-
rate charitable contributions and advertising costs).
513. Generally, advertising expenses are immediately deductible from gross income under sec-
tion 162. For a comparison of immediately deductible advertising expenses to capital expenditures,
see supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
514. Ordinary and necessary business expenses deductible under section 162 are considered a
normative adjustment and not a tax expenditure. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1994).
515. Contra SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 181, at 219-20 (arguing forcefully that tax
exemption for non-profits should be included in tax expenditures).
516. Relatedness is defined within the context of being "substantially" related where the facts
and circumstances of each activity considered for tax-exemption must meet a two prong test: (1)
there must be a link between the business activity of the company and the tax exemption the
company is seeking; and, (2) the tax exempt activity must contribute "importantly" to the funda-
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lated business income tax"' on income from a trade or business,
regularly carried on, and not substantially related to its exempt pur-
pose. 18 The initial question is whether the provision of advertising
services or public relations services constitutes an unrelated trade or
business.519 If so, then a specific exemption for amounts received in
exchange for the performance of such services warrants review as a
tax expenditure because it is not simply a normative adjustment to
unrelated business income.2 0
The existence of a federal subsidy for the provision of corporate
advertising and public relations services by a charitable organization
raises serious questions of equity and efficiency. For example, such a
subsidy permits the charitable organization a considerable advan-
tage over a commercial advertising firm because the charity oper-
ates free of tax.521 This presents the very type of unfair competition
that the unrelated business income tax was designed to prevent.5 22
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion amply shows, corporate charitable
giving is big business. Each year, corporations transfer billions of
mental business of the company, including the gross income earned by the activity (the IRS
closely scrutinizes how much income is earned, i.e. not too much and not too little). HoPKINS,
supra note 61, at 719-24. Where a tax-exempt organization was established to provide therapeutic
services for emotionally disturbed adolescents and the organization had the adolescents staff a
retail grocery store in order to stabilize their emotional rehabilitation through public exposure, the
IRS found this activity met its criteria for tax-exemption. Id. at 721 (citing Rev. Rul. 76-94,
1976-1 C.B. 171).
517. I.R.C. § 511 (a)(1) imposes tax on the unrelated business taxable income at the corporate
rate imposed under section 11. I.R.C. § 511 (a)(l) (West Supp. 1994).
518. I.R.C. § 513(a) defines unrelated trade or business as:
"[A]ny trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from
the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits
derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educa-
tional, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption. ...
Id. § 513(a) (West 1994).
519. See supra notes 333-409 and accompanying text (discussing corporate giving as a form of
advertising and public relations).
520. An organization is entitled to reduce its unrelated business income by any otherwise allow-
able deduction which is directly connected to the trade or business. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1994). In addition, various items are specifically excluded from unrelated business income,
including certain investment income, rents, and royalties. Id. § 512(b)(l)-(3).
521. See supra notes 386-91 and accompanying text (discussing how the exemption of corpo-
rate sponsorship payments from UBIT unfairly disadvantages commercial advertising agencies).
522. See supra text accompanying notes 388-91 (arguing for the inclusion of sponsorship pay-
ments in the unrelated business income of charities).
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dollars to charitable organizations. 2 Corporate managers and fun-
draisers find nothing mysterious or paradoxical about the popularity
of corporate transfers to charity. Associating the corporate name
with a charity or charitable cause is good for the corporate image
and at some point what is good for the corporate image is good for
the corporate bottom line.52 4 As the title of one marketing text
promises, corporate giving means "doing best by doing good. 525
Traditional legal scholarship, however, has not asked corporate
managers what motivates them to authorize transfers to charitable
organizations. Instead, legal scholarship begins with a false assump-
tion. It accepts that corporate giving involves the transfer of corpo-
rate assets to charity without the expectation of a commensurate
benefit. The presumed absence of a quid pro quo relationship then
propels commentators to analyze the practice of corporate giving in
light of various theories of corporate purpose and tax policy consid-
erations.526 Both approaches miss the point of corporate giving - to
enhance the corporate bottom line. Socially responsible behavior has
become profitable. 27 The corporate theory analysis asks whether
disinterested corporate giving is consistent with the purpose of the
corporation. The answer to that question depends on which theory of
corporate purpose one adopts.528 The profit maximization model of
the corporation has no room for corporate generosity (i.e., giving
away corporate assets without receiving a commensurate benefit in
return). Such corporate altruism is antithetical to a corporate pur-
pose dedicated to maximize shareholder profit and gain. On the
other hand, the social responsibility model of corporate purpose ap-
proves of disinterested corporate giving as an integral part of corpo-
rate activities.
The tax policy approach accepts the distinction in the Internal
Revenue Code between corporate transfers to charitable organiza-
523. In 1992, corporations transferred $6 billion to charitable organizations. See supra note 1
and accompanying text. For a discussion of charitable giving statistics, see supra notes 59-72 and
accompanying text.
524. See supra notes 300-18 and accompanying text (discussing the perceived business benefits
of corporate giving).
525. SIMON & STECKEL, supra note 7.
526. In 1992, corporations transferred $6 billion to charitable organizations. See supra note 1
and accompanying text.
527. The proliferation of cause-related marketing and corporate sponsorship are but two exam-
ples of this growing trend. See supra notes 355-91 and accompanying text.
528. For a discussion of the theory of corporate purpose and the history of corporate giving, see
supra notes 73-152 and accompanying text.
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tions without the expectation of a commensurate benefit in return
and all other corporate transfers to charity. It explains that the
only reason corporations give to charity is to realize certain tax ben-
efits.5 30 The tax benefit provides the tangible benefit missing due to
the lack of quid pro quo. It becomes the motivating force behind
corporate giving. As explained, tax considerations only affect the
cost of the transfer and a corporate transfer to charity will never
result in a net benefit to the corporate donor. 1
It is not clear why legal scholarship has failed to take into ac-
count the common understanding of a practice it purports to ana-
lyze. A possible explanation lies in the dual view of corporate trans-
fers to charity pronounced by the Internal Revenue Code. The
corporate charitable contribution deduction under section 170 very
clearly envisions a disinterested corporate transfer to charity" 2 and
section 162(b)53 8 goes to great lengths to describe how to distinguish
such a true corporate contribution from all other corporate trans-
fers. This bifurcated construction of corporate giving undoubtedly
influences the ability of legal commentators to conceptualize corpo-
rate giving.
The codification of the distinction between disinterested corporate
giving and all other types of giving was the result of certain histori-
cal and intellectual forces surrounding the original enactment of the
corporate charitable contribution deduction.53 4 This does not explain
why the notions of corporate altruism and social responsibility fac-
tored so heavily in the 1981 debate concerning the liberalization of
the corporate charitable contribution deduction.5 35  Almost fifty
years after the enactment, the federal government continues to ap-
peal to the corporate "conscience" in an effort to raise nontax reve-
nue.53 6 One explanation is that the federal government has become
529. See supra notes 225-237 and accompanying text (discussing the overlap between section
170 and 162).
530. See supra note 273.
531. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (discussing the favorable tax treatment
afforded certain contributions of inventory).
532. For a discussion of the requirements for the corporate charitable contribution deduction,
see supra notes 182-224 and accompanying text.
533. For a discussion of the determination of which transfers constitute business expenses, see
supra notes 225-51 and accompanying text.
534. For a discussion of the historical context of the 1935 enactment of the deduction, see
supra notes 73-128 and accompanying text.
535. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (discussing the 1981 debate).
536. See supra notes 415-19 and accompanying text (discussing President Bush's New Ameri-
can Schools Development Corporation).
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accustomed to using the rhetorical force of social responsibility in its
attempt to attract corporate funding for various social programs.
Whenever the federal government employs the language of social
responsibility, however, it helps perpetuate the myth of corporate
altruism.
The myth of corporate generosity produces the "halo effect"
which in turn enhances the benefit a corporation receives from
transfers to charity. 37 Marketing texts explain that the "halo ef-
fect" is the reason that corporate transfers to charity are so cost
effective, resulting in some cases in "more bang for your buck." 8
In short, the "halo effect"' permits corporate managers to choose be-
tween giving $100 to a for-profit advertising agency or $50 (or less)
to the friendly neighborhood charity.
The disjunction between the practice of corporate giving and the
way such behavior is understood in legal scholarship has an effect
beyond simply the production of a body of scholarly work unrelated
to the practice it purports to explain. It also influences the federal
budget tax expenditure analysis. 39 The current tax expenditure for
the corporate charitable contribution deduction is based on a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the nature of corporate giving. One way
to unravel this misunderstanding is to repeal the section 170 corpo-
rate contribution deduction.
Once the section 170 corporate charitable contribution deduction
is repealed, a corporate transfer to charity is treated like any other
corporate transfer and any deduction available for a corporate
transfers to charity is no longer a tax expenditure. ' ° Thus, the mis-
understanding appears to have produced no harm.
This conclusion is too simplistic. The effort to understand the mo-
tivation of the corporate donor, overlooks the role of the charity -
the recipient.5 "4 Generally, a qualified charitable organization is ex-
empt from tax on income related to its exempt purpose. If a corpo-
rate transfer to charity is the equivalent of the purchase of advertis-
ing or goodwill, then the receipt of such transfers should not be
537. See supra notes 319-32 and accompanying text (discussing the "halo effect").
538. See supra notes 387-91 and accompanying text (discussing the John Hancock sponsorship
of the Cotton Bowl).
539. See supra notes 488-522 and accompanying text (discussing tax expenditure theory).
540. See supra note 496 and accompanying text (discussing the relative benefits of the charita-
ble contributions deduction and the business expense deduction).
541. See supra notes 512-22 and accompanying text (discussing corporate sponsorship and ad-
vertising expenses).
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exempt from tax because the provision of advertising services and
the sale of goodwill is not substantially related to any exempt pur-
pose under Section 501(c)(3). Therefore, the exemption of such re-
ceipts is a non-normative adjustment that must be identified as a tax
expenditure. This requires the focus to shift to the recipient of the
transfer - the charitable donee.
This hidden subsidy for transfers to charity must be addressed in
the same terms used by corporate managers and fundraisers. The
question then becomes whether the federal government should subsi-
dize the sale of charitable goodwill by charitable organizations to
corporate purchasers. The policy underlying the unrelated business
income tax (i.e., elimination of unfair competition) suggests very
strongly that the answer should be "no." The receipt of $6 billion a
year in exchange for providing certain promotion activities free of
tax places the charitable recipient at an immediate advantage over
for-profit entities.542 In fact the Internal Revenue Service reached
exactly that conclusion in the case of corporate sponsorship pay-
ments, but pressure from the exempt community resulted in a rever-
sal of its decision.5 43
A meaningful debate concerning the exemption of the receipt of
corporate transfers to charity can proceed only if corporate giving is
recast as the corporate purchase of advertising services or goodwill.
The existence of UBIT does not foreclose discussion because federal
policy objectives to encourage direct corporate funding to a statuto-
rily-defined group of organizations could override the policy objec-
tive of the UBIT unfair competition safeguards. Whatever the re-
sult, the debate must take place with as much information of the
practice to be subsidized as possible. Society cannot choose to subsi-
dize that which it cannot describe.
542. See supra note 388.
543. See supra notes 367-91 and accompanying text.
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